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Dr. C R E E D'S
Voluminous Defence
O F
Dr. HAMMOND'S
EKTENE' ΣTEPON
Briefly
EXAMINED,

And
The weaknesse thereof fully
discovered.

By HENRY FEARNES.

L O N D O N,

Printed for Edward Brewster at the Signe of
the Crane in Saint Pauls-Church-yard, 1661.

Dr. C R E D 2

Voluminous Defence

O F

Dr. H A M M O N D S

EXAMINED

By

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The work itself is of full
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BY HENRY BATES

LONDON

Printed for Edward Bouverie at the Sign of
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Dr. C R E E D ' S Defence
O F
Dr. HAMMOND ' S ' E K T E N E S T E P O N ,
E X A M I N E D .

I Shall premise three things touching this doughty Work of Dr. *Creeds*.

The first shall be, concerning the *Insolent* and *Scurrilous Incivilities* wherewith it is every where fraught. And it is to acquaint the Reader, That I shall not honour them so much as to take a distinct and particular notice of them, for they are so gross, as that they carry their condemnation in their forehead. Indeed I have not heard of any wise, sober and moderate man, shough of the *Doctors* perswasion in other particulars, that hath made the least Apology for them, when they have been told how he hath in them trespassed against all good manners. I shall therefore leave them unto his *Romance* Readers, who are so much taken with their gaudy language, and for the Meridian of whose soft understandings they were especially calculated, and they shall have my fair leave to make themselves as merry with them, as they please: their mirth may stir my pity, but it shall have no influence upon either my anger or envy.

The second shall be concerning the wonderful *prolixity* thereof, occasioned by his frequent extravagancies or out-leaps, his numerous, but impertinent *Quotations*, his frivolous *Objections*, in all which should I follow him, the bulk of my Book would be so swell'd thereby as that all Readers would be frighted from the perusal thereof. In fa-

Dr. Creed's defence of Dr. H. *Examiner examined.*

vor therefore to the Reader, I shall pass by most of these with a just and deserved neglect, and select only such passages to be examined, which those learned and judicious friends whom I have consulted, have judged most material and important.

A third thing shall be concerning the sense of Doctor Hammond in the controversy. He never asserts (saith the Defendant) that the self same numerical act of holy love in Christ was more intense at one time then at another: but onely that one act of his love of God compared with another, was more high and intense then another. pag. 22, 23, 63, 64, 126. Also this I shall readily agree; neither know I any reason, that he hath to charge me for dissenting herein.

About the state of the Question he objecteth, (pag. 17, 47.) that the terms of the Question are much altered from what they were at the first. Saith he, This Refuter charged the Doctor with a direct and flat denial of the all-futness of habitual grace in Christ, and now it is onely by consequence. To prove the notorious falshood of this crimination, I shall onely refer the Reader unto pag. 258, 259. of my Mixture, for there he may see, that by Daniel Leclat deduce my charge from the Doctors words; and the validity of this deduction I have made good against Doctor Hammond, and shall further clear against this our Defendant, by discovering the vanity of all subterfuges, that he hath, to evade the force of my argumentation.

They are in number four.

When the Doctor saith that the acts of Christ's love of God are capable of degrees, and sometimes more heightned, more ardent and intense then at other times, or in other acts.

1. He speaks by a Metonymie of the effect, or Synecdoche generis, and not of the love of God properly and formally taken.

2. He is not to be understood of those acts of love of God that are immediately terminated on God the onely good; but of those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake.

3. By the actual love of God he understands (saith he) not the action of loving; but the term of that action, a quality produced thereby, which for want of words is called love.

4. By the actual love of God he understands not that which agreeth to him as *Comprehensor*; and was a sequel of the beatificall vision; but that which belonged to him as he was *Patior*; and arose from the infused knowledge of God, and the infused habit of Divine charity.

Having thus propounded the evasions of the Defendant in General, I shall take a distinct and severall survey of them.

The first is pag. 5, 6, 217, 235, 255, 260, and 215. That when Doctor Hammond saith that the acts of Christ's love of God, or holy charity, are capable of degrees, and sometimes more heightned more

Dr. H. to be understood of God's Love properly taken, &c.

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more ardent and intense then at other times, or in other acts; he speaks by a *Metonymie* of the *effect*; or *Synecdoche generis*, and not of the *love* of God properly and formally taken.

But that Dr. Hammond is to be understood of *love properly and formally taken*; when he asserts a greater ardency in Christ's love of God at one time, then another, is as clear as the Sun, from *sect. 22.* of his '*Expositio*'. For there he saith, that love as a *genus* is predicated of that love which he speaks of. Now the *genus* is predicated properly and formally of it's *species*, for 'tis predicated thereof in *primo modo dicendi per se*.

But perhaps you may say, that though the love which Dr. Hammond speaks of, be *love properly and formally taken*, yet 'tis called the love of God only tropically.

Unto this I Reply,

I. That Christ's love, which Dr. Hammond saith, is capable of degrees, &c. is that very love which is commanded *Deut. 6. 5.* a love of God with all the soul, heart, might, and strength, &c. and that is a love proper and peculiar unto God, and not to be communicated unto any creature. And, pray Sir, is not this that high, and transcendent act of Divine love you speak of *pag. 5.* whereby the soul is immediately fixed, and knit to God as the only good? and then with what face can you deny it to be the love of God properly and formally taken? But however, the poor Refuter must be condemned *lege falsarii* (*pag. 5.*) right or wrong. For whereas Doctor Hammond spake expressly of Christ's love of God, the Refuter is so dull and simple an Animal, as to understand him of his love of the Creator, whereas alas, Doctor Hammond had a profounder conceit, which is highly rational in it self, and is to be interpreted concerning his love of the Creature. And this is enough to clear me from the crime of Forgery, with which this shamelesse Defendant aspereth me.

But his Calumny will be the more apparent if we insist upon those two Tropes, One of which he sayes the Doctor makes use of.

The first is the *Metonymie* of the *effect*, and that is when the *effect* is put for the *efficient*. Now do not you by your Discourse plainly insinuate, that the *efficient* is here taken for the *effect*; the love of God, for the *issues and effects* of the love of God. If there were then a *Metonymie* in Doctor Hammond's words, it was by you a *Metonymie* of the *efficient*, and not of the *effect*. And indeed you tell us, *pag. 217.* that all the acts of piety, and mercy, and charity, and vertue, are called the love of God by a *Metonymie* of the *efficient*, because they flow from it. And either this is a flat contradiction to what you here say, or else the *Metonymie* of the *efficient* and of the *effect* must be confounded, and be all one.

But secondly, Dr. Hammond doth not make use of any *Metonymie* at

Dr. H. to be understood of Gods love properly taken, &c.

all, either of the *efficient*, or of the *effect*. For that which is termed the love of God only *Metonymically*, is so called only *equivocally*, and that the love of God is here taken by the *Deffor*, for that which is so styled only *equivocally*, you dare not aver; for that which is *predicated* of a thing *equivocally*, may in *propriety* of speech be *denied* of it: that which is the love of God only *equivocally*, may be said *not to be* the love of God.

But you may perhaps say that he speaks, if not by a *Metonymy* of the *effect*, yet by a *Synecdoche generis*.

But *Synecdoche generis* (as *Vossius*, *Aristot* and other *Rhetoricians* have taught me) is when the *genus* is put for the *species*, as creature for man *Mark 16.15*. But how the love of God is here by *Dr. H.* taken for any of its *species*, passeth my dull imagination. I shall not therefore adventure so much as to guess at your meaning, but patiently wait for your own *Learned* *Explication* of it.

And thus the Reader sees, how this first *Evasion*, that *Dr. Hammond* speaks of the love of God only as 'tis taken *tropically*, by a *Metonymy* of the *Effect*, or by a *Synecdoche generis*, fails against both *Logick* and *Rhetorick*.

But it may be objected, from *pag. 6*. That *Christs* love of God which *Dr. Hammond* speaks of, is his prayer unto God: now prayer is properly an act of Religion and Devotion towards God; and improperly and figuratively an act of holy Charity or divine Love.

For answer

1 Though Prayer considered *formally* in it self, be an act of divine Love only *improperly*, and figuratively, yet it implieth the love of God properly and *formally* taken; and 'tis undeniable, that *Dr. H.* speaketh of Prayer under this consideration, as implying the love of God properly and *formally* such; for he bringeth *Christs* praying more earnestly, as a proof to make good his exposition of those words, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy soul, heart, might and strength*, where the love of God is taken properly and *formally*. Now of this exposition it can be no confirmation, if the *Doffor* do not consider *Christs* prayer, as implying his love of God properly and *formally* taken.

Though Prayer considered *formally* in it self be not properly an act of divine love, but only *impliedly*, viz. *prepositivè* and *concomitanter*, yet the reason which the *Defendant* brings for the confirmation of this, because 'tis properly and *formally* an act of Religion, is very questionable. For

2 According to the language of *Protestant Divines*, one and the same Act may properly be an act of both Religion and holy charity too; for they take Religion in so large a sense, as that it comprehends all duties of the first Table. Thus *Ames* makes all parts of *Gods worship* both *natural* and *instituted* to be parts of Religion. Now if this acception of Religion be proper, it will not be material, though it be somewhat different from that of the *Schoolmen*.

Dr. H. understands those acts of love y^e are terminated on G.

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2 But proceed we unto his *Second Exposition*, which differs little from the former; if at all, but in terms, and 'tis concerning the acts of Christs love of God. These, saith the Defendant, are of two sorts: 1 Those that are immediately terminated on God the only good. 2 Those that are immediately terminated on us men for Gods sake, in whose love as the prime act they are all radicated and founded; the one the Schooles call *charitas ut finis*; the other they call *charitas propter finem*. Though then the acts of Christs love, as immediately terminated on God, were always at the height and one equal perfection (as was never y^t questioned or denyed by the Doctor) yet this nothing hinders but that the other acts of this love (of which alone the Doctor speaks) regarding us for Gods sake, might consist in a latitude, and gradually differ from one another, and fall short of the fervour of those acts that immediately respected God, &c. See pag. 335, 22, 70, 71, 216, &c. usque ad 248, 279. usque ad 291, 318, 329, 335, 336, 338, 343, 361, 372, 373, 516, &c.

Well then, the great mistake of the Refuter is, That whereas Dr. Hammond speaks expressly of Christs actual love of God the Creator, and yet meant thereby his actual love of man a creature, the Refuter was such a dull Block-head, as not to reach this hidden and invisible meaning of Dr. Hammond.

But first, if this were a mistake, it should not (me thinks) be so criminalous and unpardonable; For

First, The Refuter in his exposition of the actual love of God went by that common rule, *Analogum per se positum stat pro favorabili analogato*; If a word hath two significations, one proper, another improper and tropicall, it must be taken properly if it be put by it self and have nothing added to determine and carry it unto an improper and tropicall sense. Now the actual love of God is taken properly only of those acts that are terminated immediately unto God, and all those that are terminated unto us men for Gods sake, are termed the love of God only improperly, and by a trope; and Dr. Hammond speaks absolutely of the actual love of God, and hath nothing to restrain his speech unto the latter sort of acts; and therefore he is to be understood of the former, those that are immediately terminated on God.

Secondly, If this were a mistake, it had been an easie matter for Dr. Hammond to have prevented it in his *Exposition*, by a clear and distinct explication of his meaning: but he hath not done this, and therefore if the Refuter be to be blamed, Dr. Hammond cannot be altogether excused.

But I deny that I am guilty of any such mistake as is imputed to me. For that Christs actual love of God in Dr. Hammond cannot rationally be understood of all those acts of love that were immediately terminated on us men, all duties of the Second Table, &c. I shall prove by an Argument drawn from the Relation that Dr. Hammonds discourse concerning Christs actual love of God, &c. hath to the Commandment Deut. 6. 5. *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and*
with

Dr. H. understands by the Acts of Christ's Love of God, with all thy soul, and with all thy might. It is brought as an *Exemplification* and proof of his interpretation thereof; and therefore this actual love of God in Christ, must be the same with that love of God which is there commanded. Now that love of God which is there commanded, is that only which is immediately terminated on God. For,

1. It must be with all the heart, soul, might, and strength: and the Acts of love that are terminated unto the creature immediately, cannot be performed in such an intension without gross and palpable Idolatry.

2. The love of God here commanded, is by our Saviour himself distinguished from the love of our neighbour, and of our selves, and consequently 'tis restrained unto the love of God, which is terminated immediately upon God. Jesus saith, *The great Commandment in the Law is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, this is the first and great Commandment; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self*, Matth. 22. vers. 36, 37, 38, 39. Here these two Commandments, are the two Summaries of the Commandments of both Tables: And seeing they are distinguished by our Saviour himself, we must not make any confusion betwixt them. But they are confounded when the duties of the second Table, or this Commandment, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self*, are ranged under the first Table; Or this Commandment, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, soul, might, and strength*. Now those acts of charity that are immediately terminated unto us men for Gods sake, are all Duties of the second Table, and belong unto that Commandment, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self*.

3. Unto this let me adde a third Argument (which may be reduced unto the first) taken from the second Part of Doctor Hammond's Exposition of the place, and thus it stands; That act of the love of God which transcends all those acts of love that are immediately terminated on the creature, is that high act of the love of God, which is immediately fixed and terminated on God, as the only good. But the act of the love of God which is commanded *Deut. 6. 5.* transcends all those acts of love, which are immediately terminated on the creature: Therefore 'tis that act of the love of God, which is terminated and fixed immediately on God himself, as the only good.

The Major is undeniable, and if the Minor be not Doctor Hammond's own, let the Defendant expound unto us these words of his, *That Phrase thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul; denoteth secondly, the loving him above all other things, and not admitting any thing into competition with him, not loving any thing else in such a degree.*

those that are immediately terminated on God himself.

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This argument may briefly be thus also varied. No acts of the love of God, that are *superiour* unto those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake, can be *those very acts* that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake; for *one and the same thing cannot be superiour unto it self*. But those acts of the love of God that are commanded *Deut. 6. 5.* are superiour unto those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake, and so much is evident by *Dr. Hammond's* exposition of the place: And therefore those acts of the love of God, that are commanded *Deut. 6. 5.* are not those that are immediately terminated on us men for God's sake.

But suppose that *Dr. Hammond* spake of those acts of holy charity, that are terminated on us men for Gods sake: yet by what the *Defendant* saith, it will be no injustice to think, that he speaks of those acts under this *reduplication*, as terminated immediately on God himself. For by the *Defendants* opinions, *pag. 234, 235.* holy charity and it's acts, are terminated unto us *men* for God's sake, onely as a *material object*, and unto God's infinite goodns alone, as the *formal object*. Now things are rather denominated from that which agreeth unto them formally, then from that which is ascribed unto them onely materially, for *denominatio fit à posteriori*. Now those acts of charity that are terminated unto us men, considered as terminated on God as their formal object, ought to be in all, and were in Christ alwayes at the heights, and one equal perfection.

Our *Defendant* himself confesses, *pag. 217.* that to *English* ears, this phrase, the love of God, seems especially to import the prime and more principal love that hath God for its immediate Object: but then withal he adds, that in Scripture phrase it frequently does not.

The first place he quotes, is *Luk. 11. 42.* *Wo unto you Pharisees,* (saith our Saviour) *for ye tythe mint, and rue, and all manner of herbs, and passe over judgement, and the love of God: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.* But this place he confesseth to be otherwise expounded by divers, and we have (saith he) no need of doubtfull places. But 'tis without doubt, that the love of God is not there taken in such a latitude or amplitude, as to contain the whole duty of man towards God and our neighbour: for 'tis distinguished from judgement, and that compriseth, if not all, yet a great part of our duty towards our neighbour.

But the *Defendant* in the next place alledgeth instances out of the first Epistle of *St. John*, that are (he saith) beyond all exception.

The first instance, is *1 John 2. 5.* *But who so keepeth his words in him verily is the love of God perfected: hereby know we that we are in him.* But to prove the impertinency of this place, we

we

Dr. H. understands by the acts of Christ's Love of God,

we need go no further then Dr. Hammond's Paraphrase of it. But the observing his commands, is the only sure argument, that he that doth so, is a perfect lover of God, truly so called (the appellation being falsely assumed by the Gnosticks) and an argument of evidence to himself, that he is a branch, a member of Christ, as the Gnosticks boast that they are, and that whatsoever they do, it cannot make them cease to be so. The observing of God's commandments is an argument of the perfect love of God, but it doth not therefore follow, that it is the love of God itself.

The two next places, the 1 Job. 3. 17. 1 Job. 4. 20. every rational Reader will judge wide from the mark. For the utmost that can be gathered from them is, that the love of God is inseparably connected with the love of our Neighbours, and hath an influence or impery upon the acts thereof. But what is all this unto the purpose?

The last place the 1 Job. 5. 3. may perhaps be thought to have some colour of an Argument, For this is the love of God, that we keep his commandments.

Here 'tis plain, that the Apostles speech is to be understood *Metonymically*, and the meaning of it is, that the love of God is the cause of the keeping his commandments, and the keeping of God's commandments is an inseparable effect, or fruit of the love of God. This meaning of the place is excellently laid down by *Estius*; *Sensus idcirco adjecti de mandatis ejus servandis: quia diligere Deum, per consequentia rationem est mandata ejus servare. Charitas si quidem erga Deum, ait Capitanus, ratio est servandis mandata ejus. Unde quamvis preceptum diligendi Deum, ab aliis ejus preceptis diversum sit: quicumque tamen hoc dilectionis servat preceptum, ex ea dilectione etiam cetera Dei precepta servat, ut quorum observatio ex dilectione Dei necessario dependeat, ac sequatur tanquam effectus ex propria causa. Quod etiam significant illa Christi verba Joan. 14. Qui habet mandata mea, & servat ea: ille est qui diligit me. Et iterum: Si quis diligit me: sermonem meum servabit. Et ca. 15. Vos amicos mei estis, si feceritis quae ego precipio vobis. Simile est huius loco quod supra capite 2. dixit Joannes: Qui servat verbum ejus: verè in hoc charitas Dei perfecta est.* By what hath been said, the Reader may perhaps think that this place seems to be very advantageous for the Defendants turn.

But upon more serious consideration it will be found to do him no service at all: For,

First, though there be a *Metonymy* in the Apostles word, yet it lieth not in the love of God: the *Metonymy* is in the *predicate*, and not in the *subject* of the Proposition; and the love of God is the *subject* of the Proposition, as is evident from the prefixing of the Greek article *ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸ Θεόν*, and there is nothing hind'eth, but that it may be taken in the greatest propriety, onely the *predicate* (this, that we keep the commandments of God) is affirmed of it *Metonymically*.

Secondly, it is plain, that in S. John's words there is a *causal predicate*.

predication * for the love of God is the keeping of his Commandments, (a) Prædication not formally, but causally, that is, 'tis the cause of keeping Gods Com-^{improperia car-} mandements. Now every one knows, that in a ^{causal} predication there *salis est, quæ* is ever a Metonymy of either the efficient or effect. But now in this unum extre-
propofition, one act of Christs love of God was more intense then ^{ad-} ^{alium} alteri ad
ther, which the Defendant confesseth to be the sense of Doctor Ham-^{ejus causam de-} mond; there is no causal predication, nor any footstep of any other signandam non
argument, from which a man may logically conclude a Metonymy. ^{repugnante lo-}

^{quendi consue-}
tudine conjungitur, e.g. *Ira est fervor sanguinis circa cor, est oratio vera sensu causali. Nec
anim ira, quæ est affectio animi, proprie loquendo est fervor seu ebullitio, sed existit ex illâ
ebullitione, & ebullitio illa existit ex irâ, sed diversa respectu. Huc refer & illa: hic
bolus est mihi mors, hoc est mortifer. Alsted.*

Now, thirdly, if any Argument can be drawn from coherence, it is
(as I have already shewen) evident that Dr. Hammond cannot be un-
derstood of the love of God in a Metonymical acception, for he speaks
of the same love of God that is commanded, *Deut. 6. 5.* and that is un-
deniably the love of God properly taken.

In the next place, pag. 219; 220; &c. Usq; ad 227. the Defendant
endeavourerh to prove by arguments from the Doctors writings, that he
takes the love of God in such a large sense, as to take in all duties to
our neighbour. The weakness of which arguments it were an easie
matter to discover, if it were worth the while: but indeed we may justly
despise them, for it being cleared that Dr. Hammond cannot rationally
be understood of any other love of God, but that which is immediately
terminated on God himself; if they prove anything they will conclude
that the Dr. contradicts himself and that is a matter wherein I that am
none of his Followers, am no ways concerned.

Once it is very apparent, that this large acception of the love of God is
very *Catachrestical*, for according to it the lowest and meanest acts of both
Charity and Justice towards our neighbour (even the *Hanmans* consci-
entious performance of his Office) may be termed the love of God: and
most men would judge this to be an unfavourable expression; it would
sound very harshly unto not only *English* but all *Christian* ears. And
whether to harm a *Catachrestis* be to be tolerated in *Controversial* writings
may justly be doubted: If Dr. Hammonds cause then cannot be upheld,
but by stretching both a *Catachrestical* and *abusive* acception of the love
of God, it is a little strange, that 'tis in a veryattering, if not desperate
condition.

From what hath been said, the Reader may furnish himself with an
answer unto the greatest part of the book: But more particularly
unto two of those arguments, which the Defendant brings to make good
this assertion, that there is and must be in Christ, a gradual difference
in respect of the fervency of the habit of the love of God. As for
the

Dr. H. understands by the Acts of Christ's Love of God,

the third argument, p. 244. the confirmation of it may more fitly be as-
ferred unto a more proper place.

The first argument he prosecutes from p. 227 *usq;* ad. 236. and 'tis by
him thus summed up, p. 227, 228. "Where there is, and of necessity
"must be, a gradual difference, and more in respect of the goodness of
"the Objects of the habit of charity, or the law of God, there is, and
"of necessity there must be also a gradual difference in respect of the se-
"veral acts of this habit of charity, or the love of God. But there
"is and must be a gradual difference, and more in respect of the
"goodness of the objects of the habit of charity, or the love of
"God in Christ. Therefore there is, and must be, a gradual difference
"in respect of the several acts of this habit of charity, or the love of
"God in Christ.

In the Argument there is committed that fallacy which is termed *fal-
lacia ignorationis Elencbi*; for, the conclusion takes the acts of the love
of God in Christ in such a latitude, as to comprehend those acts of
love which were terminated unto man; Whereas Dr. H. and the Refu-
ter are to be understood (as hath been shewn) only concerning those
acts of the love of God, which are terminated on God himself: and be-
tween these there is no gradual difference, for they have one Object
alone, Gods infinite goodness in himself.

Unto this we may add *ex abundanti* unto the Minor, that the pretended
difference betwixt the Objects of the love of God in Christ, is by the
Defendants opinion, only as touching the *material objects* thereof; for the
formal object or reason is asserted by him to be still one and the same;
and hereupon 'twill follow, that the acts of Christs love of God are *for-
mally* the same, and consequently the acts of this love which have their
specification from their objects, are, by his opinion, *formally* the same too;
and the *formal consideration* of things is *chiefest* and most to be heeded.

These answers might easily have been foreseen, but instead of them
the Defendant falls to his conjectures, p. 232, 233. "There can (saith
"he) be but two things possible (as far as I can foresee) returned in an-
"swer to this discourse. First, that it is not one and the same habit of
"charity, whereby we love God and our neighbours as our selves; and
"and therefore as the precepts are several, so the objects are divers; and
"the affections of the soul, that carry it on to the love of God, and our
"neighbour, are as different as the Objects themselves are. And there-
"fore though it be granted that the several acts that flow from these
"severally distinct habits, do gradually differ in themselves in respect of
"intensity, according to the gradual distance of goodness in the ob-
"ject; yet it follows not, that therefore the acts of one and altogether
"the same habit of charity and holy love, do gradually differ also;
"which was the thing to be proved.

Secondly, Though it were granted, that the habit of charity and holy
love to God, and our neighbours, be one and the same habit, yet a gradual
difference in the goodness of the objects of this love will not argue a gradual
dif-

those that are immediately terminated on God himself.
difference of intenseness in the inward acts of this love, but only in the outward acts and expressions.

These answers are none of mine, but the groundless fictions of the Defendant, and therefore I may justly pass them over in silence.

But yet unto the first I shall say something, because it affords occasion of some discourse that may be acceptable unto the Reader.

First, Scotus resolves indeeds, with Aquinas, that *eodem habitu diligimus Deum, & proximum*; but then scripto Parisensi in 3.^m sent. dist. 28. he determines that *diligere proximum* is *velle eum condiligere Deum*. Dico, quod *eodem habitu diligimus Deum & proximum, quia eodem actu volo vel diligo Deum in se, & volo proximum Deum in se diligere, perfecte autem amans, dilectum vult diligi, & Deus, qui est bonum commune non vult esse bonum particulare, ideo habens habitum talem, cujus actus precipitur in communi, quod possibile est fieri, potest diligere Deum, & proximum velle Deum diligere, quia eodem habitu possum tendere in obiectum, & reflecti super illud, ergo eadem charitate possum diligere Deum, & velle proximum diligere Deum: & hoc est diligere proximum, quod est respectu honesti. Quod probatur ex hoc, quod ista duo, sc. aliquid velle, & diligere, sunt ejusdem rationis. To love our Neighbour, is to will, that together with us he should love God. Scotus then doth not take the love of our Neighbour in such a latitude as the Defendant, but far more restrainedly.*

Secondly, If Aquinas his opinion be, that the habitual love of God, and the habitual love of our neighbour be one simple and indivisible habit, one *specie infima*, then his opinion may be impugned by two arguments, in the solution of which the Defendant may do well to take some pains.

The 1. argument is because the habitual love of God is or ought to be more intense then the habitual love of our Neighbour: and this inequality is an argument of a real essential, and consequently specifical distinction. For it cannot be numerical, because *duo accidentia, numero tantum diversa, non possunt esse in eodem subiecto simul*.

Secondly, If the habitual love of God, and the habitual love of our Neighbour were one and the same specifically, then the acts of love that are terminated to our Neighbour, all Duties of the Second Table would be *elicite* acts of the habitual love of God; whereas 'tis evident, they are only *imperate* acts thereof.

But the Defendant objects, pag. 233, 234. That God and our Neighbour, are beloved for one and the same formal reason or object, and therefore the habit of Divine love towards them must be one and the same.

Unto this it may be answered.

First, That the love of God, and the love of our Neighbour, have one *formal ultimate object or motive*. Yet their *formal immediate objects* may be different. The *formal object or motive* of our love of God is his infinite Goodness, considered as it is in himself, and the immediate formal object

object of our love of our Neighbour, is the Goodness of God common to us, and shining in, our Neighbour.

Secondly, though the formal object be one and the same, yet the application thereof, and the way of tendency thereunto, is far different. For 'tis applied unto God intrinsically, unto our Neighbour extrinsically: Unto God as the end, unto our Neighbour as the means. And therefore our love of God is called *Charitas finis*, and the love of our Neighbour *Charitas propter finem*. To clear this, I shall quote the words of Suarez, Metaph. disp. 44. sect. 11, n. 30. *Adventendum est in omni habitu dari ex parte objecti aliquam rationem tendendi in illud, quam motuum appetendum possumus appellare, &c. habitus autem voluntatis tendunt ad prosequendum aliquod bonum: omnis autem prosequutio boni est ex aliquo motivo, seu ex aliqua ratione bonitatis, qua voluntatem attrahit. Hoc ergo motuum seu ratio tendendi, est absque dubio, quæ dat actui specificam rationem, quæ eadem erit, si equaliter aut eodem modo per actus attingatur: quia semper id, quod est formale, est quod dat speciem: materiale autem est quasi per accidens, vel individuale, respectu talis actus. Dico autem, si equaliter vel eodem modo talem rationem tendat, nam contingit unam eandem rationem tendendi non æquè applicari diversis materiis, & ideo non eodem modo attingi per actus. Ut est, v. g. bonitas divina quatenus est in Deo, & reddit illum amabilem, vel quatenus per quendam respectum applicatur proximo, ut illum etiam amabilem reddat. Nam licet illa bonitas in se una sit, non tamen illi rebus æquè convenit: Unde modus tendendi in illam non est idem. Et idem est universum de bonitate finis, respectu ipsius finis, & respectu mediorum, & de similibus, in quibus ratio tendendi alteri intrinsecè, aliis vero extrinsecè applicatur.* I confess Suarez holds, that the habitual love of God and the habitual love of our Neighbour are but one indivisible habit. But this is no hinderance, but that we may make use of his words against himself; and the rather, because what afterwards may be picked out of him in answer hereto, is very unsatisfying: I he utmost that he saith is, that there is a necessary connexion betwixt the acts of the love of God, and the love of our neighbour; he saith the same of other acts; But this connexion of the acts, doth not prove an unity of the habits. The habits may be connexed as well as the acts; and connexion, if it be real, implieth a real distinction. And 'tis very observable, that Suarez himself infers from the connexion of acts onely a possibility, not a necessity of the unity of the habits. Tandem, quando actus ipsi sunt inter se connexi, & quasi radicati in aliquo primo, tunc etiam possunt habere similem connexionem, sicutem virtutalem, in ipso habitu: ergo quantum est ex hoc capite, si aliud non obstat, poterit idem indivisibilis habitus esse principium huiusmodi actuum. Disp. & sect. prædict. n. 32. But I shall not pertinaciously contend about this matter, but leave it to the judgement of the learned Reader.

Here I shall give a little from the Defendant, to consider the opinion of some School-men who maintain, that 'tis always one and the same act whereby God and our Neighbour are loved; and they have of it a

pretty

those that are immediately terminated on God himself.

13

pretty illustration, from their tenor of Image-worship. Look (say they) as an Image and its Prototype are worshipped with one and the same worship, so God and our Neighbour are loved with one and the same act of love.

But the real distinction of the acts of the love of God and the love of our Neighbour, I shall prove from four Arguments.

1. From their separability: there may be an actual love of God, when at the same time there is *not* an actual love of our Neighbour. And so again on the other side, there may be an actual love of our Neighbour, when at the same time there is only virtual or habitual love of God: For at the same time there may not be any actual cognition of God. Now things that may really be separated, are questionless really distinguished.

2. From their inequality: The love of God ought to be more intense, then the love of our Neighbour (for it is to be with all the soul, heart, might and strength) and therefore 'tis really distinguished therefrom.

3. From the dependency of the love of our Neighbour upon the love of God: The actual love of God is the efficient cause of the actual love of our Neighbour, and the efficient and the effect are always really distinguished.

4. From this may be drawn another Argument, proceeding from the superiority of the actual love of our Neighbour, unto our actual love of God: For being the effect thereof, it must needs be after it, and that really a parte rei, and not only in regard of our consideration. Now this is an evidence of the real distinction of these acts; for if they were one and the same act really, then one and the same thing should be really both before and after it self: which is a manifest contradiction.

But I return unto our Defendant, and unto his second Argument, which he pursues very copiously p. 236, &c. usque ad 244. The sum of it is this, There are not only perfect and effectual, but also imperfect, conditionate, and uneffectual acts of Christs will, and those are gradually distinguished from these, &c.

But what of all this? it will not therefore follow, that one act of Christs love of God is more intense then another act, unless you can prove, that these imperfect and uneffectual acts of Christs will, are elicit, proper and formal acts of his love of God. This is a thing that you all along presuppose, but have not proved, nor never can prove. Not only Scholastical Divines, but all that have any moderate insight into Practical Divinity will tell you, Master Defendant, that to say that Christs actual love of God is imperfect, uneffectual, conditionate, is an ignorant, gross, and very lewd blasphemy.

I shall but remark two things more, touching this second Evation of the Defendant, and then proceed unto a third.

First, Christs actual love of God, which Dr. Hammond speaks of, is not (saith the Defendant) frequently the action of loving, but a term produced thereby: and yet he saith p. 70. that the acts of Christs love

of

By Actual Love in Dr. H. is meant the action of loving, of God, are some of them terminated immediately on God, and others of them on us men, &c. By this then it seems that the supposed utmost term of the action of loving in Christ, is terminated further unto another term, if not *effective*, yet *objective*. Now this is a very deep subtilty the clear explication and confirmation of which, we shall justly expect from the Defendant.

2. The Defendant grants, that the *outward expressions* of love, are not love *it self*, and wonders that I can be so uncharitable, as to think that Dr. Hammond was a man of so shallow and slender parts, as to take the *outward expressions* of love for love *it self*, pag. 84, 90, 95. And yet he tells us, that Dr. Hammond takes Christ's actual love of God, in such a latitude or amplitude, as that it contains the whole duty of man towards God and our Neighbour, whatsoever is good and excellent in him, pag. 216, 219, &c. Now the outward expressions of the love of God, are a part of man's duty, and therefore, by the Defendant, are the love of God in Dr. Hammond's sense of the word. How the Defendant will reconcile this, the event will shew.

But go we on unto the *third Evasion* of the Defendant. He distinguisheth of a two-fold actual love; 1. the *action* of loving; 2. the *term* of that *action*, a *quality* produced thereby, which for want of words is called *love*. Now Dr. Hammond (he saith) is to be understood of the latter, the *term*, and not of the former, the *action* of loving, p. 211, 223, 25, &c. usque ad. 42, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 211, 212, 113, 214.

But first suppose, though not grant, that there were such a *term* of the *immanent action* of loving, yet this cannot be the *actual* Divine love which Dr. H. speaks of. For,

1. The *actual love* which he speaks of, is the matter of that Commandement, Deut. 6. 5. *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, &c.* Now that the supposed term of the *immanent action* of love is not in any probability. For,

1. That is most likely to be the matter of this precept, whose being is most undeniable, and uncontroversed: but the existence of *immanent actions* is less questioned, than that of their *terms*. The *existence* of these hath been much questioned by many subtil Philosophers; and setting aside Philosophers, the most of men never so much as dreamt of them. Take ten rational and knowing men that never heard of this Question, *An omnis actio habeat terminum?* and demand of them, whether they think, that by the *immanent actions* of their senses, their understandings, and wills, they produce within themselves certain *qualities* of the same name with the *actions themselves*? and I am confident that most, if not all of them, will return a negative answer.

2. The matter of this precept, is of a very *important, general, and necessary obligation*: and therefore it must be obvious and evident unto all that have the use of their reason, so that the knowledge of it may

be gained without any great difficulty, but now the pretended terms of the action of loving, is a very dark and abstruse thing, and it will be a very difficult matter to make unlearned men understand it: Nay I believe many great Scholars are yet strangers to what the School-men say about the nature of it.

3. We may and ought to examine the sincerity of that love of God in us which is commanded *Deut. 6. 5.* But it would be new Divinity to say that we are to examine the terms of the immanent actions of divine love, whether they be in us or no: men may with some certainty review, and reflect upon the habit of love, and the immanent actions thereof; but their reflex knowledge of the terms thereof, can be but conjectural.

2. The Love of which Dr. Hammond speaks is, by the Defendant, such wherein there is exercised that freedom of the will which is usually called a freedom of indifference: But there is no freedom of the will exercised, in the supposed terms of the immanent action; for they presupposing the actions, are supposed to be necessary and unavoidable, and therefore the will hath no indifference unto them: the will indeed is a free cause of the action of loving; but this action, if it be the cause of a term, it is the natural and necessary cause thereof.

3. The term of the immanent action of loving is called love, saith the Defendant, for want of sufficient words: but to affirm this of that actual love which Dr. Hammond speaks of, is very very ridiculous. For of that love (saith he) love is predicated as a genus; and so in *primo modo dicendi per se*: the love therefore that Dr. Hammond meant, cannot be the term of the immanent action of loving.

But secondly, It is denied also by many great both Philosophers and Divines, that there is any such term as the immanent action of loving: and they say the same of all other immanent actions. Indeed our Defendant takes notice of no Dissenters, but my self and my poor Master Scheibler. But this bewrayes his gross ignorance in the School-men, many of whom lead the way unto Scheibler into this his opinion, and go herein a great deale farther then he. Durand is very expresse for it, *Lib. 1. dist. 27. q. 2. Capricolus l. 1. dist. 27. q. 2.* quotes also Aureolus, Petrus de Pallade, Gerar. de Carmo, as of the same judgment unto these I may add Scotus upon the same *Dist. quaest. 3.* and two Eminent Scotists, Philip. Faber Faventinus, lib. 1. disp. 21. and Rida l. 1. Controvers. 7. represent this to be the Common opinion of the followers of Scotus. Unto all these let me further subjoyn Riphel Aversa Philos. tom. 2. q. 58. Sect. 3. And Franciscus bone spei in lib. de animâ. Disp. 2. dub. 3. who mentions others of the same perswasion. Oviedo though he blame Cajetan, and other Thomists, for denying actual intellection to have a term, because every action he thinks is productive of some term or other, yet he thinks this opinion may be so interpreted, as to be drawn into a good sense; and that is done (he supposeth) by making the term not to be really distinct, but the same with actual intellection. *Hac opinio jure ab omnibus rejecta.*

those that are immediately terminated on God himself.

rejection, si loquendi modum attempares, mea quidem sententia optime posset defendi. Existimo enim tantum in modo loquendi discedere a sententia, quam postea omnino praeferam, asserente intellectionem consistere in qualitate immediatè per se ipsam nullâ interjectâ actione à principio dimanante, vel in actione identificatâ cum termino, quod sic ostendo: utraque opinio canonicè intellectionem in entitate quadam immediatè ab intellectu dimanante per suammet entitatem, ex vi cuius intellectus in actu secundo constituitur formaliter intelligens: Ergo tantum differunt hæc due opiniones, ex eo quod una entitatem hanc essentialiter per suam entitatem ab intellectu dependentem, & nullum distinctum terminum respicientem vocat actionem sine termino; & altera eandemmet entitatem vocat actionem cum termino identificatam. Neutra enim harum opinionum novam formalitatem concedit, vel negat, quam altera opinio diverso modo defendat. De anima Controv. 6. punct. 1. S. 1. It were an easie matter to produce many other testimonies: But the matter must not be carried by the number of voices, but by the weight of Arguments. And therefore I shall next propound the Arguments on both sides.

The Arguments for the Negative may be ranged into two sorts; the first prove that some immanent actions have no terms; the second, that no immanent actions have any terms.

The 1. That some immanent actions have no terms. Cajetan, as it is said, determineth that intuitive intellections have no term and such are the Beatifical Vision of the Saints in Heaven, the Angels intuitions of themselves. And the reason which he giveth is, Because the Objects of such intellections are per se present unto them, and intimately conjoynd with them.

But omitting Cajetan, I shall insist onely upon the Arguments of Scheibler, which I referred unto in my refutation of Dr. Hammond's *Exercises*. The Defendant is pleas'd in derision to call him my Master: But where the wit of the Sarcasme lieth, is best, if not easily known unto himself. If his meaning be, that I have no Metaphysics but what I learn'd from him, unto this I shall make no Apologie: though he in his Epistle Dedicatory, vain-gloriously boasteth of his Rhetorick, yet I am not so foolish as to say any thing of my Metaphysics: But if he mean that Scheibler is but a poor and sorry Master, one that can teach me but little in Metaphysical Learning, a vulgar Author, one too low for Doctor H. to consult, pag. 26. One that first lighted his candle at the taper of Suarez, p. 179 I shall then refer the Reader unto Dr. Barlow his Epistle prefixed unto Scheibler's Metaphysics, and by that the Reader will be satisfied touching the falshood, pride, and immodesty of this censure. But proceed we unto Scheiblers Argument. Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 20. n. 30. *Quidam omnes actus immanentes habent terminos patet. Quia si quis unus actus immanentes essent transiendos, fore effectivi. Per terminum enim, non illa intelligitur qui per actionem producitur. At actio postquam actus relinquitur transiendus est, fore effectrix. Absurdum autem est omnes actus esse transiendos, ut saltem patet ex discrimine actus, & productionis ipsius actus.* 16.

lib. 6. Ethic. qua per agere & facere distinguuntur. Et confirmatur: quod nullus possit dari terminus, qui producatur per actiones aliquas immanentior. Quid enim producit, v. g. intellectio vel visio. Nihil hic dici speciosè potest, quàm quod per istos actus producantur motus habitualis. Sed hæc imprimis per accidentia est ad actus illos, ut hic etiam fateatur Suarez d. l. aliique. The Argument reduced unto form standeth thus.

If every immanent action be productive of a term, or work, then every immanent action is poetical or effective.

But some immanent actions are not poetical or effective:

Therefore some immanent actions are not productive of any term or work.

The sequel of the Major may be confirmed from this, because *poietic* or *effective* is nothing else but the production of some term or work.

If it be objected that effectio is properly onely in an external matter, *efficientia proprie dicuntur, quæ extra eduntur*: Unto this you may have an answer in Scheibler's introduction to Logic, cap. 1. n. 33. where he sheweth this to be false. For there be, as he there declareth, internal as well as external effections, as the making of a Syllogism in the mind; and we may say the same of definitions, divisions, and propositions. "Fallum est, inquit, quod dicitur: Ea tantum proprie effici, quæ extra eduntur." Nam effectio est omnis ista operatio, ad quam opus sequitur, sive extra nos; sive intra nos sit; atque sic factio syllogismi, etsi in mente nostra cum formamus, est revera effectio. Probatur: omnis nostra erudita operatio est vel speculatio, vel praxis, vel *voluntas* hoc est effectio. At factio Syllogismi non est speculatio, (hæc enim tantum est secundum habitus speculativos.) Nec praxis, hæc enim tantum fit per directionem rationis factam secundum prudentiam, vel virtutem moralem. Ergo est Effectio. With Scheibler all these concur, that make *ars* to be the genus of Logic; for they say, that the effectio, which is proper unto *ars*, may be, and often is in an internal, as well as in an external matter. So Doctor Saunders in his first Appendix De usu Logica pag. 309. "Effectio, quæ est propria *arti* operatio, non minus est in materia interna, quàm externa." Thus the Major is sufficiently fortified by comparison of Scheibler's Metaphysics, with his Logic.

As for the Minor, Scheibler confirmeth it from the difference which

Aristot. 6. Ethic. makes betwixt prudentia and ars, which are there distinguished by *agere* and *facere* or *efficere*. *Prudentia est habitus cum rectâ ratione actionum*. *Ars est habitus cum rectâ ratione effectuum*, or *factuum*. Actions then strictly so called; moral actions, are not effectual.

But the Defendant says, that the sequel is very infirm, and most evidently false, pag. 28.

And why to I pray?

“Why first, ‘tis not true of all transient actions, that their terms must remain after the action is ended, &c.

“And secondly, ‘tis not true of all actions that are artificial; and so confessedly poetical, that their terms and work do remain after the action is past, as appears in the artificial actions of singing, and playing on the Lute, and other musical Instruments: and this (saith he) is sufficient to prove the inconsequence of his argument, and the weakness of whatsoever proof the Refuter shall draw from it. p. 29.

Any rational by-Reader must needs here wonder at the Defendants confidence, that I give it not another name: For all this nothing infringe the consequence of the forementioned Syllogisme: To manifest which, I shall reduce it unto a Categorical Syllogism, by due change of the Major,

Every immanent action productive of a term or work is effective or poetical.

But some immanent actions are not effective or poetical.

Therefore some immanent actions are not productive of a term or work.

Now, Sir, apply what you say unto the Major, and you will find that it no way opposeth it. There be (you say) some transient actions which have terms that are not permanent or lasting after the actions are ended; therefore every immanent action productive of a term is not effective or poetical. A most rare and excellent consequence, which follows à baculo ad angulum.

And your next is of the like, that is, *no force*. There be some artificial actions which are confessedly poetical, whose terms or works do not remain after the actions are past: as appeareth in the artificial actions of singing, and playing on the Lute. Therefore every immanent action productive of a term, is not effective or poetical. The Reader by this may see, that the Argument stands unshakable in it self, notwithstanding all the opposition of this daring Defendant.

But I perceive he catcheth at an incommodious expression, in his proposal of the Argument, and in his Answer to the first reason of Suarez. In the Argument he saith, *Actio post-quam aliud relinquitur, transiens est, sine effectrix*. And in his Answer to the first Objection of Suarez, he saith, *Non omnis causalitas est per modum productionis propriae, & rigorose; per quam scilicet producatur aliquid post actionem terminatam*. From these passages I believe it is that our Defendant thinks that Suarez's opinion is, that *work*, or *effect* is onely such an action, whose term or work remains after the action is past and ended. Indeed if this were

Seeb.

Scheibler's opinion, there were good reason for the denial of the sequel of his Argument. But this opinion cannot reasonably be fastened on him. For the instance which he gives of an *effectio*, in the preceding number, is the making of a *Syllogism* in the mind; and a *Syllogism* hath no existence in the mind after 'tis made, or longer then 'tis making. As for the two passages but now mentioned, a favourable interpretation may be made of them. A *term* or *work* may be said to remain after the action is past in order of nature, or in order of time: Now the *term* of immanent actions remain after their *effectio*, in order of nature, not time. And that permanency or remaining may have such a sense, may be gathered from another place in Scheibler, lib. 1. Metaph. c. 16. n. 17. *Nihilominus si subtiliter intueamur hanc rem, videtur etiam in unico momento esse qualiscunque permanens. Momentum enim dicitur per defectum successio- nis temporalis, unde in eodem momento potest adhuc relinqui successio se- cundum prius & posterius natura. Veluti in eodem momento simul sunt for- ma, & res formata, ut sol, & illuminatio, sive lumen. Vide de his nature instantibus distinctis, in eodem momento. Conim, l. 4. Phys. cap. 14. q. 3. a. 2. Atque sic etiam relinquatur, in tali momento, successio qualiscunque, ut non sit prorsus repugnans, durationem & proinde permanens tribuere etiam instantaneo.*

But our Defendant saith, that this of Scheibler is an utter impertinency unto the matter in hand. "But now how these assertions (saith he) if "all were granted (and these are two of these assertions, *Actiones im- manentes aliqua non habent terminum: Actio ut sic non dicit respectum ad terminum*) can any ways advantage the Refuters present Argument, I "leave any man to judge: For Scheibler expressly asserts, that as some "immanent actions have no terms, so others of them have; and he "proves it by an instance borrowed from *Julius Scaliger* against *Cardan*. "Exercit. 307. sect. 28. & Exercit. 1. sect. 3. Now to prove that *nulla actio* "immanens habet terminum (which must be the Refuters proposition, if "he speak any thing to the purpose; (for how else will he prove that "the immanent acts of love have no term by this medium?) by this as- "sertion of Scheibler, that speaks onely of some such, and proves the "contrary of others, will be impossible, till he can shew us a new Mood "and Figure to prove an universal by a particular.

Here I must desire the Defendant to awake, and to consider, that I pro- pound an Objection, that *omnis actio habet terminum*, unto which I oppose Scheibler, asserting and proving that some immanent actions have no term. Now this particular negative proposition made good, *Some im- manent actions have no terms*, is a full, home, and sufficient disproof of the universal proposition objected, *Omnis actio habet terminum*, because 'tis contradictory therunto. For of contradictory Propositions, that which is true overthroweth the other, because 'tis impossible that both contra- dictory propositions should be both either true or false.

But go we on unto a second sort of Arguments, the Arguments of those who hold that no immanent actions whatsoever have terms.

No Immanent Actions have

1. They all unanimously alledge the testimony of *Aristotle*, l. 9. *Metaph. text. 16.* Ubi distinguens actionem immanentem à tranſeunte, ait illum distinguì ab ista, quia hæc habet aliquid operatum p̄i ipsum tanquam terminum, illa vero, scilicet immanens nullum habet operatum. The words of *Aristotle* by *Rada* are thus repp'd. In quibus p̄gitur aliud quippiam aliud, quod sit p̄ter usum eorum, eorum actus in eo, quod efficitur inest, qualis est edificatio, atque actus texendi, illa enim in eo, quod edificatur, hic in eo, quod textitur inest. In quibus autem p̄ter actum non est aliud quicquam opus, in iis ipsis est ipse actus, nam visio in eo est sane, quod videt, & contemplatio, in eo quod contemplatur, & vita in anima.

I am not ignorant of the answers that *Cajetan*, *Banier*, and *Capreolus*, give unto this testimony of *Aristotle*; but they are such gross evasions, as that I shall for reply onely refer unto *Rada*, and *Faber Faventinus* in the places above mentioned. But *Suarez* hath another answer, which I shall lay down, and briefly reply to. Ad primum ex testimonio *Aristotelis* dicitur, *Aristotelis* sententiam non esse, per has actiones immanentes nihil fieri; sed vel nihil fieri extra ipsum operantem, vel (quod magis existimo) nihil fieri, quod maneat transacta actione: & hoc modo ait, huiusmodi actionem consistere in ipso usu. Quomodo 1. *Ethicorum*, cap. 1. ait, In nonnullis artibus operationes esse fines, & non aliquid per eas factum, ut in arte cytharizandi: quod necessario intelligendum est de termino facto, & permanente, quia manet post actionem ut supra declaravimus tractando de causa finali. Sic ergo dicitur, per actiones immanentes nihil factum reliqui, quia per illas nihil fit, quod illis factis maneat. *Metaph. disp. 48. sect. 2. n. 20.* The sum of this is, that the meaning of *Aristotle* is, that nothing is made, or produced by immanent actions, that remain after they are past and ended.

But 1. There is nothing in *Aristotle* that gives the least countenance unto this interpretation: and if men may be allowed the liberty of devising such senses of Authors for which there is no ground in them, it were no difficult matter to elude the most pregnant Authorities that can be alledged.

Secondly, If this were the meaning of *Aristotle*, then the difference of transient actions from immanent stands in this, that they are productive of a term or quality that remains after they are past or finished. But this cannot be the difference of transient actions from immanent; for I demand, whether it be predicated of transient actions *per se*, or *per accidens*.

If it be predicated *per accidens* of transient actions, then the difference of them cannot consist therein; if it be predicated *per se* of transient actions, then 'tis predicated of all transient actions, for à *per se* ad *de omni valet consequentia*. But 'tis not predicated of all transient actions, as is a little afterwards confessed by *Suarez* himself, concerning the actions of singing and playing on Musical Instruments, and therefore 'tis not predicated of transient actions *per se*, and consequently 'tis not the difference of them from immanent actions.

As for reasons to confirm the conclusion, most of them will serve which are brought to prove, that intellection hath no term. For 'tis generally confessed, that there is, as to this particular, the same reason of it, and all other vital immanent actions. If then actual intellection produce no term, then neither is there any term produced by the act of the senses of the sensitive appetite, or of the will. But now that intellection hath no term, no *verbum mentis* produced by it, Scotus proves by several reasons; two of which I shall prove und as managed by * *Ramus*, because he urgeth them with a great deal of perspicuity. *Primò si verbum esset terminus productus per intellectionem, impossibile esset nos intelligere intellectionem ipsam, quin simul intelligeremus aliquem terminum per ipsam produci.* (praesertim cum ex Divo Tho. p. p. q. 27. a. 1. de ratione intrinseca intellectionis sit terminus productus seu *verbum* ibi; enim ait, quod intelligens eo ipso quod intelligit producit in seipso aliquid) sicut impossibile est nos intelligere calefactionem, quin simul intelligamus calorem per ipsam produci, tanquam ejus terminum: Consequens tamen est falsum, nam experientia constat, nos intelligere intellectionem, cum tamen non recordemur, quod aliquid per ipsam producatur: Ergo *verbum mentis* non est terminus per intellectionem productus. Probatur siquela Majoris. (Cetera enim patent) quia si intellectio haberet tanquam terminum proprium *verbum mentis*, diceret ordinem essentialem, & intrinsecum ad *verbum*; sicut calefactio ad calorem per ipsam productum, ergo non posset intelligi sine ordine ad *verbum*, sicut nec calefactio sine ordine ad calorem, quia est talis ordo ei intrinsecus, & essentialis. If there were any word or term, produced by intellection, it would be impossible to understand or conceive the action of intellection, but we must wicthal conceive this term produced thereby. But now the consequent is false, for 'tis manifest by experience, that we conceive and apprehend the act of intellection, when we have no thought of any word or term produced thereby, and therefore there is no such term.

The *sequel* of the Major is thus proved: because if intellection had such a term, it would carry an essential and intrinsic order therunto, as calefaction does unto heat, dealbation unto whiteness: and therefore it could not be conceived or understood, without order unto it, even as 'tis impossible to conceive calefaction without order unto heat, &c. because such order is intrinsic and essential unto it, and therefore it cannot be abstracted therefrom. The Argument *mutatis mutandis* may be applied unto the immanent actions of the Will, and conclude that they also have no term produced by them: for if they have any such terms it would be impossible to conceive them without order and reference thereunto: But 'tis very possible to conceive the immanent actions of the will, and not to think of any terms produced by them; and for this I may appeal unto the bosomes of all men; for their experience will tell them, that they frequently review the actions of their wills, when yet they have no reflection upon any term produced by them.

No Immanent Action has Intrinsic Effective Term.

A second reason, *Intellectio est actus ultimus potentie intellectivae, ultimaque ejus perfectio* (as *ait Aristoteles* *nono Metaphysicorum* *ubi supra, & 1. Ethic. c. 9.*) *ergo nihil producit per eam. Probatur consequentia: quia jam ille terminus productus esset ulterior, & per consequens ipsa non esset actus ultimus.* Intellection is the ultimate or utmost act of the intellective power (as *Aristotle* saith in both his *Metaphysics* and *Ethicks*) and therefore nothing is produced thereby: The consequence is proved, because if there were any term produced by intellection, this supposed terme would be beyond, or farther then intellection; and consequently intellection would not be the utmost or ultimate act of the understanding. This argument too may be saddled upon the *immanent* and *elusive* actions of the will: Volition is the utmost act of the will, and the utmost perfection thereof; and therefore there is no terme produced thereby, for if there were, that terme would be a perfection beyond it.

Unto these two reasons out of *Scotus*, I shall add three more out of *Raphaël Aversa Philos. tom. 2. q. 58. S. 3.* to prove, that intellection does not produce *verbum mentis*, as a terme distinguished therefrom.

The first is the *uselessness* of this *terme* or quality, no use, office or purpose can be assigned for which it should serve.

1. It is said, That it is for the *assimilation* of the understanding unto the object known. But this assimilation being only *in esse intentionali & representativo*, that is, *in esse cognito*, is sufficiently made by the action of the understanding it self, though no terme be produced by it; for when an object is known by the understanding, 'tis *en ipsa* represented unto the understanding.

2. It is said by others, that 'tis necessary to exhibit the object present unto the understanding. But this presence required of the object in the understanding is only *intentional* and *objective*; and 'tis *objectively present* when 'tis *actually* the object of the action of intellection, and therefore the action of intellection renders the object *intentionally present*, though we suppose no *terme* to follow it.

3. * It is said, That 'tis an *image*, wherein the understanding beholds the object that it understands. But now if it have this office, then, whensoever an object is understood, the image thereof must be understood also. But now this is false, for we consider and contemplate objects, and yet take no notice of these feigned images of them: Nay,

* Tertia ratio
quam Cajet.
Ferrar. & Capreol.
addunt;
ad hoc ut in ipso
verbo tanquam
in imagine expressa
ipse intellectus intueatur
objectum, ita ut actus
cognitionis immediate
atingat verbum, &
mediante verbo
Objectum, &c.

Neque hec ratio potest admitti. Primo enim non cognosci cognitionis terminum eodem ipso actu, patet ab experientia. Quia dum consideramus, & contemplamur aliquod Objectum, constat nos non percipere aliud, quam illud ipsum de quo cogitamus, nullamque se nobis offerre imaginem mediantem. Quod si intueremur ullam imaginem, realiter ab objecto distinctam, id nos non lateret, & sine dubio recte discernereamus, nos intueri talem imaginem, sicut evidenter discernimus, quicquid aliud ex parte objecti cogitamus.

such

Such images are hidden from the most of men; none but those that have swallowed this dictate, *omnis actio habet terminum*, are privy to them: and what sense or feeling (I mean knowledge and apprehension) they have of them, passeth my sense and imagination.

A second reason that I shall urge out of *Aversa*, is, that those that *Aver* that intellection hath a terme, which they call *verbum mentis*, do also affirm that this terme is *propter intellectionem*; Now *non est ponendus terminus propter actionem, sed actio propter terminum*: *Non enim quicquam est ad hoc ut producat, sed productio exercetur ad hoc, ut res producta ponatur. Non bene ergo, supposita jam intellectione, qua dicitur cognitio objecti, ponitur verbum propter illam, tanquam terminus propter actionem: sed potius, si intellectio esset actio productiva verbi, deberet ipsa esse, & exerceri propter verbum.* Cum ergo principaliter & per se consistat, dari intellectionem quae est cognitio objecti, censendum potius esset ipsam intellectionem *propter aliam actionem*, quam intellectionem esse actionem per quam fiat alius terminus.

A third reason is, because the terme of an action, is more noble and excellent then the action it self: but suppose there be a terme of intellection, it cannot be more noble then intellection. The Beatifical vision is an action of the understanding, but suppose it have a terme, yet it cannot be surmounted thereby in perfection; for in it (as the Thomists determine) stands our happiness, and our utmost end. Now if one intellection be not productive of a terme, then to be productive of a terme, doth not agree per se and essentially unto intellection: for that which agreeth unto intellection per se, agreeth unto every intellection, because a per se ad de omni valet consequentia. But for the further strengthening of this Argument, I shall quote the words of *Aversa* himself. *Semper terminus est nobilior, & praestantior actione, ut habetur ex Aristot. 1. Ethic. c. 1. & ex ipso nota est.* Sed certe intellectio qua anima constituitur formaliter cognoscens, & comprehendens objectum, non potest dici nobilitate inferior actui verbo; quod tanquam terminus ejus inducitur. Et Aristot. 10. Ethic. c. 7, & 8. Deducit felicitatem debere esse praestantissimam perfectionem in anima; & simul determinavit esse contemplationem, id est intellectionem. Non ergo potest addi aliud verbum, quod sit terminus intellectionis. Ex plane respondetur, quod aliqui ex adversariis respondent, in actibus immanentibus actionem esse praestantiorem termino; & terminum esse propter actionem. Id enim manifeste est contra rationem & ordinem intrinsecum actionis, & terminus. Thus you see that intellection hath no terme; and if that hath none, then neither have the immanent actions of the Will any.

But *Oviado* hath a distinct and peculiar Argument concerning the action of love, *De anima* controu. 6. p. 1. sect. 3. In amore, de quo eadem est ratio ad illam intellectionem, speciale instituitur argumentum ad probandum in amando consistere; ex quo inferemus talem actionem excedere terminum, quia in illa nota ratio amoris sua est. Argumentum est a procedit cognitio in omnium affectionum praeceptionem ad amorem, sed cognitio tantum requiritur ad affectionem

nam voluntatis. Ergo in hac actione consistit ratio amoris. Probo minorem, cognitio ex parte intellectus requirit, ut voluntas valeat se determinare ad objectum appetendum: ergo requiritur ad determinationem voluntatis; sed determinatio voluntatis consistit in actione, per quam ex actu primo reducitur ad actum secundum: Ergo cognitio requiritur ad actionem voluntatis. Ergo in actione consistit amor, ad quem cognitio prerequisite. Hæc ratio rationis optime assignatur ratio formalis amoris, cui primario & in se competat, esse exercitium libertatis, quia hoc exercitium in actione consistit, ergo ad hoc ut amor sit exercitium libertatis, in ipsa actione constitui debeat, per quam voluntas constituatur amans, quæ cum per se ipsam hunc præfert effectum, nulli alio indiget termino, cui nullum superest munus, quod exerceat respectu libertatis, quæ per actionem formaliter amans constituitur. What he saith may be thus briefly summed up, Knowledge is necessarily pre-required (he means immediately) unto actual love. But 'tis only pre-required immediately, unto the action of loving, and not unto any terme of such action: and therefore the act of love consists wholly in the action, and not in the term.

It may here perhaps be objected, That all these authors which I have mentioned, differ from me; for they make the immanent actions of the understanding and will, to be only qualities, and not predicamental actions: they are only (say they) Grammatical actions; that is, they are worded and expressed, after the manner of actions: they are actions (saith Kado) non absolute & simpliciter, sed secundum quid & similitudinarie.

I confess this difference betwix their opinion and mine; but this difference is not material, for it nothing advantageth the adversary, nor prejudiceth me; and the arguments may be considered so abstractly, as that they may very well be applied unto my opinion.

Quiedo tells us of some Thomists, who agree with me in making intellection, (and the same may be said of Volition) to consist in an action not having any terme. But he goes to reconcile them with his own opinion; and against this reconciliation he propounds the same Objection, that I now mentioned; viz. that those Thomists which he speaks of, held intellection to be a proper action, whereas he made it only a quality. Unto this he answers, That the difference is not material, but only modo loquendi. His words I shall insert at large, because I judge them very pertinent unto our present purpose; "Dices in re differe hæc opiniones, quia Thomistarum opinio assertit, illam entitatem esse puram actionem, altera vero opinio formalitatem qualitatris in illa actione cognoscit. Contra, formalitas qualitatris ab hac opinione in qualitate constituta, in eo debet consistere, quod hæc entitas tali modo afficiat subjectum, illudque formaliter constituat in intelligentem, & informatum propria objecti representatione, & imaginem sed in opinione assertit illam entitatem in qua intellectus constituitur esse puram actionem; eodem modo afficit subjectum, illudque eadem ratione constituit intelligentem, & informatum eodem repræsentatione."

Unto these testimonies, it were very easy to add many others, but these are sufficient to satisfy the Reader, that you neither know nor care what you say herein. But to return from this digression.

In the next place I shall add *ex abundanti*, that divers great Philosophers both Protestants and Papists maintain that *immanent acts* are properly *predicamental actions*, and that yet they are not productive of any terms, that are qualities.

Amongst Protestant writers, I may justly reckon the generality of Logicians; for these qualities have no place in their *predicamental tables*; and if they had thought that there had been such *qualities*, the omission of them had been an inexcusable defect in their *Logicks*, because supposing, though not granting, such qualities, they would have been as numerous as any other entities whatsoever, and there is nothing can be said to exclude them from the *Predicaments*.

As for Papists Suarez confesseth that there are many Thomists of this opinion, *Metaph. disp. 48. Sect. 2. n. 5.* "Secunda sententia negat esse de
"intrinsicâ essentia actioni ut sit, habere terminum, qui per eam fiat
"ad quem dicat respectum, de essentia (inquam) actionis quatenus est
"proprium quoddam genus summum ab aliis distinctum, quia sub eo ge-
"nere quædam sunt actiones habentes terminum, aliz non. Habentes
"terminum sunt actiones transueantes, in quo hæc sententia convenit
"cum præcedenti. Quæ verò non habent terminum sunt actiones im-
"manentes, de quibus longè diverso modo sentit hæc sententia, quam
"præcedens: Existimat enim has actiones immanentes esse propriissi-
"mas actiones de genere & prædicamento actionis, esse tamen puras acti-
"ones, quæ nullum terminum intrinsicum, per se loquendo, producant,
"sed immediatè per sese attingunt sua objecta. Ita sentiunt de actioni-
"bus immanentibus multi ex discipulis Divi Thomæ: nam licet pecu-
"liariter tribuant intellectioni, quod producat verbum tanquam intrinsè-
"cum effectum, tamen nec similem aut proportionalem effectum tribu-
"unt omni actioni immanenti, nam in actionibus sensuum, & utrius-
"que appetitus id ferè omnes negant. Neque inter se conveniunt in
"attribuendo illo effectui omni intellectionis, nam quidam solum prop-
"ter absenciam objecti in quibusdam intellectionibus illum effectum
"requirunt. Nec denique videntur ponere illud verbum per modum
"proprii termini *intellectionis* ut actionis producentis, quia docent ver-
"bum & intellectionem esse res omnino distinctas, quod repugnat acti-
"oni & proprio, & termino intrinseco, quia actio solum potest esse
"modus illius rei quæ est terminus, non res realiter distincta, ut su-
"pra probatum est disputando de causalitate effectivâ. Est ergo co-
"mune sententia, actionem immanentem ut sic per se nihil producere,
"quod sit proprius terminus ejus, sed esse puram actionem, quamvis
"interdum ex illâ aliquis effectus resultet. Ita sentiunt citati Tho-
"mistæ & alii Moderni Interpretes D. Thom. in 2. parte. q. 27. a. 1.
"& Javel. 9. Metaph. q. 26. Ubi non numerat alios effectus actionum
"immanentium, nisi habitus, ad quos potius comparantur prædicamenta

agendi, quàm ut actiones: in quo satis declaratur, illas actiones non habere terminos intrinsecos propriè dictos.

Suarez propounds three grounds they lay down, for this Opinion, two are common unto them with others, but the third, I believe, is proper and peculiar unto them. "Tertio potest adjungi hæc ratio, quia hæc actiones non sunt à natura institutæ ad aliquid producendum, neque ut agens per illas communicet suum esse, sed ut per eas potentia sese uniant objectis suis: Ergo sine causâ tribuitur his actionibus quod aliquid producant. These actions are by Nature instituted for this end, that by them their Powers may unite themselves with their Objects: but this union may be performed without production of any term that is a quality, and therefore these actions have no term that is a quality.

Whereas Suarez saith in answer, that the union is sufficiently Metaphorical, this no ways weakens, but rather fortifieth the Argument: For unto a Metaphorical union of powers unto their objects, what need is there that there should be produced de novo, real and physical qualities.

But to say nothing further of these Thomists, I shall trouble the Reader but with one Author more, and 'tis a very late one, Franciscus Bone Spes: That which I conceive in him to be most pertinent, I shall here transcribe, in lib. de animâ, disp. II. dub. 3. Dico 3. intellectio formaliter consistit in actione suæ termino realiter à se distincto. 1. Contra Adolinum 1. parte, & Combricensis, Scotum, Lessium, Hurtadum, Fonseca, Gonzalem, &c. docentes illam quidem formaliter consistere in actione, sed habere terminum realiter à se distinctum. 2. Contra Vasquez 1. part. Suarez etiam 1. parte. Valentiam, Salas, Arriagam, Poncium post Scham in primum distincti. 3. &c. docentes illam consistere in sola qualitate per actionem realiter distinctam productâ. Complutenses verò nostros disp. 21. q. 3. in sola qualitate, productâ suæ actione realiter distinctâ.

"Probatur 1. Ex Philosopho 9. Met. textu 19. apud Poncium hic, "ubi aperte docet, visionis, speculationis, vitæ, &c. non esse aliud "quoddam opus præter terminum, seu actionem. Et 10. Ethic. c. 3. "Nec enim virtutis operationes, id est, intellectus, & voluntatis operationes, qualitates sunt. Ergo, &c.

"Probatur 2. quia alioqui intellectio formaliter consisteret, vel in actione ut præcisâ à qualitate realiter, à se distinctâ vel in ipsâ qualitate ut præcisâ ab actione realiter distinctâ, sed neutrum dici potest: Ergo, &c.

"Probatur minor, pro prima part. 1. quia si impertinens esset qualitas ad intellectionem, ipsaque ablata & per impossibile manente solâ actione (cui tantum subsistendæ ferviret) remaneret intellectus, unde illa qualitas esset omnino ad constituendum intellectum formaliter superflua.

"Probatur minor pro 1. parte 2. quia non est ratio, cur in ipsâ actione

"one ut præcisè à qualitate realiter à se distincta, formaliter consistat
 "intellectio, & non in qualitate ut præcisè, & c. *ad idem*
 "Probatur Minor pro 1. parte 3. quia illa actio ut sic præcisè, solum
 "facit formaliter produci & produci. Ergo, & c. *ad idem*
 "Probatur Minor pro 2. parte 2. quia intellectio est verbale quod-
 "dam, quod semper importat formaliter aliquam actionem, sive ab
 "intrinseco sive ab extrinseco, ne per omnia discurrant patebit; nam
 "visio facit videre, intellectio intelligere, volitio velle, quæ omnia
 "important actionem aliquam
 "Probatur Minor pro 2. parte 2. in actione præcisè viventis ut vi-
 "ventis salvari potest ratio vite sive ætus vitalis, ut patet à discurrant
 "per omnes definitiones ætus vitalis supra disput. 3. dub. 2. alias,
 "quidni & in tali actione præcisè salvari posset ratio vite, seu ætus vi-
 "talis viventis ut talis viventis? Unde non est ratio, cur in ipsa qualitate
 "ut præcisè ab actione realiter distincta consistat intellectio, & non in
 "actione, ut præcisè, & c. Ergo, & c. Hinc patet ad fundamentum
 "P. Comptoni.

What this Author speaks of intellectio, may be extended unto ved-
 tion, and indeed unto all the vital immanent acts.

Unto what hath been said out of Philosophers and School-men, I shall
 add the testimony of other rational and knowing men, that never so
 much as heard of the Question, *whether all immanent actions are pro-
 ductive of terms that are qualities?* These are likely to be the most im-
 partial and unprejudiced Judges in the Controversie, and let them be
 asked, Whether they think, that they produce some quality within them-
 selves, every time that they see, hear, &c. understand, will, & desire?
 and I am verily perswaded, that very few will give their Votoes for the
 affirmative; they will much doubt whether there be any such things in Na-
 ture. For they will think it very strange, that they should be the Parents
 of such numberless and even infinite swarms of beings, and yet not be in
 the least degree privy to their production.

But this argument may be thought but probable, and therefore I shall
 conclude with one of a convincing nature. And 'tis that which I urged
 unto Dr. Hammond, *Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate.* Now
 that there is no necessity of asserting these terms of immanent actions, I
 shall evince by answering all the Arguments which the Defendant brings
 to prove them,

1. He refers unto the reasons of Suarez, p. 31, 32. "Secundum hos
 "actus, scilicet immanentes, verè dicimur quales, nempe boni aut ma-
 "li, scientes, amantes, irati, &c. Item hi actus sunt formæ ultimæ actus-
 "antes ac perfectiores ipsas substantias, quibus insunt; ergo conveni-
 "unt illis communicatio qualitatis supra assignatæ.

The first Argument is taken from the denomination by immanentes
 But in this there's *petitio principii*: for 'tis no less doubtfull and con-
 verted, *An secundum hos actus immanentes verè dicimur quales?*

affusissimè finit qualitates : And Suarez could not be ignorant, but that the latter would be denied, as well as the former: for he thinks one to be as unknown as the other; and therefore he doth very unlike himself, only to suppose it, whereas he should have proved it. That he thinks one to be as unknown as the others will easily appear by the exception that he takes at this Definition of Quality, "*Qualitas est quæ quales quidam dicuntur*. Quæ definitio, inquit, licet ea ratione essentialis videatur, quod deur per habitudinem ad effectum formalem, quem omnis forma essentialiter respicit: tamen quod ad nos spectat, æquè obscura nobis manet propria ratio qualitatis. Sicut si definiretur quantitas esse aqua dicatur quantitas licet comprehensum in carere effectus & denominatio quantitatis, tamen æquè ignota manet quid in nobis sit esse quantum, vel quid conferat quantitas rei quantæ. Ita ergo in presenti æquè ignotum manet quid sit esse quale, seu quæ peculiaris modus affectionis per hanc vocem explicetur. Percontanti enim quid sit quale, bene etiam respondebimus esse id quod qualitate affectum, vel constitutum est: tamen nisi ista via supponatur ut notum, quid sit qualitas, tota res æquè ignota relinquetur. *Metaph. disp. 42. S. 1. n. 1.* This general answer may suffice. But I shall say something unto every particular.

First saith he, *Secundum hos actus verè dicimur boni & mali*. These actus denominate us to be good and evil.

For Answer, *Immanent actus* denominate us to be good and evil, not qualitatively, but effectively, or actively: they denominate us not to be good or evil habitually, but to do good or evil actually. And such a denomination may be from a meer action, that doth not include a quality as its term, though it presuppose a habit as its principle, from which it floweth.

Secondly, *Secundum hos actus dicimur scientes, amantes, irati, &c.*

But is it not every way as doubtful and controverted, whether these concretes, *sciens, amans, &c.* be qualitative denominations, as whether these abstracts, *actualis scientia, abstractus amor, actus sciendi, actus amandi*, be qualities? Nay, doth not Suarez himself, in the place now cited, make it to be a most obscure and uncertain matter? "Adde inquit, interdum obscurissimum esse discernere an res denominetur qualis, necne, aliquæ denominationes ut dicuntur homo amans, aut videns: incertum autem est, an illa denominationis sit qualis, vel alterius rationis, &c." *Philosoph. disp. 42. S. 1. n. 1.*

The second Argument is taken from their actualuating and perfecting the substances in which they are: "*Item hi actus sunt formæ ultimæ actantes ac perfectientes ipsas substantias, in quibus insunt*. Ergo Convenit illis communis ratio qualitatis supra assignata." *Philosoph. disp. 42. S. 1. n. 1.*

The foundation of this Argument is this Proposition, that Every form which ultimately actualuates and perfects the substance in which it is, is a quality.

No Immanent Actions have

quality. But *Suarez* could not but expect, that this Proposition would be denied by his Adversaries.

1. They will say, that suppose immanent acts be pure and meer actions, no ways including qualities, yet even so they are second acts, for every action is a second act: and as second acts they actuate their active powers, and *his mediantibus* they actuate the substances in which they are.

2. They will say, that *meer and pure actions* may be said to perfect the substances in which they are. And for this they think they have *Aristotle* on their side, for he defines man's happiness to consist in action; *ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐστὶ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς λογικῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν*; *τὸ τελειοτάτων ἢ βέλ. τινος*. *Beatitudo est operatio anime rationalis secundum virtutem optimam, & perfectissimam in vita perfecta*. Now it can not be denied, but that mans happiness being his supreme end, doth perfect him.

It may be said, that *Suarez* intimates a confirmation of the consequence of his *Euthymem*, from his own definition of quality, "Item hi actus sunt formæ ultimo actuantes, ac perficientes ipsas substantias quibus insunt; ergo convenit illis communis ratio qualitatis supra assignata. Now the definition of quality that he maneth is, I suppose, in these words, "Qualitas est quod videtur esse accidens quoddam absolutum, adjectum substantiæ creatæ, ad complementum perfectionis ejus, tam in existendo, quàm in agendo." *Disp. 42. S. 1. n. 5.* Now this definition is refuted by my Master *Scheibler*; and though it be too low for *Dr. Hammond* to consult such a vulgar Author as *Scheibler*, yet I hope I may refer the Defendant to him. But I shall refer (as he saith of *Suarez*) not so much unto his Authority, as unto his Reason. His words are as followeth, "Hæc definitio similiter mala est. Aut enim illæ particulæ: in existendo, vel operando, intelliguntur conjunctim, sive copulativè, aut disjunctivè. Hoc quidem modo, ut quod alterutrum illorum præstat, dicatur qualitas. Illo vero modo, ut intelligatur id solum, esse qualitas, quod utrunque facit, hoc est, quod perficit substantiam in esse, & operari. Utroque tamen modo vitiosa est definitio. Nam si qualitas sit, divisim loquendo, quod substantiam perficit, vel in agendo, vel in existendo: sic etiam locus, tempus, &c. erunt qualitates, quæ in existendo substantiam perficiunt: Item actio, quia ipsa forma est, unde substantia agens denominatur: sin verò qualitas sit demum, quæ utrumque præstat, tùm multe qualitates, non erunt qualitates. Multæ enim qualitates nullam actionem exercent: veluti ex habitibus sanitas, si ea sit habitus, ex potentiis naturalibus, potentie passivæ: plurimæ ex qualitatibus partialibus, quæ ipse in universum, si quid operentur, est id secundariò solum, & quasi eventualiter. Ac denique etiam figura, quippe quæ activa non est, non erit qualitas fuit autem de re plenius supra cap. 6. tit. 4. art. 2. p. 1. 1. 1."

Another

Another Argument we have, pag. 121. "As there cannot be an efficient cause without its causality: so impossible it is there should be any causality, where nothing is produced and caused by that causality. As it is impossible there should be an active power, without respect to the act that terminates the power: so impossible it is, there should be any action, without some product to terminate the action.

This argument is in Suarez, *Metaphys. disp. 48, Sect. 2, n. 16.* and cited by Scheibler, *Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 10. n. 31.* *Est ratio à priori, quia actio ut actio, si sit vera, ac propria nihil aliud est, quam productio aut effectio, aut causalitas efficientis causa: sed impossibile est vel mente concipere veram productionem, quin per eam aliquid sit productum, vel causalitatem actualem sine re aliqua causata: Ergo impossibile est etiam intelligere actionem sine termino.* Unto this argument you have an answer in my Master Scheibler, n. 32. *Respondeo, omnem actionem esse causalitatem; sed non omnis causalitas est per modum productionis propriæ, & rigorosæ, per quam scilicet producat aliquid post actionem remanens. Nam & ipsæ actiones dicuntur effectus præcisè & in se, quia habent esse dependens aliunde, ut fatetur Suarez Disp. 18. Met. sect. 10. n. 8. Ex quo etiam apparet: nullam in eo repugnantiam esse, si aliqua sit causalitas, neque tamen sic aliqua res causata, distincta causalitate, quia causalitas ipsa potest esse hoc ipsum causatum.* There is but one expression in the answer lyable to exception, *post actionem remanens.* Now leave out that, or else rectifie it, by adding *ordine natura, vel temporis;* and the answer is good, and remains unshaken by any thing that you say.

The same objection you have in *Franciscus Bone spei, de animâ, disp. 11. dub. 3. resol. 3.* applied unto imo intellection in particular: unto which his answer is, That some actions are productive of terms that are really undistinguished from them. The words of both the objection and answer, are as followeth.

Obijciat, actio est formaliter fieri termini, sive modus, quo aliquid fit, ergo intellectio est aliquid realiter distinctum à suo termino.

In forma, Respondeo, distinguendo antecedens, actio est formaliter fieri termini realiter à se distincti, vel indistincti, concedo antec. necessario realiter distincti, nego antecedens. Sic poterit ad consequentiam.

For further clearing this answer of *Franciscus Bone spei;* I shall de- * *Quod eadem*
 fire the Reader to take notice * that a faculty or power (*verbi gratia;* the *numerosa* *facult-*
understanding) is in several regards or considerations both *active* and *as simul habe-*
passive. It is *active*, as it produceth the action of understanding, and *ad vim agendi,*
& sit principi-
um recipiendi actionem quam elicit, non potest cum aliqua probabilitate dubitari, supposita ve-
ro doctrina de actibus immanentibus, qui recipiuntur, in eisdem potentia; à quibus eliciuntur,
et eam effectum indignant aliquo alio co-rincipio, ut specie vel obiecto aut
simili, sive non. Nam quidquam in hoc sentiat, verum nihilominus est eandem
facultate

facultatem secundum rem esse simul potentiam activam & passivam respectu ejusdem actus, & respectu sui ipsius, quatenus eundem actum recipit, & aliat. Et ratio est quia illam qualitatē quatenus habet actualiter perfectionem talis speciei, potest esse virtus eminenter, vel virtute continere alium actum, & potest esse formaliter assimilabilis per eundem actum, ut in praedicta disputatione 18 latius diximus. Nec in hac occurrunt nova difficultates, quae ibi tractata non sit. Suarez Metaph. Disputat. 43. Sect. 3. n. 14.

passive, as it receives and sustains it: answerably the *immanent* act of this power or faculty, intellective, may undergo the consideration of both an action and a term.

1. The consideration of an action, as it actuates the understanding, as an active power, as it is from it, and produced by it.

2. The consideration of a term, as it actuates the understanding as a passive power, as it is received and seated in it.

But it may be Objected, That by this, intellective should be a term unto it self. But this cannot be, for then it should be both before and after it self, and that is a thing utterly impossible.

For answer, It is impossible for a thing to be both before and after it self, *partē rei*, really and indeed: but 'tis no repugnancy for a thing to be before and after it self, in regard of several considerations; a thing may have several formalities and considerations; and one of them may antecede the other; *secundo modo rationis*. Thus the consideration of the production of intellective by the understanding, precedes the reception or inhesion of it in the understanding. By this you see then, that if immanent actions be productive of a term, it is of a term that is distinguished from them only ratione rationis; and therefore they are not properly productions, but conceived and considered after the manner of productions.

But perhaps there may be another Argument, p. 118. in these words "And give me leave to tell you That it will be impossible to make it good, till first you shall demonstrate against Suarez and the best metaphysicians and Philosophers, that *actio, ut sic, non dicit esse instantaneam respectum ad terminum*; and that there can be any motion whether instantaneous, or successive, and not from a terminus à quo, to a terminus ad quem, and give us a solid answer to their Arguments." (1)

If there be here any argument at all, thus it stands reduced to a form.

Every motion, whether instantaneous or successive, proceeds from a terminus à quo, to a terminus ad quem.

But now every action is motion.

Therefore every action proceeds à termino ad quem.

The *Minor* is false, unless motion be taken largely and improperly, and if it be thus taken, then the *Major* is denied; indeed the *Major* affirms thus, the *terminus ad quem*, the thing in controversy: so that in the argument there is *petitio principii*; for its every way as doubtful and controverted, whether motion, taking the word in a large and improper sense, *habet terminum ad quem effectivum*, as whether every action hath. For motion in this large and improper sense, is the equivalent of action, I said, *signanter terminum effectivum*, for there is no doubt, but all actions and motions have an *objective terme*, such a terme as is their object: the question is, whether every action, and motion in the large and improper sense of the word, have an *effective terme*; such a terme as is its product or effect? And this being the onely thing in question, is onely affirmed, and not confirmed.

But the *Defendant* not onely presseth us with reasons, but also burdens us with the Authority of *Suarez*, *Ruvio*, *Smiglesius*, &c. p. 30. 31, 11, 6, 11, 7.

Unto these it were very easy to adde many other, and as easy to oppose as many on one side, but in points controverted amongst School-men, it signifieth very little to muster up the Abettors of the several Opinions; for the matter must be carried not by multitude of Voices, but by weight of Arguments. It is not therefore material what *Suarez*, *Smiglesius*, or *Ruvio* say; unless wital they prove what they say; having then answered all the Arguments that the *Defendant* produceth, either of his own or of others, there is no reason why we should stay any longer upon the consideration of any of his witnesses.

But yet before I part from them, I cannot but profess my wonder how *Scotus* comes to be reckoned in the number of them. *Faber Faventinus*, and *Rada* represent him to be of a contrary Opinion, and they being his professed Champions, are likely to be as well read in him as *Dr. Creed*. But let *Scotus* be consulted, and he will speak another language concerning Intellection, and what he saith of that, may be extended to all immanent vitall actions. *Nec est verbum mentis terminus aliquis productus per intellectionem, quia intellectione non est actio productiva alicujus termini tunc enim impossibile esset eam intelligere, et non esse termini, sicut impossibile est intelligere calefactionem esse, et non esse calorem, ad quem fit calefactio non est autem impossibile intelligere intellectionem in se, non intelligendo, quod fit alicujus termini, ut productus per ipsam.* But our subtle Doctor was but a man, and therefore 'twas possible for him to contradict himself; but whether he hath done so, will appear by examination of the passages that our *Defendant* quotes out of him, p. 30. And now if our *Refuter* shall not fit to lodge any strength upon *Scheiblers* confirmation, I shall refer
him

him for an answer to Scotus, l. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. 6. where he shall find this largely discussed, that though habitual knowledge be not the intrinsicke terme of these Operations, sed quasi consequens, & extrinsecus, and that operationes huiusmodi possunt intelligi, & esse sine habitu, ut patet in habentibus habitum intensissimum, ut in beatis, and in Christ in respect of habitual Grace which was alwayes in him in its utmost height possible; yet they cannot possibly be, or conceived to be without actual knowledge, the quality that terminates them. To this purpose also may the same Scotus be seen, l. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. ult. f. 130. & 1 Sent. d. 27. q. 3. p. 347. ad 3. ex edit cavelli.

As for the first place, l. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. 6. f. 32. indeed the former part of the words are in Scotus, that a habit, viz. of knowledge, is not the Intrinsicke Terme of immanent Operations, but only their Extrinsicke, and Accidental Terme. But now as for the latter words, they, that is, Immanent Operations cannot possibly be conceived to be without Actual knowledge, the quality that terminates them: these are not found in Scotus, but are a bold Supply, that I say not Forgery, of our Defendant, Scotus there propounds three questions concerning Intellection, and the like immanent Operations. The first, which belongs only to our present purpose, is cuiusmodi entitas sit intellectio, volitio, et huiusmodi operationes immanentes? and his Resolution is, that they are onely Qualities. This he proveth by removal from them of all other kinds of being, and because there is most doubt, whether they be not actions, de predicamento actionis, he chiefly insists upon that, and the chief reason which he brings, is, because they are not productive of any terme; he thought Immanent Operations not to be Predicamental Actions; and herein, I confess, he differs from mine opinion, and so he doth also from yours. But pray sir, mark whats the reason, for which he excludes them from the Predicament of Action? It is because they have no term. With what face then do you affirm that Scotus sayes, That Immanent Operations cannot be without a quality that terminates them. But because you are likely to outface the matter, I shall in cert Scotus, his words at large: First, he hath, N. 31. this passage, Præterea actionis est aliquis terminus realis, hic autem præter intellectiōem? non est aliquis terminus, &c. And again afterwards, N. 32. Quod intellectio non sit actio, vel passio, probō sic actio, & passio, sunt aliquid termini accipientis esse per ipsas sed operationes immanentes sunt ultimi termini, quibus nihil accipit esse, &c. Marke you me that Sir, Quod si dicas, quod cum per actus habitus generantur, habitus est terminus dictarum operationum, & sic sunt actio, & passio.

Ad argumentum dicendum, quod actio illa, quæ proprie est ad terminum, non potest intelligi sine termino: sed operationes huiusmodi possunt intelligi sine habitu & esse, ut patet in habentibus habitum intensissimum, ut in Beatis: Ergo proprie non dicitur terminus quasi intrinsecus.

sed quasi consequens, & accidentalis cum ergo hujusmodi operationes aliquid sint & probatum est, quod non sunt substantia, nec relatio, nec actus, aut passio, neque quantitas, vel aliquid extrinsecus adventitium, relinquitur, quod sint in genere qualitatis, &c.

The Reader is by this time, I suppose, convinced of your unworthy falsification of *Scotus*, for he saith no such thing as you say; and he saith the quite contrary, *Operationes Immanentes sunt ultimi termini, quibus nihil accipit esse.* This one instance is sufficient, to give a taste of your fidelity and honesty in quoting *Authors*. Of it I shall make this Use, that for the future I shall little trouble either my self or the Reader, with Examination of your Authorities; for you have in so shameless, gross, and palpable a manner, falsified *Scotus*, as that you deserve but little Credit in any Testimonies that you shall alledge. In the very same question afterwards: N. 35. he expressly denyeth, that *Immanent Operations* have any Terme, which receives any being by them. And in this particular he sayes they are unlike, proper and predicamental actions. *Tertia proprietatis actionis proprie sumpta, est quod esse accipit p. r. eum idem intelligit de passione.* *Operationes ergo immanentes assimilantur actioni & passioni in prima conditione, et secunda, non autem in tertia, que est completiva.*

A second place is lib. 1. Sent. d. 3. q. ult. p. 130. n. 11. *Ista est alia conditio ulterior, videlicet, quod ista forma de ratione sui transeat in aliquid, ut in terminum, & hoc sive illud aliud sit intra operans sive extra, non curio non est enim intelligibile, quod sit intellectio, & volitio, et quod non sit alicujus termini hoc autem convenit actioni proprie dictæ, ut transeat in aliquid, ut in terminum, propter istas igitur duas condiciones concurrentes in istis formis, dicuntur ista forme esse actus secundi, cum vere sint forme manentes.* The words are not quoted, but I suppose these are those the Defendant meaneth.

But 'tis plain that *Scotus* speaks of an Objective, not Effective Terme.

1. From a comparison of this place, with other passages, that plainly, and expressly deny Immanent Actions to have Terms.

2. From a following passage in the same page, *Nunc autem aliquis actus intellectus vel volitionis, potest esse ejusdem rationis, licet non sit alicujus termini producti:* Here he supposeth it possible for Intellection and Volition not to have any Terme produced by them: And therefore, when he sayeth in the place objected, *Non est enim intelligibile, quod sit intellectus, et volitio, et quod non sit alicujus termini.* Here by the Terme he means onely the Object, and not the Product of Intellection and Volition.

3. From the Coherence of the words, with the foregoing:

Scotus his design is to prove, that *Immanent Operations*, though they be not proper actions, *de genere actionis*, may yet be called *Second Acts*, because in two respects they resemble Actions: 1 Because of their perpetual dependance upon their causes. 2 Because they have a tendency unto a Terme. Now this must needs be understood of an *Objective Terme* onely; for if it were understood of an *Effective Terme*, it would make them to be, by Scotus his Opinion, proper and Pradicamental Actions, which is a thing that he constantly denyeth.

4 That the word *Terme*, which *Intellection* (saith Scotus) regards, signifieth onely an *Objective Terme*; the Defendant, if he had not been in haste, might have gathered from the *Margent*, where we have these words: *Intellectio, & volitio dicuntur Actiones, quia dependent continuè a suis causis, et quia tendunt in aliquid ut in terminum attingentia*. Here *terminum attingentia* is distinguished plainly, a *termino efficientia*. This distinction of the *Terme* of *Intellection*, is plainly insinuated by Rada, a great follower of Scotus, *contro. Theol. p. 1. contro. 7. p. 124, 125. Intellectio, inquit, habet terminum quem actualiter respicit, scilicet, objectum, &c. Sed non est productiva sui termini nec per ipsam tanquam per actionem aliquid produciuntur, &c.*

But go we on to a third place in Scotus, *lib. 1. sent. d. 27. q. 3. p. 347. ad 3.* This place the Defendant quotes again, p. 32. and there he inserts the very words of Scotus. Howsoever, saith he, Though the Refuter thinks fit to refer the Doctor, because he is a Critick, to learn some Metaphisicks from Sheibler; yet I will be so civil to him, because he is a School-man, to refer him for his learning in this point, to one of the subtlest of these Doctors. And let Scotus be the man, it is, *L. 1. sent. d. 27. q. 3. s. 19. ad tertium*. The place is short, but full, and not taken notice of by Suarez; and the words are these: *Ad tertium, concedo quod Notitia est proles: &c. vere genita, sed productio illa non est actualis intellectus, quia, ut dictum est supra, actualis intellectus non est actio de genere actionis, sed est qualitas nata terminare talem actionem, qua significatur per hoc quod est dicere, vel in communi per hoc quod est elicere; non igitur verbum est aliquid productum actione, qua est intellectus, quia ipsa intellectus non est productiva alicuius, sed ipsa est producta actione qua est de genere actionis, sicut dictum est supra*. He here refers to the place quoted by Suarez, *1 Sent. d. 3. q. 6. p. 110. Col. 2. n. 31. & ib. q. ult. p. 136. ex editi Cavel. where he has very solidly proved it.*

For answer, Scotus in this very question delivers (as you have seen) another Doctrine; and 'tis very strange that he should so forget himself, as to contradict it so soon: But the truth is, that in this passage, there is not so much as one word or syllable sounding for the Defendants purpose, viz. That all Immanent Actions

are productive of Terms: Nay, here is something that expressly contradicts this tenor of the Defendant; and is that intellection which the Defendant cannot deny to be an *Immanent Action*, is not productive of any Term. For which reason he makes it a Quality, and denies it to be an Action, *De genere actionis, non, scilicet, est aliquid productum actione, quia est intellectio, quia vero intellectus non est productiva alicujus, &c.* Indeed he makes *dicere* to be productive of intellection as its Term, but the Defendant should take notice, that *dicere* is by *Scotus* a *Transient*, and not an *Immanent Action*; an Explication of which may be seen in *e Rada*.

There is, I believe, now no impartial and unprejudiced Reader, but must needs confess, that Heat and Rage of Opposition, hath here blinded the Defendants judgement: For else, how is it possible that he should thus mistake, and misunderstand a plain place in *Scotus*? It is very probable that the Defendant may judge Me incapable of understanding *Scotus*; but he hath no reason to think so contemptibly of all his other Readers, into whose hands his book may come. For doubtless many of them are as able to reach the meaning of *Scotus*, as himself: hereby a Guesse may be given at the great Abilities of his Admirers, who swallow such stuff as this.

Here, before I passe on, I shall briefly sum up the State of the Question, *An omnis actio habeat terminum.*

For Explication of the Terms,

I. Actions are either *Immanent* or *Transient*.

II. The Terme of Actions is either only *Objective*, or else *Effective* also.

An *Effective Terme* is either *Extrinsic*, and *Accidental*, or else *Intrinsic*, and *Essentiall*, unto which an Action carrieth an *Intrinsicall* and *Essentiall* Respect.

Their Distinctions thus premied: I shall lay down three things which are granted, and uncontroverted on both sides.

1. That all *Transient Actions* have not only an *Objective*, but also an *Effective Terme*; a Terme which they produce.

2. That all *Immanent Actions*, have an *Objective Terme*, an Object unto which they tend, which is called *Terminus attingentie*.

3. That some *Immanent Actions* have an *Effective, Extrinsic*, and *Accidental Terme*, viz. *Habits*. I call it an *Extrinsic* and *Accidental Terme*, because tis *Accidental* unto *Immanent Actions*, to be productive of such a Terme: For there are many *Immanent Actions* that produce no such Terme.

The matter that is controverted, is, Whether all *Immanent*

e Omnis actio habens terminum productum per ipsam dicitur, transiens ab Aristotele, non quia transeat in externam materiam, sed quia transit in terminum, sive ille terminus maneat in agente, sive transeat in externam materiam. De qua re videndus est Antonius Trombeta in sua Metaphisica. Controv. Theol. part 1. Controv. 7. p. 125.

No Immanent Actions have

Actions have an Effective, Intrinsic and Essentiall Terme?

This is denied, no Immanent Actions have such a Terme, for respect unto such a Terme is not Intrinsic and Essentiall unto such Immanent Actions: And the Reason is, because they may be abstracted from such a respect. Now nothing can be abstracted from that which is Intrinsic and Essentiall to it.

Having thus proved that these pretended termes of Immanent Actions are excluded *e numero entium*, it is needless to enquire under what head of being they are ranged.

Yea, but our Defendant tells us, page 37. that Suarez makes them to be dispositions.

Doth he so? What then I pray? Is he not our professed Adversary in this Question? And therefore is it any Newes, or wonder, that he dissents from us? The truth is, having affirmed that there are such things, it concerns him to place them somewhere or other, and he could think of no such convenient place to lodge them, as amongst Dispositions.

Yea, but the Defend. p. 37, 38. acquaints us with a Reason, which Suarez hath, why he makes them dispositional: For, *dispositio* is *facile mobilis*, and so are the Termes of Immanent Actions: They have no fixed and permanent, but a moveable being, by reason of their dependence on the actual influx of their Virall Powers.

For answer. 1. Though every disposition be *facile mobilis*, yet every thing that is *facile mobilis* that hath a moveable being, is not a Disposition, as is apparent from predicamentall Actions, and such Relations as have transient foundations.

Secondly, this Reason weighs little with us; for we deny these pretended Termes to have any being at all: And if they have no being at all, then consequently no moveable being. This reason were of some Validity upon Presupposition, that these pretended Termes were Qualities: But we deny them to be Entities, and say that they have no being, but a fancied one, in the imaginations of a Party, or Faction of School-men; and for this Affirmation, I have laid down as I suppose, sufficient ground.

But suppose the Termes of some Immanent Actions may be called dispositions, yet there is no reason for calling so the pretended Termes of the Actions of Divine Love in our blessed Saviour: Because they dispose unto nothing; and *dispositio disponit ad aliquid*; neither the Name nor Nature of Disposition agreeth unto them; and therefore why should they be called dispositions?

For conclusion of this discourse; I shall adventure to give my Guess at the Reason which led some of the School-men to devise these Termes of Immanent Actions. It was, I suppose, to support, and clear their monstrous, and groundless, Fictions that they have concerning the

doctrine of the Sacred Trinity, which they vent upon the first of the Sentences, Dist. 27. and 32. And on the first of Summes, q. 34. and 37. Where they have usually these bold inquiries *An verbum divinum producat per actum intelligendi? &c. An Spiritus Sanctus producat per actum diligendi?* By these daring and Presumptuous Disputes, they have exposed the Mystery of the Trinity unto a great deal of scandal and scorn amongst Socinians and other Anti-Trinitarians.

Before I Passe on to the fourth, and last Evasion of Dr. Creed: I shall from what hath been said, in impugning the Pretended *Termes* of Immanent Actions, inferre the impertinency of all that he saith, p. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 115. 116. 117. 118. In defence of this Proposition in Dr. Hammond, the word Love is a *Genus* equally comprehending the two Species, habitual and actual Love, or the Acts of Love. For Dr. H. by actual Love, or the Act of Love, understands, as hath been shewn, the Action of Loving, and not (as the Defend. most vainly pretends) any quality produced by that Action, which is its Term and Product. His Proposition then, notwithstanding all Doctor Creeds Defence, is still chargeable with that absurdity which I objected against it, viz. that it makes Love as a *Genus* equally to comprehend, as Species, *primo diversa*, things put in several Predicaments. For habitual Love is in the Predicament of Quality, and the action of loving in the Predicament of Action.

For further disproof of Dr. H. his proposition, I shall add what I said touching the habit of Love, and the sincere and cordial expressions thereof. No one word can, as a *Genus*, equally comprehend the efficient, and the effect, viz. as Species; but the habit of Love is the efficient, and the acts of Love are the effects thereof, (the habit of Love (saith the Defend.) effectively concurs with the Will, to the production of the inward Acts of Love: therefore Love, as a *Genus*, doth not comprehend habitual Love, and actual Love, as Species. The Major of this Syllogisme, the Defendant will say, is most ridiculously false, as appears by what he saith to the like Syllogisme, that I framed concerning the habit of Love, and the Expressions thereof. His Answer is very remarkable, for the transcendent and matchless both ignorance and impudence of it; and therefore I shall crave the Readers patience for a while to consider it.

Dr.

Dr. CREED.

Your third (to begin with that, for I shall not tie my self to your Method) is most ridiculously false. You say (not to trouble our selves about the Mood and Figure (3) No one word can as a Genus equally comprehend the efficient, and the effect: The habit of Love is the efficient cause, and the sincere and cordial expressions of Love are the effect: Therefore Love is not predicated of them equally as a Genus.

Your Major, Sir, your Major; by all means have a care of your Major. For what think you, Sir, of all Univocal productions? When Fire produces Fire, and Corn brings forth Corn; when a Man begets a Man, and one Heat makes another; does not one and the same word as a Genus comprehend the efficient and the effect? And is it not in these a certain maxime, that, *Qualis est causatalis est effectus*; such as the Cause is in nature, such also is the effect? And I hope you will think it lawfull for things of the same nature to be comprehended under the same Genus: Nay, are not these distinguished from equivocal productions, because in these, *Effectum est ejusdem rationis cum efficiente*; but in the other, *efficiens non convenit cum effectui in eadem forma, sed eminenter illam continet*? Nay, does not your own Scheibler, as well as Suarez (both whom you so seriously commend to the Doctor's perusal) tell you that *Causa univoca, est qua producit effectum similem in specie*? But methinks, Sir, if (since your more noble, more serious employments in the Study and writing of Scholasticall and Practicall Divinity) you had thought fit to neglect such Vulgar Authors, and to forget the Common Notions and Maximes delivered by them; yet you should at least have observed, this in your reading of Aquinas, that in his Sums does frequently deliver this doctrine, and makes very good use of it. And now, Sir, I hope you will think it lawfull for things of the same Nature to be comprehended under the same Genus; For where, I pray, will you rank the several individualls of the self-same Species (for such are all Univocall Causes, and Effects, as is plain

from Sense and Experience) if not under the same Genus?

I might prove the grosse and palpable falshood of your Major, Sir, by divers instances drawn from equivocal productions, where the Cause, and Effect must be placed in the same predicament, and consequently under the same remote Genus at least, which is sufficient to destroy your Major. When the Sun and Stars produce Gold and Silver, and Brasse, and other Minerales, when they produce Stones of all sorts and kinds in the Bowells of the Earth, are not the cause and the effect, at least as species subalterna, placed under the same Genus of substantia Corporea? When an Ass begets a Mule, or a Man produces Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrailles; and when a Woman brings forth monstrous births instead of Legitimate Issues, as Serpents, Moles and Frogs, and other such like (of which among Physicians there are many true stories) I pray, Sir, must not the cause, and effect be both ranged under the same immediate Genus proximum, which is Animal? So when light produces Heat, are not the Cause and the Effect both put in the same Predicament under the same Genus of Partible Qualities? To keep closer to the business more immediately in controversie. The habit of Love effectually concurs with the will of to the production of the inward Acts of Love, and yet I say that love as a Genus is Equally predicated of the habit, and the inward Acts of Love, as has already been demonstrated, and may in due time be further proved, notwithstanding any thing you have, or can say to the contrary. And this is abundantly more than sufficient to show the falshood of your Major, when you say that no one word can as a Genus (whether proximum or remotum, summum, or subalternum) (for you absolutely deliver it) equally comprehend the Efficient and the Effect.

The Major which you say is most ridiculously false, and against which you make so horrible an Out-cry, I shall fortifie by three reasons.

The 1. Is because Genus Analogum non predicatur æqualiter de speciebus. But now Analogy, viz. Attributionis Intrinsicæ, consists in dependency, from which Effective dependency is not excluded; as is maintained by the generality of the ancient Thomists, by my Master, Scheibler. Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 1. art. 3. cap. 3. tit. 5. art. 1. And by Scheibler's Master, Suarez, Metaphys. di p. 28. s. 3. disp. 32. s. 2. n. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. By Irænaus a Frier Carmelite, Discep. in Univers. Logic. p. 113. Martini Exercit. Metaph. p. 521. And by divers others as you may see in Statio Reg. Philosoph. p. 397. And upon this account it is, that Ens is made to be Genus Analogum to Ens creatum, and increatum, to substantia and accidens. And I have read in the

No one word doth as a Genus Comprehend

the Manuscript of a Great Philosopher of the University of Oxford, that for this reason *Qualitas* is *genus Analogum*, because of the Dependency that *Habitus* hath upon *Potentia*.

I know this is to be understood with many *Limitations*, with which I shall not now Cumber the Reader: and besides, I am not Ignorant that 'tis Opposed by many *Moderne Philosophers*.

But however it hath so Great and Learned Patrons, and they bring so good Reasons for this their Opinion, as that no modest man will Censure it to be a most Ridiculous Proposition.

Secondly, No word that is predicated of things *Secundum prius*, et *posterius*, is predicated of them equally, as *genus univocum* of its Species, for the equality that distinguisheth *genus univocum* from *analogum*, is *equalitas ordinis*, not *dignitatis*. But whatsoever is predicated of the Efficient Cause and the Effect, is predicated *secundum prius* and *posterius*: Ergo nothing that is predicated of the Efficient and the Effect, is predicated of them equally as *genus univocum*.

Thirdly, *Species totius generis univoci*, are *simul natura*: but the Efficient Cause and the Effect, are not *simul natura*: And therefore they are not Species of the same genus.

* Pro hac Sententia videtur militare, quod habet Aristoteles in cap. de modis simul ea dicens quae ex eodem genere in divisione sibi invicem opponuntur, esse natura simul. Atque species immediate unum genus respicientes, ex eodem genere in divisione sibi in vicem opponuntur, ut albedo et nigredo, in quas color dividitur. Sunt igitur natura simul. Quod si natura simul sunt, non potest una ab altera dependere in participando genere. Stallio. Reg. Philosoph. p. 397.

And thus have I sufficiently provided for my Major: as for your Arguments against it, they had need be very strong, and convincing, for otherwise indifferent Readers will judge your Vociferation against it, being with so full a mouth, to be Frontlesse. But let them be what they will, let us hear them.

Dr. CREED.

For what think you, Sir, of all univocal Productions? When Fire produces Fire, and Corn brings forth Corn, when a Man begets a Man, and one heat makes another; does not one and the same word, as a genus, comprehend the Efficient and the Effect?

When I Read this passage, I was about, I confess, with a just indignation to throw away your book, as unworthy mine, or any other Scholars further perusal. I desire to have low and humble thoughts of my self, but yet I cannot think him a competent Adversary for me to Encounter, who is so Ignorant in Logick; as to say, that Man and Fire are genera: I propounded the Question to a Fresh man, *an homo sit genus?* and he answered no, and readily confirmed his Negative thus: *Nulla species infima est genus: homo est species infima; Ergo homo non est genus.* I make no doubt but that our Defendant hath great abilities in other learning, but I shall never acknowledge him to be a Philosopher, or School-man, that thus trespasseth against the very A. B. C. of Logick. I shall give him this friendly advice for the future, that before his next attempt in Scholastical Divinity, he first con over Smith, Breerwood, Sanderfon, or some other such compendium of Logick, that so he may be able to avoid such mistakes as this, which will Expose him unto the Derision of every Boy.

If any shall Object in the Defendants behalf, that the Ramists hold that every Species is genus, and that individuum is species infima, as may be seen in Scheiblers Topics: c. 28. n. 77, 78, &c. usque ad 85. This yet can be no starting hole for the Defendant; for this proposition, every genus is predicated equally of

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its Species, is a *Maxime* of the *Aristotelians*, delivered by them long before ever *Ramus* saw the light; And there is no-doubt can be made that they take *genus* and *Species* in a *Peripatetical*, and not *Ramistical* sense.

If it be said again secondly, that even *Dr. Sanderson* in his *Logic*, l. 3. c. 24. confesseth that *Topically Species infima* is *genus*.

Why this can as little avails the *Defendant* as the former shift, for tis undeniable that we speak of *genus* as *predicabile*, and the *Maxime*, *Genus predicatur aequaliter de speciebus*, is delivered by *Porphyry* in his *Isagoge*, where he handles the Doctrine of the *Predicables*.

In a third place it may be replied, that in that Interrogation of our *Defendant*, does not one and the same word as a *genus* comprehend the *Efficient* and the *Effect*? He is not to be Interpreted of any of the words immediately preceding *Fire*, *Corne*, a *Man*, *Heat*, but of some words that are to be understood and Supplied as *Elementum*, which as a *genus* comprehends the *Fire* producing, and the *Fire* produced: and *planta*, or *corpus animatum*, which in like manner is predicated of the *Corne* bringing forth, and the *Corne* brought forth as a *genus*: and *animal*, which is predicated in the same manner as a *genus* of the *man* begetting, and the *man* begotten: and *qualitas patibilis prima*, which in the same way is predicated of the *Heat* making, and the *Heat* made.

But First, What Reason have I to make this Supply in your Words?

Secondly, We cannot Supply, or understand these words, *Elementum*, *Corpus animatum*, *animal* *qualitas patibilis prima*: For *Elementum* is predicated of the *Fire* producing, and the *Fire* produced; *Corpus animatum*, of the *Corn* bringing forth, and the *Corne* brought forth, &c. and so *Animal* of the *Father*, and the *Son*, only as of *Individuals*: whereas the comprehension, and predication of the *Genus*, that we speak of, is only concerning its *Species*.

Unto all this I shall adde *Ex abundanti*, out of *Irenaeus*, a *Modern Thomist*, that which will answer your *Objection*. And tis the more pertinent, because it speaks of one of your Instances, viz. *Fires* producing *Fire*; *Cave tamen putes quantlibet dependentiam facere nostram Analogiam, nam ignis generat ignem, qui tanto univocè conveniunt in natura ignis, quia cum illa dependentia*

dentia Physica non reperitur dicta inaequalitas: Vel melius ista dependentia est solum quoad actualem existentiam, seu positionem extra causas, non autem quoad participationem secundum essentiam, seu esse objectivum si enim quæatur, utrum ignis B. generetur ab igne A. et ab eo dependens, ut generetur, et existat, ab eodem dependeat essentialiter spectatus, non considerata existentia, dicendum erit, quod non quia ignis A. non est principium igneitarum, alioqui esset principium sui ipsius. At vero accidens dependet a substantia essentialiter, ut sit ens. Quid fiet evidens comparanti singula hoc modo. Leo non minus erit animal, etiam si homo sit impossibilis: At accidens non erit ens, si substantia sit impossibilis; cum enim accidens sit entis ens, cuius erit ens, si nulla sit substantia? ergo aliter accidens participat ens, quam leo participet animal. Nec refert, quod sublato homine tolleretur leo, quatenus rationale, & irrationale sunt relata, ac proinde simul sunt natura: Nam hic non considerantur ut relata, sed precise ut Animalia. Discept. in Univers. Logic, p. 113.

In the next place you tell us great news, of the difference betwixt Univocal and Equivocal productions, a thing that is known, and obvious unto every Pufny. But you spend many lines about it, and very gravely confirm it, by the testimonies of Scheibler and Swarox: Then you intimate that I forget this Notion, and therefore referre me for it to Aquinas his Summes. But what ground, may colour, have you to say that I forget it? The truth is, you have not so much as a shadow for such an imputation; but to Calumniate, is grown to be so familiar with you, that 'tis even incorporated into your discourse.

But what inferre you from all this? Why forsooth, that Individuals, whereof one is the Efficient, and the other the Effect, may be comprehended under the same word as a Genus. But what is all this to the purpose? Is it not clear, that my Major is to be understood concerning the comprehension of Species by the Genus? Indeed no Reader, but such a Dis-ingenuous Caviller, as Dr. Creed, will understand me, concerning the comprehension of Individuals.

This supply of Species is no subter-fuge, but may easily be gathered from the coherence of my words. For the Proposition which I undertake to prove, is that Love as a Genus, doth not comprehend as Species, the Expressions of Love, equally with the Habit.

No one word doth as a Genus Comprehend

But let us see next whether you have any better success with your Equivocall productions.

First, Most of your instances are of *Genus remotum*; whereas Dr. Han. and I, are all along to be understood of *Genus proximum*, and the *Maxime* of Porphyry, which is the foundation of all this argumentation, hath the same sense too.

But you next bring instances, wherein the Cause and the Effect, are both ranged under the same immediate *Genus proximum*, which is *Animal*. When an Ass begets a Mule, or a Man produces Wormes and Vermine in his Head and Entrailles, and when a Woman brings forth *Monstrum* birth instead of Legitimate Issues, as Serpents, Moles, and Frogs, and other such like (of which among Physicians there are many true Stories) I pray, Sir, must not the Cause and Effect be both ranged under the same immediate *Genus proximum*, which is *Animal*?

But first, that *Animal* is a *Genus proximum* unto an Ass and Mules, unto Wormes and Vermin, unto Serpents, Moles and Frogs, is a grosse falsehood, easily discernable by every one that knows any thing almost in the Predicament of Substance. For such a one cannot be ignorant, that *bum* intervenes betwixt all these and *Animal*: Aristotle in the 7th of his *Metaph.* text. 28. saith, That the *Genus proximum* of *Mulus*, and *Equus* wants a Name. And the same may be said touching the *Genus proximum* of an Ass and a Mule.

Secondly, All these instances are impertinent, because they are of such *Efficients* and *Effects* as are *per accidens*: Whereas 'tis undeniable, that I am to be understood of such only as are *per se*: For so are *habituall* and *actual* Love, as also the sincere and cordial Expressions thereof. Thus in generall.

But to take a particular Survey of the severals:

I. When an Ass begets a Mule, it is a Monstrous and Unnatural production, and *Monstrum fuit per accidens*, as not being intended by particular nature.

II. That a Man produceth Wormes and Vermin in his Head and Entrailles, as an efficient, is new, strange, and false Philosophy: For,

I. No

1. No particular cause * can be the Efficient, viz. Principall, of any Essential forme specifically different from its own. So may concurre thereunto dispositive, disponendo, ut preparando materiam, nec non eam probando, or applicative applicando, ut in passivis, non effective, immediate attingendo productionem ipsius forme. Nay, 'tis a received Opinion, that no Angel can produce any substantiall forme, but only as causa applicans: and therefore the production of Animals out of purrid matter, is generally resolved to be by a Universall Cause, either the Heavenly Bodies, or the first cause.

* Suarez Metaph. disp. 18. f. 2. n. 26. A. verba Philos. tom. 2. p. 233. 239. 240. 241. Compton Carlton disp. 25. Phys. f. 3. no. 8. p. 304.

But 2. That man is not the Efficient of Wormes and Vermine in his Head, &c. The Reader may see in Poncius, P. 3. pag. 22, 23. Causalitatem efficientem respectu vermium, qui producuntur ab aliis causis extrinsecis: Contra homines habent activitatem respectu hominum, seu substantia illius, ex qua producuntur vermes: Ergo possunt dici habere activitatem respectu vermium; nec enim aliaratione mores habent activitatem, aut dicuntur principia productiva aliorum hominum, nisi quatenus habent activitatem productivam seminis ex qua fiunt.

Respondetur, negando consequentiam ad cuius probationem dicitur, quod non propterea precise homo dicitur esse principium alterius hominis exco, quod producat, semen ex quo fit alter homo, sed etiam, quia illud semen habet aliquam activitatem in ordine ad producendum alium illum hominem.

III. A Woman may bring forth monstrous births instead of legitimate issues, as Serpents, Moles, Froggs: but that she is the Efficient of them, viz. Per se is a palpable untruth; and that for the same reason, that man is censured to produce Wormes, and other Vermin in his Head and Entrailles. Unto this let me add, that the Effective dependant, which I speak of, is Necessary, and in some sense Essentiall. But the Dependence of these monstrous births upon a Woman, is per accidens, Fortuitous and Casual; and so most imperiently alleged.

Now

48 *The distinction of a twofold Love of God in Christ,*

Now let us summe up the State of my *Major Proposition*, and thus it runs. No word as a *Genus proximum* doth equally comprehend as its *Species*, the *Efficient per se* and the *Effect*. Unto this, now, let us see what a brave and gallant opposition you make.

You say.

1. That one word as *species infima* doth comprehend the *Efficient* and the *Effect*.

2. That one word as *Genus* doth comprehend, viz. *Mediately*, *Individuals*, whereof one is the *Efficient*, and the other the *Effect*.

3. That one word, as *Genus remotum* doth comprehend equally as *species*, the *Efficient* and the *Effect*.

4. That one word as *Genus* doth equally comprehend the *Efficient per accidens*, and the *Effect*.

Now none of all this doth in the least degree impugne my *Major Proposition*, as meant by me: And therefore I might here justly desire you to sit down, and sadly to consider, how groundlesse and foolish your *Tragical Exclamation* is against my *Major Proposition*. But I appeale from you and your ignorant and partiall *Admirers*, unto the *Learned* and *Unprejudiced Readers*.

I go on unto the *Defendants* fourth and last Shift. *There was*, saith he, in *Christ*, a twofold actuall Love of *God*. The one agreeing to him as *Comprehensor*, being a sequell of the *Beatifick Vision*; this he grants to be alwayes equally full and intense. But this love, saith he, was necessary, and therefore not meritorious. There is therefore belonging unto *Christ* another Actuall Love of *God*, as he was *Viator*, which was free, and by which he merited: and this sprang from the infused knowledge of *God*, and the infused habit of *Charity*. And this Love was more intense at one time then another, or one Act of it was more intense then another Act: and this distinction he prosecutes very largely, pag. 68. 244. 288. 290. 333. 334. 337. 330. 336. 339. 344. &c. Usque ad 357. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 372. 522. 524. 525. &c. Usque ad 540. 622. 624. 626. 627. 628. 629. 635. 636. 637.

1. This Answer I saw in *Suarez*, but could not foresee that *Dr. Ham.* would make use of it. Indeed I had no ground to think that he would: for it cannot do him the least service, as I shall shew anon; and therefore I had no Reason to trouble the Reader with any mention of it.

2. Where

2. Where you read this distinction in *Suarez*, you might have also seen an *Objection* against it, which might have deterred you from using it, if you had considered how unsatisfying *Suarez* his answers are therunto. The *Objection* is, that two accidents only numerically distinguished, cannot be at the same time in the same subject. But now *Christ* his beatific love of God, and that which springs from the infused habit of charity, are distinguished only in number: And therefore they could not be at the same time in *Christ*.

The first Proposition, that two accidents cannot be at the same time in the same subject, is a proposition that you your self acknowledge, p. 196. 256. to say the contrary, you say is a grosse absurdity, the fallshood of which, reason it self at the very first proposal is able to discover.

But it may be said, that *Suarez* hath unto this *Objection* two answers. But how unsatisfying they are, will appear by the examination of them.

The first is, that these two loves differ, not only numerically, but also specifically: *Sic hoc altero ex duobus modis probabilibus dissolvi potest. Primus est, dicendo actus illos differre specie, quia actus amoris beatifici tendit in Deum propter omnem perfectionem, & rationem, propter quam amabilis est: nam tota illa per visionem beatam distincta, & clare videtur, & proponitur voluntati; at vero amor, qui consequitur scientiam infusam, vel tantum secat in Deum sub speciali aliqua ratione boni, ut iustitiam, misericordiam, &c. v. l. solum sub ratione summi boni, quasi confuse cognita, & non distincte: propterea quatenus in se continet omnem bonitatem & perfectionem. Unde diversitas satis esse videtur ad diversitatem specificam illorum actuum. In tertia pars. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 49. l. 2. p. 632.*

Unto this I shall reply in the words of *Beccanus Sum. Theol. Scholast. part. 3. tract. 1. cap. 22. quest. 5.* having averred against *Cajetan* and *Capreolus*, that actus charitatis, in via, and in patria do not differ specie; he confirms his conclusion from the testimonie of *Aquinas*, and from reason. *Tertia Conclusio. Actus charitatis non solum potest esse tam in eisus in via, quam in patria, sed etiam tam perfectus in essentiali perfectione obiectiva. Est contra Cajetanum, & Capreolum, qui docent actum charitatis in patria esse re specie ab actus charitatis in via, & essentialiter perfectiorem esse. Ratio est, quia alter versatur circa Deum clare visum, alter circa Deum obscure cognitum. Sicut ergo clara visio, & obscura cognitio differunt specie, ita etiam amor vie, & amor patrie, qui in illis fundantur. Sed conclusio nostra est D. Thom. in 2. quest. 67. art. 6. ad 2. ubi asserit dilectionem sum re suam speciem, & essentiam, non ex cognitione, sed ex re cognita: ac prout in via & in patria esse eandem specie charitatem, quia licet cognitio sit diversa, tamen res cognita est eadem. Et confirmatur, quia diversitas essentialis in actibus voluntatis, praesertim quando conveniunt in genere proximo, debet sumi ex diversitate obiecti formalis. At in amore vie, & patrie, est idem obiectum formale, nempe infinita bonitas, qua Deus in se infinite bonus est: ergo in illis actibus non est diversitas essentialis.*

The second answer is that two accidents, a solo numero distincta, possunt scilicet superari aliter esse in eadem subjecto, &c.

The distinction of Christ's love of God as Father

But this supernatural providence of God, is not to be fled unto without a man be necessitated thereunto by some cogent argument and if you can find any such argument in *Suarez*, good leave may you have to manage it unto your best advantage.

All the argument that I can find in *Suarez*, is, that he thinks it fit to extend the merit of Christ unto his love of God. Now his beatifick love of God, was not meritorius, (saith he) because 'twas not free, but necessary: and therefore he thinks there must be another love of God in Christ assigned, which was free, and so capable of meriting. This argument you also propound very often.

Unto this argument there are in the School-men several answers, of which you take no notice: for which concealment I believe no probable reason can be rendered, but your late and small acquaintance with the School-men.

1. Some hold that Christ did merit by the beatifick act of his love of God, as terminated unto God himself. *Suarez*, in the place by you cited, quoteth for this opinion, *Alfiodorensis*, *Gabriel*, *Scotus* and *Capreolus*, unto whom you may see in *Vasquez* added, *Almain*, *Occam* Major. You referre the Reader to a short passage of *Scotus*, in the place cited by *Suarez*, which proveth nothing denied by me. But I shall now referre you to another passage in the same place, which expressly contradicts you; for there *Scotus* declareth at large how Christ merited by his beatifick love of God, as he was Comprehensor. Dico (inquit) propter argumentum, quod Christus meruit secundum portionem superiorem & secundum omnem meritum ejus. Hoc tamen est difficile tenere propter alias beatos, qui tunc videntur posse mereri in infinitum: probo autem illud, quia omnis actus acceptatus a Deo, tanquam actus bonus & laudabilis, pro quo Deus velit aliquid retribuere illi, cujus actum accipiat, vel alteri, pro quo fit, est meritorius: hujusmodi est omnis actus Christi secundum naturam humanam: etiam actus beatificus, quo secundum portionem superiorem fruitur Deo: quia persona illa non secundum omnem conditionem sui, fuit simpliciter in termino; ideo potuit Deus omnem actum creatum illius personae acceptare tanquam dignum aliquo bono pro eo retribuendo illi personae, si indignisset, vel alteri, scilicet nobis, pro quibus meruit. Et hoc tenendo, oportet dicere, quod si actus beatificus secundum portionem superiorem Christi fuit meritorius, quod non includit contradictionem actum beatificum Michaelis, vel alterius beati, posse acceptari tanquam aliquod dignum retributione, quod retributum daretur propter meritum; puta daretur Michaeli aliquid propter actum meritum custodiæ quam exerceat circa me, contradictio dico non esset; tamen de facto Deus non sic acceptat actum illum, quia persona illa est totaliter extra statum merendi secundum totum subiectum: non sic Christus, sed secundum aliquid fuit in statu viatoris, & propter hoc omnis actus ejus creatus acceptus erat, & meritorius illi, pro quibus offerrebatur Deo.

Or would think it very strange, that you should over see this passage in *Scotus*, in the very same question that you quote. I may here make use of your words concerning my self, p. 633. I can think of no other probable ground of the Defendants mistake, but only his writing at random, and con-

features upon other mens short notes and suggestions. But this over-sight is trivial, in respect of that which is in your Quotation out of *Nicholaus De Orbellis*, p. 349. for in that there are words expressly gainsaying your opinion; for they assert that it was possible for the beatific act in Christ (that is, in the Scotist-language, his fruition of God by love consequent unto the beatific vision) to be meritorious. *Ideo potuit Deus a seipsum creatum illius personae accipere sanguinem dignum pro se vel pro illis pro quibus offertur Deo, etiam actum beatificum.* Sicut enim meritum tantum consistit in ipso actu elicit, sed in conditionibus per se elicitis; sic acceptatio divina non solum respicit actum, sed conditiones accidentales suppositi elicitoris.

In pag. 637. with a great deale of gravity and scorn, you advise me for the future to let the School men and Scholastic Divinity alone, &c. But I have juster reason to advise you, that seeing you have been so unhappy in quoting *Scotus*, and his *Epitomator*, *Nicholaus De Orbellis*; to get some able friend, if not to construe, yet to expound such passages, as you shall quote for the future our of School-men: seeing you are so wonderfully prone to alledge out of them such things as make nothing for you, but aptly against you. But to return to the matter in hand.

This opinion of *Scotus* touching the meritoriousness of Christs beatific love of God, is maintained by the generality of his followers, as may be seen in two renowned ones of them, *Faber Faventinus* in *Sent. lib. 3. disp. 48. p. 210, 211, 212.* *Rada Super 3. lib. Sent. Controv. 12. a. 1. p. 338, 339.* In *Faber Faventinus* there are two other arguments, besides that already urged by *Scotus*, *Contra eandem assertionem recentiorum, quod Christus non meruerit actu beatifico, est aliud argumentum: nam certum est, quod Christus dilexit Deum ex charitate, & voluit illi bonum affectione iustitiae, & in hoc praesertim consistit meritum, ut ait Scot. & ipsi fatentur, quia radix omnis meriti apud Deum est charitas, & amor ipsius Dei, ergo non videtur negandum esse hoc meritum a Christo, at hic amor, & dilectio in Christo fuit fruitio beatifica, quia erat beatus, & videbat Deum clare, ex qua visione sequebatur dilectio, & fruitio perfectissima, qua est beatifica.*

Præterea est argumentum Scoti, sicut in nobis meritum respicit partem intellectivam, sic in Christo, sed in nobis non est meritum, nisi sit in portione superiori, neque enim meremur actibus nostris, nisi voluntas nostra perfectissime jungatur Deo actibus, qui respiciunt Deum, sicut nec peccamus, nisi voluntas nostra cedat a Deo, ergo Christus non potuit mereri secundum portionem inferiorem tantum, & non superiorem, si meruit autem superiori, hoc fuit per dilectionem Dei, quia hic actus immediate tendit in Deum, ergo dilectio, quæ est fruitio, fuit actus meritorius in Christo. loc. prædict.

Unto this some Modern-School-men answer, by distinguishing, as our Defendants; out of *Suarez*, concerning a twofold love of God in Christ, This distinction *Faber Faventinus*, in the place but now cited, first propounds, and then refutes.

He propounds it. Respondens ad hoc Asserentes ubi supra distinguen-

do de duplici actu amoris & dilectionis in Christo, nam alter actus dilectionis erat in Christo, quatenus erat comprehensor, qui sequebatur visionem beatificam; & hoc actus non meruit, quia non erat actus liber; alter vero actus dilectionis erat in Christo, in quantum erat Viator, qui sequebatur non visionem beatificam, sed cognitionem infusam, & hoc actus meruit, quia erat actus liber, & hanc sententiam asserunt esse D. Th. multis in locis, sed p. a. fertim 3. p. q. 19. a. 2. in responsione ad primum, ubi ait, quod Christus per charitatem meruit, non in quantum erat comprehensor sed ut erat Viator.

2. Having thus propounded the distinction, he replieth unto it. Sed contra hanc Responsionem est argumentum secundum Scoti principale, quo probatur, quod actus, quo anima Christi, fovebatur Deo, non poterat esse duo, sed unus tantum, quod argumentum est istud: actus fruitionis est actus adequatus potentia, quia voluntas credita firmitur quantum potest: sed una, & eadem potentia circa idem obiectum, non habet actum unum adequatum, & alterum in adequatum, & distinctum a primo, quia hoc implicat contradictionem, nam primus non esset adequatus, ergo voluntas Christi per actum fruitionis non potest diligere Deum per se amore amicitia adequate, & per alium actum eundem Deum diligere per se amore amicitia, sed in d. quate.

N. x. he sets down the Rejoynder of the Adversary, and unto it subjoyns his Triplication. Sed Responderunt, quod Major est vera, quia actus sunt omnino ejusdem rationis, sed quando sunt diversi actus, & diversae rationis, non est vera. In proposito autem sunt diversi actus specie, quia actus fractionis tendet in Deum propter omnem perfectionem, & rationem propter quam Deus est amabilis, sed amor, qui est meriti oriundus tendit in Deum propter aliquam specialem rationem, ut propter justitiam, vel misericordiam, &c. & haec diversitas dicitur esse sufficiens, ut actus ille distinguatur a priori. Secundo dicerent, quod sint diversi numero, quia tendunt in Deum, quod est obiectum idem diversis viis, quia aliud per charitatem consummatum, aliud per charitatem viam.

Sed istae Responsiones non satisfaciunt argumento, quoniam non recte probatur istos actus distinguere, nam actus distinguuntur per obiecta ex secundo de anima: at obiectum actus fruitionis per se est ipse Deus diligibilis propter se amore amicitiae, similiter obiectum primum meriti est Deus ipse diligibilis propter se amore amicitiae volendo sibi bonum, cum ergo obiectum sit idem materialiter, & secundum eandem rationem formalem actus non possunt esse diversi.

Ad primam rationem, qua probatur diversitatem specificam, dico quod illae circumstantiae, non pluriificant essentiam actus, sed solum mutant in eo aliquas circumstantias, & accidentia, externa autem accidentia non pluriificant substantiam rei.

Præterea dato, quod illae circumstantiae faciant diversitatem actus, tunc non solvitur argumentum, quia nos hic quaerimus, an actus amoris, qui tendit in Deum plene, & amat illum amore amicitiae toto corde, & interiori modo, quo potest, sit meritorius, necne, non de aliis actibus dilectionis sub variis circumstantiis minus perfectis, nam videtur absurdum non esse.

negare in Christo actum illum perfectiorem, quo dilexit Deum totis viribus, non esse meritorium, cum in nobis sit meritorius. Secunda ratio non concludit, quia eadem charitas, quæ est in via, remanet in Patria, ut docet Scot. in hoc 3. suo loco, ideo ex medio non distinguuntur istiusmodi. Præterea, ut dictum est, in diuino non variatur actus substantialiter, sed accidentaliter, at distinctio accidentaliter nihil facit.

Præterea argumentum Scot. stat in suo robore, vis enim argumenti est, quia nulla potentia eadem potest habere unum actum adæquatum circa aliquid obiectum, & simul alterum actum inadæquatum circa idem obiectum, quia implicat contradictionem, ratio est, quia in illo primo actu adæquato includitur actus imperfectus, & inadæquatus. Ad propositum, actus fruitionis est actus, quo perfectissime, & sub omnibus circumstantiis diligit illud obiectum, ergo non potest alio actu sub alia circumstantia diligere idem obiectum, quia jam hic actus includitur in illo, & frustra multiplicatur. Quod verò dicunt Di Th. fuisse huius sententiae, ego puto falsum, quia loco citato, dum ait, Christum meruisse charitate non in quantum erat comprehensor, sed viator, non infert diversitatem actus ut ipsi volunt, sed diversitatem status personæ; ac si dicat, Christus meruit actu elicitō ex charitate, qui actus erat fructus, sed quia actus ille erat personæ, quæ simul erat Viator, & Comprehensor, illo meruit, non in quantum erat comprehensor, sed in quantum erat viator, & hoc modo eum intelligendo, convenit cum Scot. ut infra videbimus. Sed dices, potuit Christus habere duplicem actum cognitionis Dei, scilicet per visionem beatificam, & per scientiam infusam: Ergo potuit quoque habere duplicem actum amoris, alterum per fruitionem beatam, alterum per charitatem infusam. Respondent, quod non est par ratio de scientiâ, & amore, quia scientia erat de eodem obiecto, sed diverso modo cognito, & per diversa media, quæ faciunt cognitionem esse diversam, distinguitur enim scientia penes modum, sed amor, ut his loquimur, est de eodem obiecto, eodem modo, ac etiam medio. Faber Faventinus, lib. 3. dist. 18. q. 1. disp. 44.

There are two considerable Objections against this doctrine of Scotus, which are at large propounded and answered in these two eminent Scotists. * Sed est tunc etiam mentionem, * Faber Faventinus and Rada.

concedatur Christum meruisse actum fruitionis, & beatificam, videtur idem dicendum de aliis beatis, quod est absurdum, quia Beati in Patria sunt actibus non merentur, quia sunt in termino. Respondet Scot. non valere consequentiam, ratio est, quia ut superius dictum est in ratione meriti includitur acceptatio divina, placet ergo Deo acceptare omnes actus Christi, tam portionis inferioris, & partis sensitivæ, quam portionis superioris, & beatificos pro meritis, ideo factio hoc pactum ab æternis, actus illi erant meritorii, & hoc eodem modo potuisset actus aliorum Beatorum pro meritis acceptasse, si voluisset, & fecisset, hoc pactum, quia non implicat contradictionem, tamen quia non fecit hoc pactum, ideo illi non sunt meritorii, non fecit autem Deus hoc pactum acceptandi actus Beatorum pro meritis, quia in illis non erat congruitas, quæ erat in actibus Christi, dum erat in hac vita, nam Christus in hac vita non erat congruus Deo, quo ad affectionem commodi perfecte, ut ceteri beati, sed poterat

poterat pati, & de facto patiebatur, ergo suis congruum, quod omnes alius Christi, etiam beati, acceptarentur pro meritis ratione personae, quae erat Viator. Faber Aventinus in tertium lib. Sent. dist. 44. p. 332.

Sed hic modus dicendi difficilis est propter alios beatos qui tunc videntur posse mereri in infinitum. Nihilominus tamen probatur, quoniam omnis actus acceptatus a Deo, tanquam actus bonus, & laudabilis pro quo Deus velit aliquid retribuere illi cuius actum acceptat, vel alteri pro quo sit meritum. Sed omnis actus Christi secundum naturam humanam, etiam actus beatificus voluntatis est huiusmodi, ergo est meritorius. Consequentia optima est cum maiori, minor probatur. Nam quia persona Christi non fuit secundum omnem conditionem sui simpliciter in termino, potuit Deus omnem actum creatum ejus acceptare, tanquam dignum aliquo bono, pro eo retribuendo, vel Christo si indignisset, vel alteri, si nobis pro quibus meruit. Ex quo inferitur non esse contradictionem, nec eam includere, actum beatificum Michaelis, vel alterius beati acceptari tanquam aliquod dignum retributione, quod daretur propter meritum. De facto tamen nullum actum beatificum alicujus beati, nec quemlibet alium acceptavit, nec acceptat, quia persona cuiuscunque beati est totaliter extra statum merendi secundum totum subiectum. Non sic Christus, sed secundum aliquid fuit in statu Viatoris propter quod omnis ejus creatus actus liber acceptus erat, & meritorius illis pro quibus offerebatur Deo. Sed obijciat, quomodo Christus mereri potuit cum secundum portionem superiorem fuerit extra viam, non minus, quam alii beati, videtur. sane, quod non plus mereri potuerit quam alius beatus in Patria.

Respondeo cum Scotis, quod siue meritum non respicit, nec consistit tantum in ipso actu elicto, sed aliquo modo in conditionibus personae suae suppositi elicientis, sic acceptatio Divina non solum respicit actum, sed condiciones etiam accidentales suppositi elicientis. Atque ita actus Christi etiam beatificus, cum ipse esset viator, nec totaliter in termino potuit ob hanc conditionem acceptari, non tamen actus beatificus alterius beati, licet in hoc nulla esset contradictio. Rada Super tert. lib. sent. contr. 12. a. 1. p. 338. 339.

The first is taken from a comparison of Christ's beatific love, with that of the blessed Angels and Saints in heaven. If his beatific love of God be meritorious, then also that of the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven is so too: But this is absurd, for then they should merit unto all eternity.

They both answer out of Scotus by denial of the sequel of the Major, and for this denial they give this reason: God's acceptance is requisite unto merit, Now God accepteth all the created acts of Christ as meritorious, whereas he made no Covenant with, or promise unto the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven, touching any such acceptance. And for this different dispensation towards them and Christ, they lay down out of Scotus this following congruence. Whilst Christ was here in this life, he was Viator as well as Comprehensive, and consequently all his created actions were capable of meriting: for merit regards not only the action meriting, but also the state and condition of the person performing the action: but now the blessed Angels and Saints in Heaven were absolutely and altogether comprehensive, and so in termino extra statum merendi incapable of meriting: You see then they resolve the meritoriousness of Christ's beatific love of God into the condition of Christ's person. Christ merited by it, not so much because 'twas beatific, but because 'twas the love of

a person who was in some respect *liberator*, in which was a state of meriting.
A second Objection is drawn from the necessity of *Christ's* beatifick love of God: Every meritorious act is free; for freedom is essentially requisite unto merit. But now *Christ's* beatifick love of God was not free, because 'twas necessary. And freedom and necessity are incompatible in the same act: It followeth therefore that *Christ's* beatifick love of God was not meritorious. This argument the *Defendant* inculcates frequently.

The *Scottists* answer by denying the Minor. *Christ's* beatifick love of God was, say they, free, though not with a freedom of indifference, yet with a freedom of complacency, and that not only concomitant, but causal. I call that concomitant, which is in acts whereof the will is not a cause, *qua voluntas sibi complacet in aliquo, esse respectu ejus nullius cause rationem habet*: and such a freedom there was (say they) in the *Father's* begetting of the *Sonne*, the *Father* had a complacency therein, and was well-pleased therewith. But he did not beget the *Sonne* by any act of his will. I call that causal, which is in acts whereof the will is a cause. This is that liberty which the *Scottists* call the essential liberty of the will, and is by *Rada* thus defined. *Hec libertas est complacenter cognitionis finis sub propria finis ratione, supposita, quasi se determinare ad agendum, sive con ingenter se determinet, sive necessario*. In 1. lib. sent. Controv. 13. p. 207. This freedom the *Scottists* make to agree unto every elicit act of the will, and consequently unto the beatifick love of God. And the reason that they give, is, because freedom is essential to the will, and is predicated of it *quasi in ipsum*, and a quatenus ad de omni valet argumentum: What is predicated of the will as the will, is predicated of every act of the will. This reason is urged very acutely by *Father* *Fontenay* against *Cajetan*, who saith that the will is a free agent only in respect of some acts, and not in regard of others. Contra: vel competit voluntati secundum essentiam, & absolute esse principium liberum, vel non: si non ergo voluntas accidentaliter est principium liberum, & tunc quæro, quoniam sit illa potentia, cui inest principium agendi libere per essentiam, vel est voluntas vel non dabitur principium liberum essentialiter, quod est absurdum, quia omne per accidens reducitur ad aliquod per se, datur principium liberum per accidens; ergo debet dari principium liberum per essentiam. Si dicas voluntas respectu aliquorum actuum est libera per essentiam, respectu aliorum est naturale principium. Contra quod inest alicui per essentiam, & secundum quod ipsum inest i universaliter. Ex Arist. 1. Post. c. 4. exemplum. Homo per essentiam, & secundum quod ipsum est rationalis, ideo omnis actus, qui provenit ab homine per essentiam, est rationalis, i. per rationem factus, unde actus naturales sentientes, vegetandi, &c. quia non sunt rationales non competunt homini, ut homo est, sed ut animal & vivens: Est ergo verissimum, quod inest alicui secundum quod ipsum inest ei universaliter, tunc sic, at voluntas est principium liberum per essentiam, ergo universaliter est libera respectu omnis actus vel est dicendum, quod non est libera per essentiam, sed per accidens, quod jam rejectum est, ut absurdum, si dicas quod inest voluntas.

voluntati secundum essentiam, tunc sic. Duo prædicata contraria, & mutuò se destruentia, non possunt inesse eidem subjecto, secundum idem, quia implicat repugnantiam, sed voluntati secundum essentiam inest esse principium liberum, ergo non potest secundum essentiam inesse principio naturali, ut contra distinguitur à libero, ut in proposito interuenimus, ex hac ergo ratione colligitur, quod voluntas essentialiter est libera non naturalis, & sic patet, quod ratio Scoti concludit, non solum quod agere naturaliter, & agere liberè sunt differentie primæ entis, quæ non possunt inesse eidem potentie, & principio essentialiter, sed necessario constituunt duo opposita principia activa, quorum unum non reducitur ad alterum, nec ambo ad tertium, & per hoc impugnatur, quod voluntas respectu finis claretur, & beatitudinis in communi habeat actum naturalem, si enim est potentia essentialiter libera, omnis actus elicitus ab ea est ei liber non naturalis.

Confirmatur, quia alicuius voluntas in primo instanti, quo habet actum naturalem, non esset voluntas, sed natura, & ita non haberet esse perfectum, sed transiret de imperfecto ad perfectum, quod de divina voluntate est absurdum, & etiam de creata quia illa in instanti prodicatur, & ideo in illo habet totam suam perfectionem. In lib. 1. Sent. disp. 37. P. 223.

Utrò Faber Faventinus let me adde Rada, who Lib. 1. Contr. 13. p. 210. 211. proves largely, That the will, quatenus potentia est, cannot be considered prout natura est, as nature is an active principle distinct from that which is free, and therefore consequently cannot have any natural act, but all its acts are free.

Quinta conclusio voluntas quatenus potentia est, nequit considerari, ut natura, prout natura est principium activum distinctum contra liberum, nec ut talis aliquam actionem habet. Probo priorem hujus conclusionis partem. Primo potentia naturalis & potentia libera sunt oppositæ potentie, ergo eadem voluntas non potest considerari, & ut natura, & potentia libera, vel distingui in naturam, & potentiam liberam. Antecedens probatur, quia Arist. 9. Met. tex. & 6. distinguit liberum a naturali. Consequentia probatur, quia tunc idem distingueretur in se, & in oppositum sui, sicut si animal distingueretur in animal, & non animal, vel homo in hominem & equum. Quod patet: quia (ut diximus) potentia naturalis & libera opponuntur, sed distinctio, qua distinguitur idem in seipsum, & in oppositum sui, est prorsus absurda, ut de se patet: ergo illa distinctio, qua voluntas in naturam & liberam distinguitur, est absurda. Confirmatur argumentum, quia unica potentia non potest habere geminum operandi modum oppositum atque diversum: sed agere liberè & naturaliter sunt modi oppositi immediatè divergentes potentiam activam, ut supra diximus: Ergo voluntas non potest per modum naturæ & libertatis, utrumque consideretur, operari, &c.

Ad confirmationem dico, maximum esse inconveniens eandem po-

sentiam specie, & numero diversos, & oppositos omnino operandi modos habere. Nam sicut duas differentias idem genus dividentes eadem specie inesse implicat: ita implicat omnino idem principium specie, & numero habere diversos, & oppositos operandi modos, quales sunt agere libere, & naturaliter, quod ex æquo, & immediate dividunt principium activum. Et cum obijciatur, quod anima operatur cum discursu, & sine discursu in ordine ad diversa, scilicet principia, & conclusiones, Respondetur quod ut ait Scotus in 2. d. 1. q. 6. 110A. agere cum discursu & sine discursu, non sunt modi oppositi, atque diversi, diversas naturas indicantes, cum eidem naturæ rationali insint: at vero agere libere, & agere per modum naturæ, modi sunt omnino oppositi diversi nec. sicut principii convenientes: quia principium activum prima divisione dividitur in liberum & naturale, &c.

Secunda pars ejusdem conclusionis, ut puta, quod voluntas nullam operationem habeat, ut natura, sed ut voluntas, probatur. Voluntas ut natura, prout natura distinguitur contra agens liberum, nullatenus potest sine repugnantia considerari: Ego ut natura non potest habere actionem. Patet, cum consideras voluntatem, ut naturam, vel ly natura, limitur pro principio opposito, & distincto contra liberum: & hoc jam manet impugnatum. Vel accipitur in communi ad principium liberum & naturale. Et si sic, clarum est quod nullam potest habere operationem: quia operatio cum sit singularis & determinata, necessario eam habet à principio singulari determinato: Ergo necessarius debet esse, vel principium liberum, vel naturale: Ergo si est illa actio à voluntate, ut natura nec. sicut voluntas ut sic, erit agens per modum naturæ, vel liberum, sed non primum propter dicta: Ergo secundum: Ergo voluntas, ut natura, est voluntas, ut libera: Ergo agit libere. Et confirmatur: quia sicut omnis actus elicited intellectus est ab intellectu, quatenus intellectus est: ita omnis actus voluntatis, est à voluntate, ut voluntas, & libera est. Et certe si voluntas præcise, ut natura quædam est, consideratur, solum habet propensionem & inclinationem in suum finem sicut lapis in centrum: quia omnis actus & operatio elicita ejus est ab ipsa, ut potentia libera est contra potentiam naturalem distincta. Quod voluntas ut natura nullam habeat operationem, tenet subtilis Doctor in 3. d. 15. lit. A. & dist. 33. paulo antelicitur.

Whereas 'tis added for the confirmation of the Minor, that Christ's beatifick love of God was necessary, as being a necessary consequent of the beatifical vision in him, and freedom and necessity are repugnant.

Unto this the *Scotists* * answer, that there is no such repugnancy * *Unde pro betwixt freedom and necessity, as is imagined: indeed a natural agent, dilucidatione*
hujus rei, & rationum in oppositum, notandum est, ut elicitor ex Scoto quodl. 16. a. 2. circa finem, & dicemus in Metaph. in propria disp. hæc quatuor, contingens, necessarium, naturale, & liberum posse habere, quod contingens, & necessarium opponitur, ut patet ex Arist. 2. Peri-
and

ber. in c. de modalibus similiter naturale, & liberum opponuntur, ut patet ex eorum definitionibus. Naturale enim est quod determinatum ad agendum, liberum, quod est indeterminatum ad agendum, sed ipsum determinat, ex qua sequitur necessarium stare cum naturali, & cum libero, quia illis non opponitur, non autem stare cum contingenti; similiter sequitur liberum stare posse cum necessario, & cum contingenti, quia illis non opponitur, non autem possit stare cum naturali. Confirmatur, quia in philosophia multa naturaliter fiunt, & tamen per accidens sive contingenter fiunt, ut monstra, & quæ casus, & fortuna eveniunt, ut submersio navis contingit, &c. Et tamen cause per se illius omnes sunt naturales, multa etiam naturaliter, & contingenter non pignuntur, non ergo hæc contrarietate, aliquid sit naturaliter, ergo necessario; similiter multa necessario ex natura, & non naturaliter, ut quæ coactæ, & violentæ fiunt.

Merius multa liberè fiunt, & tamen necessario non contingenter, unde omnes communiter dicunt, Deum diligere se liberè & præsertim D. To. q. 10. de Potentia. a. 2. ad 4. diligit ergo Deus se liberè necessario, & non tamen naturaliter, quia si liberè, & necessario hoc esset idem, quod naturaliter posset: etiam Thomistæ dicere, quod Spiritus sanctus liberè & naturaliter produciatur, quod tamen dicunt repugnare, ut recte repugnat ex eorum definitionibus, omnes ergo sustinentes Deum esse agens liberum, dicunt Deum necesse a se diligere, & tamen liber ut Theologi, & multi ex Peripateticis, licet in actibus ad extra ponant Deum agere necessario, & beati in patria secundum nos liberè diligunt Deum, & tamen necessario, licet ergo in voluntate creata pro hoc statu contingentia, concomitenter libertatem, & sæpe confundantur, tamen propriè loquendo non sunt idem, ut vidimus, ex hoc patet solus dubitat omis, quia licet concedamus Spiritum Sanctum procedere liberè non tamen ab hoc sequitur contingenter produci. Faber Faventinus. In 1^{mo} lib. Sent. disp. 37. c. 4. p. 224. 225.

and a free are opposite, and so also a necessary agent and contingent: And therefore the same agent in the same act cannot work naturally and freely, necessarily, and contingently. But now there is no such opposition betwixt natural and contingent, and betwixt free and necessary; and hereupon it followeth, that a natural agent may work contingently, and per accidens, as we see in Monsters, in casus, and fortuna: and so again on the other side, a free agent may work necessarily, thus God loves himself most freely, and yet withal most necessarily too. Rada hath four very shrewd Arguments, to prove the consistency of the highest freedom, with the highest necessity, which I shall insert for the Defendant to try his utmost still upon. Quod summa necessitas stat cum summa libertate, probò multipliciter. Primo voluntas divina necessario vult bonitatem suam (ut supra ostendimus) & tamen in volendo eam est libera: igitur libertas stat cum summa necessitate. Consequentia tenet, minorem verò probò. Voluntas divina refert ad finem alia objecta, quæ sunt volubilia propter finem, igitur ipsa sua eadem ratione potentia est operativa circa utrumque: sed circa ea, quæ sunt ad finem, operatur sub ratione potentia libera, ut etiam Thomistæ concedunt, ergo etiam circa finem, (ut pura circa bonitatem suam) operatur sub ratione potentia libera, ergo liberè vult bonitatem suam. Prima

• Prima consequentia hujus argumentationis probatur, quia potentia operans circa unum objectum, non absolute, sed in ordine ad aliud, eadem sub eadem ratione est operativa circa utrumque. Quod patet ex Philosoph. 2. de anima text. Com. 146. ubi ait, quod potentia illa, quae cognoscimus differentiam unius objecti ab alio, illam sub eadem ratione potentiae, cognoscit utrumque; ergo similiter in proposito potentia operans circa unum objectum in ordine ad aliud, ipsa sub eadem ratione potentiae, operabitur circa utrumque. Et confirmatur quia alias oporteret constituere unam potentiam, quae verteretur circa finem, & aliam circa media.

• Secundo probatur. Libertas est Condicio intrinseca voluntatis absolute, vel in ordine ad actum volendi, ergo est composibilis cum conditione perfecta operationis perfectae circa perfectissimum Objectum, praesertim illa conditio non repugnat, imò otest convenire tali operationi: sed talis conditio in operatione perfecta est necessitas: Ergo libertas est composibilis cum necessitate. Antecedens est manifestum, quia voluntas natura sua intrinseca libera est. Consequentia probatur, quia conditio intrinseca potentiae, quae secundum se nullam dicit imperfectionem, non potest esse contraria, perfectioni operationis ejusdem potentiae, quia tunc prorsus repugnaret hujusmodi potentiae habere perfectam operationem etiam in ente infinito, in quo reperitur. Sed quod talis conditio perfecta, sit necessitas, patet, quia perfectio voluntatis, unde voluntas est, est diligere Deum, ergo perfectio est habere illam operationem firmiter, & necessario. Et confirmatur, quia posse non habere illam dicit imperfectionem, ergo necessario habere illam, perfectionis est maximae, & rursus, ergo est possibilis illa necessitas in operatione perfecta voluntatis, ut voluntas est: alias enim, nec in Deo reperiretur.

• Tercio probatur. Actio circa finem ultimum, ut finis est, est perfectissima, ergo necessitas in tali actione non tollit, sed magis ponit id, quod ad ejus perfectionem per se pertinet, sed libertas maxime eam perficit, ergo necessitas quae in tali actione reperitur, non tollit, sed ponit potius libertatem. Probo assumptionem, quia actio libera ex natura sua est perfectior cunctis operationibus, ut in controversiis quarti, Deo favente, ostendemus.

• Quarto probatur. Quanto actio voluntatis circa finem ultimum est magis necessaria, tanto est liberior. Ergo summa necessitas est composibilis cum summa libertate. Consequentia est evidens, antecedens probo, quia secundum Anselmum & Augustinum, quos supra citavimus, illa voluntas est liberior, quae omnino à rectitudine deviare non potest, sed illa quae necessario simpliciter diligit bonum infinitum à rectitudine nullatenus deviare potest, ergo illa est liberrima: sed talis est divina voluntas respectu dilectionis Dei, &c. ergo est respectu carum liberrima. In 1^o lib. Sent. Controv. 13. p. 213, 214.

The Defendant is pleased to say, page 68. That the Saints and Angels

Angels in heaven love God freely, with a freedom improperly taken, for a liberty from co-action.

* *Conditio intrinseca potentie non repugnat perfectioni in operando ipsius potentie, siue absolute potentia consideretur, siue in ordine ad actum perfectum, s. d. libertas s. conditio intrinseca, & essentialis, voluntatis, ergo non repugnat perfectioni ipsius voluntatis in operando circa actum perfectissimum.* Faber Faventinus In ^{1^{um}} lib. S. nr. disp. 37. c. 3. p. 221.

But first, the *Scotists* * will tell him that freedom is attributed unto their love of God in the greatest propriety. For the *beatific* love is the greatest perfection incident unto their wills: and freedom is an *intrinsic* and *essential* condition of their wills. Now (say they) that which is *intrinsic* and *essential* unto a power or faculty, cannot be repugnant unto the greatest perfection thereof: therefore the *beatific* love of God which is *necessary* and *freedom*, are no ways inconsistent.

Secondly, In their love of God there is a freedom, not only from coercion, but also from natural necessity, such as that which is in the motion of a stone downward, which presupposeth no act of the understanding. The necessity which is in their love of God, is not such a necessity, but a *voluntary* necessity, which hath alwayes foregoing an act of intellectual knowledge. And this for the first answer unto the difficulty propounded.

There is by some School-men given another, indeed a quite contrary answer: and 'tis, that Christs love of God was not *meritorious*, and in asserting this they think there is no absurdity, because there is otherwise a very wide and spacious field for Christs merit, in the acts of his love of man, and in the acts of his other virtues. Of this opinion *Beccanus* makes mention, *Sum. Theol. Scholast.* tom. 5. c. 14. q. 3. *Alij sic sicut Christum fuisse viatorem, non solum ratione carnis, & anime passibilis, sicut jam explicatum est, sed etiam ratione anime, quatenus amabat proximos. Comprehensorem vero, ratione anime, quatenus amabat Deum clare visum. Itaque, meruisse per actum charitatis circa proximos, non tamen per actum charitatis circa Deum.* This opinion he thinks to be probable, and *Suarez* in 3^{am} part. *Thom.* tom. 1. disp. 39. S. 2. saith that it may easily be defended. The contrary opinion therefore, at the most is but a *Scholastical Problem*. But *Vasquez* hath a full defence of this Opinion, that Christs love of God was not meritorious: and with it he joyneth a refutation of this distinction of Christs love, given by *Suarez*, and others: the passage is somewhat large, but because 'tis home, and accurate, I hope I shall have the Readers patience for the inserting of it.

* *Mihi vero multo probabilius semper visum est, Christum non meruisse per affectum ullum charitatis, & dilectionis erga Deum, sed per opera aliarum virtutum, tam circa se, quam circa proximum, &c.*

Primum igitur Christum non meruisse per illum actum charitatis
 bonum ex scientia infusa in Doctrina S. Thomæ, manifestum est, nam
 cum ille aperte dicat q. 11. a. 1. essentiam Dei, ac proinde mysterium
 ipsum Trinitatis, non cecidisse sub scientiam infusam, id quod nos etiam
 supra disputatione 53. c. 11 satis superius probavimus, consequitur
 nullum potuisse in Christo esse affectum dilectionis erga Deum præter
 illum, quem vocant beatificum, cumque ille non potuerit esse merito-
 rius, ut præcedenti capite monstravimus, efficitur etiam, per nullum
 actum dilectionis Dei Christum mereri potuisse; quamvis enim dicimus,
 in Christo mansisse scientiam naturalem unius Dei, tamen illa
 non potuit esse principium dilectionis ipsius Dei ex charitate, ut mani-
 festum est. Præterea cum Christus non habuerit fidem, sequitur, ex
 nulla cognitione potuisse Deum diligere. Age tamen, concedamus
 Christo scientiam-infusam-essentia Dei distinctam ab adquisita, nihilo-
 minus frustra in eo concedemus duos affectus charitatis erga Deum, al-
 terum ortum ex visione clara Dei, alterum ex scientia infusa; nam af-
 fectus dilectionis tendit in rem cognitam, sicut in subiectum, non au-
 tem in ipsam cognitionem: ergo licet esset scientia infusa Dei in Chri-
 sto, quia tamen esset eadem bonitas ipsius Dei proposita voluntati per
 scientiam infusam, & per visionem, idem effectus esset dilectionis: qua
 ratione, ut communis fert opinio Theologorum, eadem est dilectio Dei
 in via, & in patria, & quamvis visio Dei in patria esset causa novius
 dilectionis Dei, quia intensius eliceretur, aut alio modo, tamen non po-
 test esse causa diversus actus secundum speciem, & uterque actus simul
 non posset manere in patria, etiam si in patria posset manere fides, non
 quidem alia ratione, nisi quia dum voluntas movetur circa objectum du-
 plici modo cognitum, solum ab eo allicitur prout perfectiori modo cog-
 nito, ipsum autem prout cognitum minus perfecto modo nihil movet
 voluntatem, ac si eo modo cognitum non esset & hoc quisque quotidie
 in se ipso experitur; nam cum quis diligit alium ex relatu, atque ip-
 sum, & ea, quæ de ipso audiverat, postea videt, jam non ex relatu,
 sed ex clara visione, & experientia ipsum diligit, & aliorum testimoniu-
 tum nihil in ipso operatur, ut eam diligit: quæ doctrina multo majori
 ratione in præfenti locum habet; nam cum essentia divina per claram vi-
 sionem perfectissimo modo videatur, ita ut necessario ad se trahat vo-
 luntatem per affectum amoris, ut supra diximus, neque addere sapiet ad
 se voluntatem, ut ipsa deinceps moveri non possit ex alio genere cog-
 nitionis ad diligendum Deum alio affectu, aut eodem. Quod verò
 dicitur Johannis 14. Sed ut cognoscat mundus, quia d. Igo patrem, &
 sicut mandatum dedit mihi Pater, sic facio, surgite, eamus hinc, non
 probat Christum per dilectionem Dei nobis redemptionem meruisse,
 quia eo loco solum commendatur charitas Christi erga Patrem,
 & obedientia, de merito autem, & operatione meritoria non a-
 gitur.

Here Vasquez presupposeth two things already proved by him,

1. That

Some School-men hold Christs love of God not meritorious.

1. That in Christ there was no infused knowledge of the essence of God and the mystery of the Trinity distinct from the beatifical vision.

2. That Christs beatifical love of God was not meritorious.

Having premised these two things, he next proves, that though there were in Christ an infused knowledge of the essence of God distinct from the beatifical vision; yet it could not hereupon follow, that there should be in him a love of God distinguished from that, which was the sequel of the beatifical vision; and the reason is, because there was one and the same goodness propounded unto his will, by the infused knowledge and the beatifical vision; and therefore the same effect of love, where the will is moved, and stirred up about an object known after a twofold manner, it is only allured, and wrought upon as 'tis known, after the more perfect way and manner, thus when I come to see by experience those good things in a man, which before I knew only by report, I then love him only upon mine own experimental knowledge, and no longer upon the relation of others.

Lastly, Suppose this distinction of Christs love of God were true and sound, yet 'tis utterly unserviceable for the defence of Dr. Hammond, and that by the opinion of the *D. fendant* himself: For Dr. Hammond (saith he) is to be understood of the acts of Christs love terminated towards man for Gods sake: Now the *Autors* and *Fauctors* of this distinction, understand it expressly concerning the act of Christs love as terminated towards God himself, and they do distinguish it from the acts of his love of his neighbour. This is so plain in *Suarez*, out of whom the *D. fendant* borroweth the distinction, as that one would think it impossible for the *Gentl. man* to oversee it. But this oversight renders it very probable, that he never read *Suarez* himself, but had the distinction sent him from some friend, who knew not the consistency of it with his other distinctions.

* Dico ergo primo, habuisse Christum actum amoris Dei liberum, supernaturalem, & elicatum a charitate, & ab amore beatifico distinctum, &

illo actu perfectissime meruisse. Ita intelligo sententiam D. Tho. hic solutione ad primum dicentis, meruisse Christum per charitatem non in quantum erat charitas comprehensiva, sed in quantum erat viatoris: ubi de charitate loquitur, prout terminatur ad Deum. Suarez in 3 part. Thom. tom. 1. disp. 39. S. 2. p. 622.

Unto this we may adde, that those that stickle for this twofold actual love of God in Christ, as terminated unto God himself, have not so much as one word or syllable for the indifferency of his love as Viator, touching the degrees, whereof all the indifferency that they assert therein, is *Contradictionis quoad exercitium actus*. So much is affirmed by *Gregory De Valentia* tom. 4. disp. 1. q. 19. puncta 2. *Hanc actum charitatis aiunt in Christo fuisse aliquo modo liberum: ita scilicet, ut posset ab eo certe aliquando desistere, &c. quam libertatem modo dicendi in Scholis usitato, vocant libertatem quoad actus exercitium*

tantum

The distinction of a twofold love of God in Christ, &c.

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tantum, &c. But our *Defendant* himself will not deny, that all the inward acts of the love of God in Christ, that were terminated immediately on God himself, were always at the highest equally intense: And therefore this distinction being meant of the acts of Christs love of God as terminated unto God himself, can do *Dr. Hammond* no service at all in this Controversie.

Having beaten the *R. father* from all his Evasions, I shall next examine what he saith unto my three Arguments.

The *first* is drawn from the all fullness and perfection of Christs habitual grace. The habits of all graces and virtues in Christ were always full and perfect, most intense, and not capable of further or higher degrees, and therefore so are the inward acts or actions of those graces and virtues too. Now what is said in general of the habits of all graces, may in particular be averred of the habitual grace of divine charity. That in Christ was always full and perfect, most intense, and not capable of further or higher degrees, and therefore so were the inward acts, that is, actions thereof too. Here are two Enthymems implied, the latter subordinates unto the former: For habitual grace is the *genus* of divine charity, and not the equivalent thereof, as the *Defendant* fondly thinks. That I make in p. 330. B. the Consequence of the latter Enthymem; I proved p. 3. 4. 12. from which the confirmation of the former may easily be collected. The said proof of the Consequence I shall briefly repeat, and somewhat enforce. And *us*, that there can no other ground be assigned, for the intension of the action of loving of God in Christ, but the intension of the habit of love: which *Dr. Hammond* and his *Defendant* both affirm, in Christ to be always so full, and intense, as that it was not capable of further or higher degrees: For an action is not capable of degrees of intension and remission, but *secondarily*, *mediate qualitate*, which it produceth, or from which it proceedeth, *ratione termini*, or *ratione principij*: it cannot be *ratione termini*: any quality that was the *effective term*, the product of the inward action of love; for that there is no such term or product of the action of love, hath now been largely confirmed. And if it be said, that it was *ratione principij*, then it must be in regard of the habitual grace of divine love: for there are but two qualities, that are the principles of the action of loving God in Christ; the power or faculty of the will, and the habitual grace of love. Now the power or faculty of willing, cannot be intended in any man: and the habitual grace of love in Christ, was always so intense, as that in him it was incapable of further intension; and consequently all the inward actions flowing therefrom, were of an equal intension.

Here your Answer unto which you referre, is, that I ignorantly, or willfully confound the immanent acts of love with the action of loving, &c. And that the *Doctor* speaks of the *immanent acts of love*, and not of all the actions, p. 21, 22.

The Authors Arguments vindicated from

But *first*, I have proved, that there are no such things in *verum natura*, as the acts of love distinguished from their actions as their terms.

Secondly, Suppose that there were such terms, yet that the *Declar* cannot reasonably be understood of them, hath been sufficiently demonstrated.

Unto this I add *ex abundanti*, the testimonies of some few Schoolmen, from which may be gathered, that the *habit* and the *act*, are always equal in *gradual perfection*; and from this it will follow, that if the *habit* be always equally intense, the *act* must be so too. But now for preventing all future mistakes, and to cut off the *Dissidents* Objections, I shall lay down, of this a *limitation*, which might easily have been foreseen, and is usually in things of this and the like nature. It is to be understood *ceteris paribus*, provided that all other causes concur equally, and uniformly unto the *act*, so that the *habit* be not hindered by them, but left to its natural way of working. Now in *Christ cetera e-rant paria*: there was no disparity but a most absolute and perfect equality, and uniformity in the influence of other causes, *viz*. The will of *Christ*, and Gods assisting grace, in the production of his actual love of God, his will never willed any abatement of the *act*, and God never withdrew his assisting grace in the least degree or measure: and therefore his habitual love of God wrought in him always equally and uniformly, as to the inward *act* thereof. Having promised this limitation, which I shall intreat the Reader to carry along with him in his mind in that which follows, Let us come unto what you say unto the testimonies themselves.

First, you quarrel me for that I cite not *Aquinas* from his own writings, But quote him twice from *Capreolus*, but I had very good reason for this, for the passages that I quote are not in *Aquinas* his Summes or in his book *Contra gentes*, which is all that I have of *Aquinas*. The first passage he quotes out of *Aquinas De Virtutibus*, q. 1. a. 11. and the second is out of the same work, *questio de charitate art. 10*. I believe that if you had read *Capreolus*, you would have been as much to seek to find these places in *Aquinas* as I was. If you can direct me to them I shall thank you, but I suppose 'tis a book not commonly to be had.

The first testimony you do not answer, but outface. From it I truly (as you grant) concluded, that a greater vehemency in the operation of love, argued a greater participation in the subject of the habit of love. Now from this it undeniably followeth, that if the operation of love be more vehement at one time than another, then the subject doth more participate of the habit of love, at one time than another: and whether this be not to the purpose, Let any man judge.

The pertinency of the second testimony, is as evident as that of the first. For if it be, as you grant, an undoubted truth, that *idem est charitatem augeri secundum essentiam, & ipsam habere efficaciam ad producendum ferventioris dilectionis actum*; then 'tis also as undeniable a truth, inevitably following hereupon, that if the habit of charity be

licacious, in producing a habit of more fervent love, at one time than at another, the habit of charity is encreased; according to its essence, at one time more than another.

In answer unto the third testimony you spend part of four pages, which is all nothing to the purpose: for you mistake the place of *Aquinas*, supposing it to be *2. 2. q. 24. a. 8. Co.* whereas it is not, (as I have shewn out of *Capiculus*) in his *Summa* at all.

Unto the place out of *Scotus*, the *Defendant*, to amuse the Reader, talks a great deal: p. 341, 342. but I must needs profess, that I cannot pick out of all that he saith, so much as one syllable that is applicable in a way of answer. Unto what I urge out of *Scotus*, *Actus naturaliter elicited* (pray good Mr. *Defendant* mark the word *naturaliter*;) *ab aliqua forma equa in se ipsa* is *fiction illi formae*.

But of what I urged out of *Huado De Mendocia*, that *in se ipso actus secundi supponit aequalem in ensi nem in actu primo*, you have a very rare, and lubrile explication. His meaning is, say you, that the second act cannot possibly exceed the first, in gradual perfection, though it may come thort of it; p. 334, 337. Away Trifler: before you write any more *Commentaries*, learn some *Systeme of Logic*: And indeed every *Systeme of Logic* will discover the supery of this conceit, for it will teach that *aequales* are adequately opposed unto *equales*, and that *inequales* are *minores*, as well as *maiores*.

But unto this fifth argument, you have as you think, a most satisfying answer, p. 331^a, 337^b, which you inculcate very often elsewhere, p. 24, 63, 67, 68, 69, 71, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 185, 186, 209, 210, 247, 349, 350, 340. And it is, that though natural and necessary causes work always equilly and uniformly ad extremum virium, yet 'tis otherwise with free agents: and such are all moral habits in general; and consequently the habitual love of God in particular, which is as free (you say) as the will it self, in which 'tis seated.

Unto this I have two things to reply.

First, that any habits, either intellectual, or moral, are free Agents, is new and strange Philosophy: for hitherto it hath been a Proverb in the Schools, that *habitus agens ad modum naturae, ceteris paribus*. But having to do with such a most Adversary as our *Defendant* is, it will be necessary to transcribe some testimonies, otherwise I shall never stop his mouth; and I shall begin with *Scotus*, *Scripto Oxoniensi*, Lib. 1. dist. 17. q. 2. p. 248. *Operatio non elicitur libere, cujus principium activum est mere natural;* & *agens per modum naturae: sed habitus cum non sit formaliter voluntas, nec per consequens formaliter liber, si est principium activum, erit mere naturale; ergo operatio ejus non erit libera; & ita nullum velle erit liberum, si elicitur ab habitu, ut a reali principio activo.* *Scripto Parisi*, lib. 3. dist. 33. q. 1. p. 431. *Quilibet habitus, quantum est de se, inclinat per modum naturae, & virtus per modum naturae suae ad actum supernaturalem inclinat naturae*

liter seu habitus acquisitus ad actum sibi proportionatum, quoniam habitus non est liber, sed tantum voluntas; habitus enim ita inclinatur per modum naturae potentiam in obiectum, sicut gravitas ipsum grave deorsum. Unto Scotus I shall adde Suarez in his Metaphysicks. Atq; hinc colligitur generalis regula, &c. scilicet nihil obviare libertati, vel contingentiae actus seu affectus, quod aliqua causa naturali necessitate ad illum concurrat, dummodo aliqui cum indifferentia efficiatur, respectu cuius effectus denominetur liber. Ratio huius satis declarata est explicando fundamentum secundae sententiae: amplius v. v. illustrari potest non nullis exemplis, &c. Simile quid dici potest de influxu habitus concurrentis cum potentia libera; habitus enim ex se non habet indifferentiam, aut propriam libertatem, sed ex necessitate naturae operatur operante sua potentia. disp. 19. s. 3. n. 10. Unto Suarez I shall subjoin a Modern Scoist Pontius, who, Philos. Curs. part 3. disp. 13. q. 3. n. 35. page 552. expressly averreth that it is absurd to say that the habit of charity either infused or acquired is free. Probatur sequela, quia alias habitus charitatis de facto tam infusus, quam acquisitus, esset liber, quod est absurdum. But I might have spared the labour of quoting all these Authorities, for there is a place which I urged out of Scotus, that the Defendant transcribed at large, p. 340. b. that will strike the matter dead. The place in Scotus at large is this. Contra, possibile est illam animam habere summam gratiam, ergo summam fruitionem. Consequentia probatur; quia actus naturaliter elicited ab aliqua forma aequatur in perfectione illi forma; fruitio est actus supernaturalis, & pro consequens elicited a causa supernaturali, quae est gratia, & patet quod naturaliter, quia gratia non est formaliter libera. Ergo secundum quantitatem gratiae potest esse quantitas fruitionis.

Here you see Scotus expressly affirmeth, that the fruition of God, which he makes to be the actual love of God, is naturally elicited from grace, because grace is not formally free: and is not this openly contradictory unto our Defendants dictate? pag. 337. b. that all the habits of grace, whether in Christ, or in all other men, are naturally free and undetermined in their operations. And now can any man think, that the Defendant understood this passage in Scotus? for if he had, he would in all probability have concealed it, as much as he could, and not thus have transcribed it at large, seeing 'tis so apparently destructive to his own Opinion. But by this the Reader may see, with what profound judgment he quotes the School-men.

Unto these Authorities I shall annex a Reason, taken from the Defendants own notion of freedom, for he makes it to consist in indifference: and habits answerably to the degree of their intension and prevalence, take away and diminish the indifference of both contrariety and contradiction.

1. Of Contrariety: for by inclining to their own proper acts, they render away from all contrary acts: by how much the habit of temperance prevails in a man, by so much he obviates all acts of intemperance.

2. Of Contradiction: for they incline unto frequency of their acts, *Seco & tempore debitis*, and incline against sinful omission of their acts.

This Reason may, for the substance of it, be collected from what the School-m.n. usually say, to prove that free-will doth not consist in a habit. I shall at present content my self only with a Quotation of *Aquinas*, Prim^a part. q. 83. a. 2. Corp. *Habitus dicitur, secundum quos nos habemus ad passionis, vel ad actus bone, vel male, ut dicitur in 2. Ethic. Nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad concupiscentias. Per intemperantiam a tem male. Per scientiam etiam bene nos habemus ad actum intellectus, dum verum cognoscimus, per habitum autem contrarium, male. Librum autem arbitrium indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum, vel male; nullo impossibile est quod librum arbitrium sit habitus.* This *mutatis mutandis* will prove that no habit is formally free.

Secondly, Though habits be not formally free, yet I confess they are, in regard of their use and exercise, subject * unto the impery of the will. So that the will freely useth or not useth them. But this will no wayes advantage the *Defendant*: for all men are obliged to act the habit of love, as touching its inward acts, unto the highest, *ad extremum virium*. They are bound to love God with all their might and strength, therefore with all their habitus might and strength: and if their love fall short of this height, it is sinful and defective, which cannot without blasphemy be imagined of Christ, who was *impeccabilis*, and therefore fulfilled all righteousness; and therefore when he loved God, he loved him as much as he could: the all-fulness of his actual love, was for degrees answerable to the all-fulness of his habitus.

As for his Answer to my second Argument, drawn from the beatifical vision in Christ, that hath been sufficiently replied unto, in my examination of his distinction of Christs love of God, as he was *Viator*, and as he was *Conqueror*.

The third, and last Argument was fetcht from Christs impeccability. It was impossible for Christ to sin: but if the inward acts of his love of God, had been less intense at one time than at another, he had sinned; for he had broken that first and great Commandment, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy mind, with all thy might and strength*, Deut. 6. 5. Mar. 12. 37. Mark 12. 30. Luke 10. 27. In Answer unto this Argument, the *Defendant* insists from pag. 357. up to ad 520. of examining which, his own concession will save the labour: for he grants that if we speak of that eminent act of holy charity that is immediately terminated on God himself, we are bound to love God to the utmost height we can; and that he who doth not so love him, doth not love him so much as he deserves, or as much as men ought: and that therefore the acts of Christs love, as immediately terminated on God, were *always* at the height.

the height and one equal perfection; p. 77.

Now that Doctor Hammond is to be understood of this eminent act of holy charity, that is immediately terminated on God, I have clearly demonstrated: and unless the Defendant can answer my arguments, his accusation of my third argument, as guilty of that Sophisme which the Philosopher calleth *equivocation*, will passe but for an idle and ignorant calumny. The Defendants friends may be ready to say that I decline the examination of that which followeth, because 'tis unanswerable, but alas! there's no such matter: for that it is a very rotten, erroneous discourse, guilty of compliance with Popery, in a great measure, I shall shortly demonstrate in a distinct Treatise, if God grant me life, health and liberty. The reason then why at present I take no further notice of it, is, because not only the Stationer, but divers good friends have for several reasons much importuned me, to contract this Debate as much as I could, and I should now forthwith put a period to it, but that I am desirous to give the Reader in brief, a further taste of the inconsistencies with which this work of Doctor Creed is every where fraught.

First, p. 53, 54, 55, 56, 57. he concludes that a habit of divine love in Christ was not capable of further degrees because the act and exercise of it was capable of further degrees. If Christs love of God (in the act and exercise) was capable of Degrees, *not intense at one time than another, and had in its latitude, or amplitude several Degrees, one different from another secundum magis & minus, all them comprehended in* because issuing from) the habit of Divine Love, then this habitual love of God must be acknowledged all-full and perfect, alwayes (pray Master Defendant mark the word alwayes) in him so full, and so perfect as not to want, and so not to be capable of further degrees. But the Antecedent is true, and therefore also the Consequent. The evidence of the sequel is supposed, and grounded upon two very known Maxims; *Nihil est in effectu, quod non prius erat in causa*, and *Nihil dat quod non habet*. This is an argument silly and ridiculous beyond all comparison: for, *mutatis mutandis*, a man from it may argue against the growth of the habit of love in all the Saints that ever were, are, or shall be on the earth. If their love of God in this life, in the acts and exercise, was capable of Degrees, &c. then their habitual love of God, must be acknowledged all-full and perfect alwayes in them, so full and perfect as not to want and so not to be capable of further degrees. As for the two known Maxims, they will do him no service, unless he put in the word *semper*. *Nihil est in effectu, quod non erat prius semper in causa*. *Nihil dat quod non habet semper*. And if you adde the particle *semper* every flesh-man will soone discover their notorious falshood.

Secondly, p. 57. he hath another rare consequence: The Apostle saith that Christs being in the forme of God, though he thought it no robbery to be equal with God, yet made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the forme of a servant, and was made in the likeness of man, and being found

found in fashion as a man, be humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Crosse, wherefore God also hath exalted him. Therefore Christs love, viz. actual and inward, was more intense at one time than another: viz. at his agony and dying for us more intense, than in his suffering nakedness and hunger for us.

Thirdly, in p. 18, 19. of my Refutation of Doctor Hammonds 'Extravagant', I have these words. 'If this be your meaning, I must needs assume the boldness to tell you, that no such matter is visible unto me in any of the School-men. But perhaps you may mean such School-men, as such a Punny, as I never saw or heard of; however you cannot expect to lise, until you produce their testimonies: And I shall intreat you to alledge such as may be had in Pauls-Church-yard, or at least in the Library at Oxford. Now from this the Defendant concludes, p. 62. that I tell the world in effect, that I have all the School-men at my fingers end: nay just as many, no more, nor no less than are in Pauls-Church-yard, and the Library at Oxford.'

Fourthly, p. 83, 89. the Defendant saith, that I do not thoroughly understand a passage which I quote out of Raynaudus: My words are these. Raynaudus makes mention out of Gabriel Biel, of a distinction of love into *affection*, and *effective*: and what is this effective love, but the effects and expressions of love.

But now that he doth not take this to be a proper distribution of a Genus into its Species, appeareth by what he saith out of the same Author concerning the division, &c. Well, where lieth my mistake in these words? why plain it is (say you) from Raynaudus, that love effective is not only the outward sensible effects, and expressions, but also something else. For though it be true, that all the outward sensible effects, and expressions of love, be love effective, or in plain English the issues, and effects of love; yet the termes are not reciprocal, and convertible. For there are many effects of love, that are not sensible, and thus external. For instance good wishes, good prayers: are the effects of true love, so also are joy at the welfare of the beloved persons well-doing, and sorrow, and grief at his miscarriage; and yet they are not alwayes expressed, nor does any prudent man alwayes shew his joy or grief, or expresse his good wishes, thoughts and desires to him be most tenderly affects. Well, what of all this? Why saith the Defendant, the subject-matter of your discourse leads me necessarily to understand your interrogation of the outward sensible effects and expressions of love. Sir, you must put in the word only, or else you say nothing to the purpose: and if you put that in, what you say is very false. It is (I say) false that the subject-matter of my discourse, leads you necessarily to understand my interrogation, only of the outward sensible effects and expressions of love, and you can never prove it by

by any rule of argumentation. Indeed my designe is, to prove that love is not a *genus* unto the outward expressions of love; or that the outward expressions of love are not a species of love, and may not this be very well proved, though in my inter-rogation the effects and expressions of love be taken in a general sense, abstracting from both inward and outward expressions? may not that which is denied of effective love in general, that is all effects and expressions of love, be particularly denied of the outward and sensible expressions of love? Did you never hear of arguing a *genus ad speciem negativè*, grounded upon this Maximæ * *Quod convenit autem non convenit generi, Convenit etiam, aut non convenit speciei?* Is it not a good argument to conclude, that homo is not lapis, because nullum animal it lapis: because no effective love, no effects, and expressions of love are a species of love, will it not thence irrefragably follow, that no outward effects and expressions of love are a species of love?

Sanderfon. L3.
gic. p. 205.

Fifthly, I had said p. 10. of my Refutation, &c. I am very loth to enter into a Contest with so great a Critick touching the meaning of a word: And from this innocent and harmless passage, the Defendant concludes; That I contemptuously undervalue the Doctor's excellent Critical learning, That with me a Critick is but a whiffling Grammarian, an empty Pedagogue. p. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. That the Doctor in my opinion is some petty Grammarian, that knows the meaning of Musæ, and can tell how to decline Lapis, some great Critick forsooth, one fit to teach School-boys perhaps the meaning of a Greek or Latine Author: but for any skill in the Arts, and Reserches of Philosophy, he is a very Dunce, and not at all seen in the curious speculations and subtleties of School-learning. But what colour is there for these odious sequels in my words? Indeed they can be drawn from no Topick place, but that of the Defendants furious malice.

Sixthly, Whereas Dr. Hammond had said, that each of the expressions of Christs love of God, had an act of internal love of which they were so many proportionably different expressions: I answered, that if the Doctors meaning were, that these different expressions in regard of intension, must be proportioned exactly unto their inward respective acts of love, must be equal or parallel unto them; then I denied what he said, and called upon him for the proof of it. Now this my denial, which no rational man can or will deny, the Defendant himself most unnecessarily and idly confirms in 16. pages, p. 139, 140, &c. usque ad 155. and p. 150, 151, 152, 153, 154. he quotes the testimonies of many School-men for the confirmation hereof, and in the close of all this, he wonders

ders at my omission of these, and the like testimonies: And hereupon he concludes my ignorance in *School-men*. His words are these: And therefore I cannot chuse but wonder, that our *Refuter* should take no notice of these or the like passages, which to ordinary eyes would have seemed more to his advantage, than all that he has quoted in his Pamphlet from the *School-men*, and Suarez, and Scheibler to boot. But this and some other passages in his book, which offered themselves at first sight, make me not value his *School-learning* at the same rate and price he has put upon it in the Title-page of his mixture. But old Homer was blind, though he were the Prince of Poets; and our writer of *Practical*, and *Scholastical Divinity* sees not all things in those Doctors that may most serve for his advantage. Here by the way I deny, that I put such a rate and value upon my *School-learning*, in the Title-page of my Mixture, as the *Disputant* pretends: only I profess my self a *Well-wisher* unto *Scholastical Divinity*, desirous to revive the study thereof: but however there is not either in mine, or in his own discourse any foundation, (shall I say?) nay, not so much as any shadow, for either his wonder or censure. The particle therefore (therefore I cannot chuse but wonder) &c. plainly intimates, that what he saith, is a conclusion drawn from something foregoing. And for my part, I have most diligently sought for premises unto this conclusion, and can find none, and therefore must earnestly entreat the *Disputant*, to direct us where or what they are. In my fore-mentioned denial, I acted the part of a Respondent; and by what laws of disputation a Respondent, though a *School-man*, is obliged to heap up testimonies out of *School-men*; for the confirmation of every denial that he makes, especially if the proposition denied be apparently false, as this was, viz. That the outward expressions and the inward acts of love of God in Christ, must of necessity be of equal intension. And thus hoping that by the next we shall know why you fell into this fit of wondering, I pass on.

Seventhly, In the next place you tell us, that in men the inward affection commonly varies, according to the intension and remission of the outward expressions and effects: and in prosecution of this he spends, with a great deal of noise and triumph, about 16. pages more, p. 155, 156, &c. usque ad 171. But what of all this, Sir? is this any thing to the matter in hand? Can you from any thing in this tedious discourse inferre any thing against my Denial, viz. that the outward different expressions of love, must of necessity be proportioned exactly unto their inward acts of love? and if you cannot, (as undoubtedly you cannot,) to what end serves all that you say, but to waste time, pen, ink, and paper.

But you tell us often, that the Doctor is no wayes engaged to prove, that the inward acts of love, and the outward expressions, are of necessity equal in point of intension. But the contrary will

A taste of the absurd non sequiturs of Dr. Creed.

appear to every *Philosophy in Logic*, that will but peruse the *Dollers sequel*, as 'tis in him at large, for thus it runneth: and from hence I suppose it unavoidably consequent (pray Mr. Defendant mark the word *unavoidably*) that that act of internal love expressed by Christs dying for us was *superiour* to those former acts (supply in intention) which only express themselves in his power: and to the same person thus loved sincerely, did also love, and expressed that love more intensly at one time then at another: which was the very thing I said in another instance. Now choose unto this consequent what Antecedent you will, out of Dr. Hammonds words: either those that are immediately foregoing yet it being certain that each of these expressions had an act of internal love, of which they were so many proportionably different expressions; or those that preceede these. To this I subscribe: that such as the expression was, such was the act of inward love, of which that was an expression: and from it it is impossible for you or any other of Dr. Hammonds friends, to inferre this consequent. But you print p. 168. that you have done the feat your self. And now because you p. 168. (and it is your third charge) that the reason of the Dolls consequent is in you invisible; and that you shall never acknowledge his Inference legitimate, until you be driven thereto by eduring his Epithymone unto a Syllogisme: I shall hence, for your better satisfaction, performe it. If ordinarily there is, and must be a proportionable agreement in respect of intention and Remission, betwixt the inward acts of love, and the outward expressions, then that act of internal love expressed by Christs dying for us was *superiour* to those former acts which only express themselves in his power. If you say you inferre it necessarily, then the consequent is evidently false; you must then change in your Antecedent the word *ordinarily*, and in the room thereof put in the word *necessarily*, or else the consequent will not follow *unavoidably*.

First, for the major of this your Syllogisme, I demand concerning the Consequent, whether you inferre it from your Antecedent necessarily, or only probably; If you say only probably, then your consequent is none of Dr. Hammonds: for he supposeth that his followeth necessarily from what he hath said. Hence I suppose it (saith he) *unavoidably* consequent (that is, necessarily consequent) that that act of internal love expressed by his dying for us, was *superiour* to those former acts which only express themselves in his power. If you say you inferre it necessarily, then the consequent is evidently false; you must then change in your Antecedent the word *ordinarily*, and in the room thereof put in the word *necessarily*, or else the consequent will not follow *unavoidably*.

As for the assumption, that is evidently false too, if you supply what is to be supposed, for then thus it runs. Ordinarily there is, and must be in all men, and was in Christ, a proportionable agreement in respect of intention and remission, betwixt the inward acts of the love of God, and the outward expressions thereof. Now all men are by the commandement of God, which Christ fulfilled, obliged to love God, when they love him, with all their might, and consequently with all their habitual might. But by the opinion of both Dr. Hammond, and

and the Defendant, men are not bound in all expressions of their love of God, to performe them with all their might: and therefore tis false, very false, that there must be a proportionable agreement in respect of intension and remission betwixt the inward acts of the love of God, and the outward expressions thereof. And thus you see what a rare Syllogisme you have made, both the premises of which are manifestly false.

By what hath been said, the Reader may, (as discover the falshood of your Syllogisme, so also) frame a true Syllogisme, against the sequel of Dr. Hammond: and 'tis as followeth. If all the inward acts of Christ's love of God were with all his habitual might, then that act of his internal love, viz. of God, express'd by his dying for us, was not superiour, viz. in intension to those former acts, which only express'd themselves in his poverty: but all the inward acts of Christ's love of God, were with all his habitual might: therefore that act of his internal love of God, express'd by his dying for us, was not superiour, (viz. in intension) to those former acts, which only express'd themselves in his poverty. The Major is undeniable, and we may say as much of the Minor: because Christ fulfilled the commandment, which was to love God, with all his might and strength: Therefore with all his habitual might and strength: and this is confessed by your self touching the acts of love that are terminated unto God himself, of which I have proved Dr. Hammond only to be understood.

Eightly, Dr. Hammond saies that if it be proved that *Exsuperat*, according to the vulgar translation, signifieth Luke 22. 44. *Prolixius*; there will yet be place equally for his conclusion, viz. that one act of his eternal love of God was more intense then another. But if there be any place for such a conclusion, then thus the argument stands, Christ's prayer was longer then before; therefore his inward actual love of God was then more intense then before. But this sequel (as is evident unto every ordinary Reader) is very illogical and irrational, and yet the Defendant justifieth it, and in vindication of it spends twelve pages, p. 253, 254, &c. usq; ad 265. But how unsatisfying this his vindication is, will quickly appear, if he please to cast into Syllogisms what he takes to be argumentative therein. But this is a thing that he dares not so much as attempt, for then every Freshman will easily discover the foppery of his discourse. However in the meane time I shall give the utmost strength that I can unto Dr. Hammond's argument, as 'tis propounded by himself, and as 'tis reinforced by the Defendant. The conclusion to be proved is, that one inward act of Christ's love of God was more intense then another. Now this Dr. Hammond proves from the length of his prayer: for parallel to a greater length, there's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God in a longer prayer, compared with that which is shorter. All the proof that I can finde of this, reduced into forme, stands thus. Where there is a multiplication of Degrees, more de-

A taste of the grosse non-sequiturs of Dr. Creted.

gresses of the inward actual love of God, there's a greater intension of the inward actual love of God: but in a larger prayer of Christ, there was a greater multiplication of Degrees of love, &c. more degree of love, &c. then there was in a shorter: And therefore there was a greater intension, viz. of the actual inward love of God. The *Major* is confirmed from the nature of intension, which is nothing else but a multiplication of Degrees in the same subject, an addition of one Degree unto another.

And then the *Minor* is thus confirmed by Dr. Hammond, where there is a greater multiplication of the acts of love, viz. inward; where there are more acts of love, there is a greater multiplication of the degrees of love: for in every act of love, there was some degree of intension, but in a longer prayer of Christ there was a greater multiplication of the inward acts of love, more acts of love then there was in a shorter; and answerably there was a greater multiplication of the Degrees of love, more Degrees of love, &c.

My Answer unto this *Syllogisme* shall be, both unto the *Major* and the *Minor*.

First then, I answer unto the *Major*, by distinguishing concerning the multiplication of Degrees: It is either of the same numerical forme, or of some numerically different. Where there is a greater multiplication of degrees of the same numerical forme, there is a greater intension; but not where there is a greater multiplication of formes numerically different, for intension is an addition of Degree unto Degree in the same numerical forme. The *Major* then, if understood of the latter multiplication of degrees, is false: but if understood of the former is true. But then the *Minor*, if understood answerably of the same, will be false. And Dr. Hammond's prooffe of it will be most impertinent. For th: several inward acts of Christ's love of God, are formes numerically different, and therefore let them be multiplied never so much, this will conduce nothing unto the greater multiplication of Degrees, in one act of love then there is in another. So that from this it can never be inferred, that one inward act of love in Christ, was more intense then another. But Dr. Creted very stoutly and lastly affirmeth the contrary p. 256. I Reply and say, If the Degrees of his love are in number multiplied as the acts are, there must be a growth in their intensive perfection, and the last act, which has the greater number of Degrees in it, will be gradually more perfect then the former. Here you say that if the Degrees of Christ's love are in number multiplied as the acts are, there must be a growth in their intensive perfection, and withill you suppose, that the last act hath a greater number of degrees in it: and hereupon you conclude of it, that it will be gradually more perfect then the former. But, good Mr. Defendant, instead of saying and supposing, you should have proved what you say and suppose: but of such prooffe there is not in all that you say, any the least footsteps.

But

But be this how it will, plain it is, you say p. 257. that I do not reach the Doctor's meaning, and the force of his argument. I have made the most of his words that I could, but as for any hidden and invisible meanings, distinct from that which his words hold forth, I know not that I was obliged to search after it. And therefore I shall leave that unto the Defendant, who can see further into a *Mill-stone* than other Mortals.

But however, let us examine this profound meaning of Dr. Hammond's. The Doctor concludes and argues from the effect in the cause, thus, where the Zeale is true and real, and not personall and counterfeit, (as in Christ without doubt it was most true) there a multiplication of the outward acts of prayer, and a longer continuance in them, argues a greater inward affection, and true zeale. And for the truth of this assertion I appeal to the practice of the whole world.

Here if you supply what is to be supplied, touching the object of this inward affection, This assertion, which you obtrude with such a confidence, is apparently untrue. I say 'tis apparently untrue, that a multiplication of the outward acts of prayer, and a longer continuance in them, argues a greater ardency of inward affection to God, or love of him. And for the falshood of this assertion, I appeal to the bosomes of all experienced, either Ministers, or Christians, who can tell him that their inward love of God is frequently as intense, in their shorter; as it is in their longer prayers, and that the shortness of their prayers, many times doth not proceed from any abatement of their love of God, but from regard to the infirmities of such as joyn with them, and for diverse other reasons. Mr. Paul Bayne was esteem'd a very pious and devout man in his time, and 'tis said of him, that his prayer in his Family, was not usually above a quarter of an hour long: as having respect to the weaknes and infirmities of his Servants and Children; and he used to dissuade others from tediousness in that duty. I beleive the Defendant will not deny, but that a man may, in putting up the Lord's Prayer, have his actual love of God every way as high and intense, as in the longest prayer either of a man's own or anothers composition. But not to insist longer on other men, It is plaine of Christ, that his shortest prayers, his shortest ejaculations, did proceed from an actual love of God, every way as intense as the longest. And for the truth of this, I appeal unto the Commandement of God, that enjoyned Christ, and all other men, to love God with all their might and strength: therefore with all their habitual might and strength. Now however other men may transgresse this Commandement, Christ did not, could not; and therefore whenever Christ loved God actually, he loved him with all his habitual might and strength, *ad extremum virium*; and consequently one inward Act of his love of God, was not more intense than another.

Ninthly, p. 268. you accuse my Answer unto an Argument of Dr. Hammond's, as guilty of that fallacy, which is called *petitio principii*

A task upon the gross non sequiturs of Dr. Creed.

If this be not (say you) to evade *Χρὶςτιανισμὸν*, I know not what your great Master Aristotle means. But this is a most ridiculous and groundless eximination, for this, as every other fallacy, is a fault or defect in arguing, not in answering. It is (familiarly) call'd Master Scheibler's) *deceptio in syllogismo*. De Syllogismo, cap. 17. de 6^{to} art. 1^o, saith my great Master Aristotle, *Elenthus Sophisticus*. It hath alwaies been observed for a rule in disputing, that when the Respondent denies a sequel, and gives a reason for it, it is the Opponents part to refute the reason, and the Respondent is not obliged to confirm it. It is then a grosse and familiar to conclude me guilty of this fallacy, of *peritio principii*, because I do not confirm the reason, for which I deny Dr. Hammonds consequence. But, Sir, if you had not falsified it, by adding *must to may be*, it is a Proposition so plain and evident, as that it needs no confirmation, and can be denied by no rational man. Thus it stands, my reason is, because in all these inward acts of Christs love of God, (and we may say the same of the inward acts of other virtues and graces) there may be no gradual dissimilitude. Mark, Sir, the word *may be*, and then tell us whether there be any contradiction in this Proposition, in several inward acts of Christs love of God there ~~is~~ gradual dissimilitude; if there be, pray discover it, if there be not, then give me leave to conclude, that in the multiplied acts of Christs love of God, there may be no gradual dissimilitude. You say this is the controversy betwixt me and the Doctor. But your own conscience must needs convince you that this is a falsehood: for you your self state the controversy to be, whether one act of Christs love of God were actually more intense than another? and yet if I had said, that in the inward acts of Christs love of God, there could be no gradual dissimilitude; that I have proved by three reasons, unto which you have given but iotic answers: and these reasons I am not bound to repeat at every turn, for this would quickly swell my book to such a Volume as yours is.

Temblly, he hath a passage page 273. for which he hath not in my words the least foundation: And will not every man think that our Refuter was a man of great judgment and parts, and fit to quote Suarez against Dr. Hammond? But I rather think he was misguided by some Notes, and that he never consulted the Authors he quotes, but took them upon trust: otherwise it thinks it is impossible he should be so strangely deceived. But, pray Sir, wherein is the Refuter so strangely deceived in Suarez? why 'tis clear and evident by Suarez, though every act of Christ, in respect of the person that performed it, was of an infinite, and so of an equal intensive value, yet in respect of the moral goodness, that is intrinsically inherent in Christs actions, nothing hinders but that one in this respect may be better and more intensely perfect than another, as well as one grief and torment which he suffered was greater than another. And therefore (say you) the same Suarez, even in that very page and column, and in the section immediately preceding that passage that our Refuter has quoted, expressly says to this purpose. *Primum omnium salendum esse, opera Christi fuisse*

debet major quidem aliam quod multum refert ad quantitatem satisfactionis: cum denique quia inde fieret, non magis redemisse nos Christum per passionem, & mortem, quam per alios actus vite sue, quod est contra Evangelium, quae possint semper tribui redemptionem nostram, ad Rom. 3. 4. & 5. Gal. 3. ad Hebr. 2. 9, and 11.

In Answer.

First he propounds a Concession, the very passage quoted by the Defendant, and therein he grants, that Christs works were unequal in regard of their moral goodness, which was intrinsic and essential to them, really inherent in them: and in regard hereof one work might be better than another. Respondetur, primum omnium satendum esse opera Christi fuisse inaequalia in propria bonitate intrinseca, & essentiali, vel realiter inherente ipsi actui quia, ut dictum est, tota hac bonitas erat finita: poterat ergo esse major, & minor, & aliunde unum opus Christi erat melioris obiecti, quam aliud & unum intensius alio, & sic de aliis circumstantiis, ergo erant vel poterant esse inaequalia in hac bonitate.

But then in the next place he sheweth at large, quomodo sit aequalitas meriti, cum inaequali bonitate, as 'tis summed up in the margin; how an equality of merit or meritorious value, is consistent with the unequal goodness, that is really inherent in the actions them selves. Nihilominus addendum secundo est, quod id est opus Christi ex parte personae operantis fuisse infiniti valoris, quia licet bonitas, & aliae conditiones actus conferat inter dum ad hunc valorem, tamen quia haec dignitas infinite personae excolit hunc valorem ad perfectissimum ordinem, & usque ad infinitum gradum, ideo tollitur omnis alia proportio: illa enim persona, cum in omni genere infinita sit, eminetur continet omnia alia bona, & ideo confert actui, quicquid valoris omnes aliae circumstantiae conferre possint. Quo circa totum id, quod erat in opere Christi, ex parte ipsius actus, intelligendum est quasi materialiter se habere, personam vero esse quasi formam conferentem valorem, quae omnes illas actus aequaliter informat, & ideo omnibus confert infinitum, huius actus aequalem valorem. Exemplo explicari potest, si pecunia tali regni signo signata, tantum valeret, cuiuscumque esset materiae ratione figura.

And hereupon in the third place he inferres, that which I cited out of him. Hinc certio fit, plura opera Christi esse quidem extentiva plura merita, intensiva tamen non esse plus valoris in multis, quam in uno: ut si essent plures calores infiniti intensi, essent quidem plures, non tamen efficerent unum intensiorem & pari ratione, si in uno opere Christi quod successive per partes fiebat, partes cum toto comparemus, intensiva tantus valor erat in qualibet parte, sicut in toto opere, & in uno momento, sicut in longo tempore: quia forma id quid erat valor, tota erat in toto, & tota in singulis partibus.

And now let the most partial Reader review this discourse of Suarez, and then let them sit down and sadly consider, whether the Defendant doth understand Suarez; or if he does understand him, whether his conscience inform him not, that I was not a jot mistaken in mine allegation of him, and if it doth, then what conscience is there in his affirming that I was.

Eleventhly, p 330. the Defendant pretends a grant of mine that I never made. However, saith he, I observe that in your first Argument you right

by understand the Doctrine of the love of God, and take it here as he still does in the large sense, as it is all one with holy charity, or containing in its general notion the acts of all graces and virtues whatsoever, and therefore because now *consequenter eum*, I am rejoiced to tell you in your concession; You are, Sir, very quick sighted to observe that which never drops from my Pen, nor was ever in my thoughts. Pray Sir reflect once more upon my words; put them upon the Rack, and try your utmost skill in Logick, nay, call in what assistance you please; and if you can from them prove this pretended concession, then trample upon me with as much scorn as you please, and until this be done, I shall assume the boldness to tell you, that your pretence is a shameless untruth.

Twelfthly, p. 370. the Defendant hath two strange sequels from my words, which until he can justify I shall look upon as slanders. If in the state of Christ's humiliation, there was by special dispensation, as our Resurser grants, a restraint of his happiness or beatifical vision, he could not then see God so perfectly, and so perfectly enjoy him, as after his Glorification, when there was no restraint, and consequently his love could not be so ardent, so highly intense and perfect as afterwards, when now he sits at the right hand of God. Let the Reader but view the place quoted by the Defendant, p. 261 and add to it another, p. 346. wherein I more fully explicate my self; and then if he will judge impartially, he cannot but conclude the Defendant to be a most unworthy Calumniator. My words p. 261. are at large, as followeth. "It is not to be denied, but that by special dispensation there was some restraint of the influence of his happiness or beatifical vision, in the whole course of his humiliation, and particularly in the time of his doleful passion. Unto this joyne page 346. where the point is farther explicated. "Of this Heaven happiness in the soul of Christ, from the beatifical vision, there would always, without Gods miraculous restraint and prevention, have been even, as it were, connatural sequels. 1. A fulness of unspeakable, and unconceivable joy, solace, delight, pleasure and comfort in his soul. 2. A redundancy of glory from his soul unto his body. But by the special dispensation of God, the resultancy of the former was suspended and withheld in the time of his passion, and the latter the derivation of glory from his soul unto his body, was totally deferred until his exaltation.

Here I do not say, that there was a cessation, interruption, or abatement of the beatifical vision, but only a restraint of its influence, not upon his love of God, but upon the fulness of joy in his soul, in the time of his passion, and the redundancy of glory from his soul unto his body, in the whole time of his humiliation; excepting his transfiguration. Now from this the Defendant inferreth two Propositions, one in the neck of another, one immediately, and the other mediately.

1. "In his state of humiliation he could not see God so perfectly and so perfectly enjoy him, as after his Glorification, when there was no restraint. And.

And consequently, his love of God could not be so intense, so highly intense and perfect as a steward's, when now he sits at the right hand of God.

But now, if any should presume to ask for a reason of the consequence of these two Propositions, I must needs tell him that they are drawn from a Topick place; vvhich in the Defendant is vvonderfully skilful, *fallacia consequentis*. And in Ke. lerman's *Logic* p. 543, 544, there are amongst others especially, vvvarious sequels instanced in; that are of the same stamp vvith these of our Defendants. *Beatus sit in angulo, ergo erat plebs. Divus Gregorius edis casum. Ergo Diva Veronica salter.* I finde after vvards, p. 122. that from this very same Proposition of mine, he hath vvvo other like absurd and inconsequent inferences. His vvords are as follovveth, "If the inward act of Christs love vvve always at the utmost height, because this most intense love is a natural and necessary sequel of the beatificall vision, then it necessarily follovveth, if his love vvvee always thus intense, that then he always enjoyed the beatificall vision, the sole and necessary cause of such a love. For it is an undoubted maxime, That *posita causa fit effectus*. And if so, vvvhich shall we say to the Author of a discourse of Scholasticall Divinity vvith Practical, Henry James of Chesham? for sayes he not expressly, That it is not to be denied, but that by special dispensation, there vvvas some restraint of the influence of this happinesse or beatificall vision, in the vvhole course of his humiliation, and particularly in the time of his dolefull passion? And how if his fervour of love vvvee a natural issue of the beatificall vision, it vvill necessarily follovv, that as that his happinesse, and clear intuitive sight of the divine essence vvvas restrained, so the fervour of his love vvvas proportionably abated also. Here he drawes vvvo Propositions from my vvords.

1. That Christ did not always enjoy the beatificall vision.

2. That sometimes the fervour of his love of God was abated. Now both these inferences are very inconsequent. For

First, it stands the first, there vvvas some restraint of the influence of the beatificall vision in Christ. Therefore he did not always enjoy the beatificall vision, vvith as good Logick a man may conclude; that there vvvas no heat in the fire, Dem. 1. because God restrained its influence upon the bodies of those three Worthies. It is very strange, that this our great Schoolman should be so ignorant, as to confound the interruption or cessation of the beatificall vision, vvith the restraint of its influence: or to think the former a necessary sequel of the latter. Here by the vvay observe, that vvwhereas the Defendant p. 123. quotes a saying of Leo, vvvhich he saith is approved of by all Antiquity, that at the time of our Saviours passion, *Non dissolvit unguem sed subtraxit visionem*; It is to be understood vvvarily, that the beatificall vision vvvas vvwithdrawn only in regard of influence, and never in respect of existence; for that in had a perpetual being or existence in the soul of Christ is upon very good reasons affirmed by the generallitie of both Papiists and Protestants.

The

The second Inference is every way as inconsequent: for thus it stands. There was, by special dispensation, some restraint of the influence of his beatific vision: Therefore there was a restraint of the influence of it upon his love of God; so that the influence of his love was proportionable abated, as the influence of his beatific vision was restrained. Here is palpable fallacie, *ad dictum secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter*; the restraint of the influence of the beatific vision in Christ is particular, not universal. There was, I said, some restraint of the influence of this happiness, or beatific vision, &c. And I instanced in the particulars, upon which the restraint of this influence was, of which his love of God was none.

Thirteenthly, p. 378, 379, 380, 381. the *Defendant* chargeth me "to make use of an objection, that not only opposes Dr. Hammond in this particular, but equally overthrowes the whole Christian Religion, that destroys the doctrine of the ever-blessed Trinitie the Godhead, and satisfaction of our Saviour, and the immortality of the soul, and hell-fire, and eternal torments, that blowvs up as well the office as the maintenance of Ministers, and opens a broad gap for the Socinian and Anabaptist, the Ranters and Atheists, to come and invade all that is sacred among us. This is a terrible and most horrid accusation, and if the *Defendants* cannot make it good, he may (to use his own words, p. 11.) justlie be derided for the most monstrous Railer and Sycophant, or any worse thing that Christianitie abominates. But he pretends that he hath made it good." And now that the Reader may see that I do you no wrong, I shall for the present suppose that the Doctor had borrowed this Exposition from *Bellarmino*, and consider the force of your Argument against him, upon this supposition. I reduce it thus into forme, that the strength of it may appear. Whosoever makes use of any Argument or Tenent, or Exposition of Scripture, that is to be found in *Bellarmino* or other Popish Writers, is guilty of a compliance with Papists. But Dr. Hammond makes use of this very Exposition which is to be found in *Bellarmino*. Ergo, Dr. Ham-

mond is guilty of compliance with Papists. That you do me intolerable wrong the Reader may see, if he will but peruse my words. "Your Reader hath just reason to expect a confirmation of what you say."

"Because this very Answer is the shift of Papists in several controversies between them and us, *Bellarmino* Tom. 2. *De Monarchia* lib. 2. cap. 1. Tom. 4. *de ommissione gratiae, et statu peccati* lib. 1. cap. 12. &c." And was it not fit that you should acquaint us, what those cogent reasons were that necessitated you unto this compliance with Papists? Now from these words of mine, the Father of Lyes cannot inferre that proposition, which you most injuriously Father upon me, viz. "that whosoever make use of any argument, or Tenent, or exposition of Scripture, that is to be found in *Bellarmino* or other Popish Writers, is guilty of compliance with Papists. But the *Defendant* will exort this proposition from my words whether I will or no." What say you Sir, is not this your present argument? Can you give us any other proposition, to reduce your Socritical Enthymeme into a Syllogisme? If you cannot, pray tell me then, what strength is in your Major, and what answer you will give to it, when a Socinian, or Anabaptist, or Ranters, or Atheists, shall presse you with it, &c. And so he raves on most furiously, as if he were mad, not only in this but the next page.

But to discover to every ordinary Reader, that he doth most grossely and palpably calumniate me; I shall reduce my words into two Syllogismes, and yet leave out that proposition, which he so maliciously imputes unto me. The pro-

position to be proved is, that it was fit that Dr. H. should acquaint his Readers what those cogent Reasons were that necessitated him unto the answer that he gave, and thus 'tis proved. If this answer were guilty of compliance, With Fa-
pists then it was fit that Dr. H. should acquaint us, what cogent reasons nec-
essitated him hereunto. But this answer is guilty of compliance with Papists.

And therefore it was fit that Dr. Hammond should acquaint us, what cogent reasons necessitated him hereunto.

For confirmation of the Minor the particle *this*, (this compliance) is carried
eth us to the foregoing words, and from them we may draw this Syllogisme.

That answer which is the first of Papists in several controversies between
them and us, is guilty of compliance with Papists.

But this answer is the first of Papists, in several controversies betwixt
them and us.

And therefore 'tis guilty of compliance with Papist. And now my words
being thus analysed, the Reader cannot but be astonished, a *Sublar*, a *Man* of
wits, and parts, a *Minister*, a *Christian*, should so forget himself, as to lay at my
doores a proposition, that hath no bottom at all in my words, but is his own
meere invention, that I say not forger, and I believe he can hardly tell which
to wonder at most, the malice or ignorance that is in this crimination of
the Defendant.

But I forget my selfe, thus to go beyond the limits that I have pre-
fixed to my selfe, in the examination of this *Polonie*. And indeed I
believe 'tis very irksome unto the Reader, as well as unto
my self, to take in such a *Dunghil* of *Non-sequiturs* as this work is, and there-
fore I shall trouble the Reader with the Examination of but one Argument
more, and that I am willing to insist a little upon, because it seems at first
blush to be of more force and weight than the rest. And besides, 'tis concerning
that which is the the *Tetrachordon*, the matter in controversy, 'tis drawn from
Luke 2. 52. And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in grace with God and
man. This Argument the Defendant prosecutes from page 188, *usque ad* 206.
243, 344, 369, 370, 572-573. &c. *usque ad* 596. where he heaps up the re-
stimonies of a world of Commentators, whereof many contradict one ano-
ther, to no purpose, that I know, but to distract the unvary and careless Read-
er, and to work in him a belief, that our Defendant is a man of vast reading.

The Argument for better distinction take may be branched into two parts.

First, he argueth from Christs increase in wisdom, he increased in wisdom, there-
fore he increased also in the inward actual love of God.

The reason of the consequence is, because love of necessity bears propor-
tion unto knowledge, p. 60 370, 431, 512, 524. Unto this, I shall return several
Answers.

The first is, in the first part of my mixture, p. 249. The increase in wisdom
here spoken of, is only extensive, not intensive, and from an extensive increase
in wisdom, can never be inferred an intensive increase, in the inward acts of the
love of God. Yea, but saith our Defendant, p. 291. how you will reconcile this
with what follows, I will leave any man to judge: and so will I too, provided that
he be a man that understands any thing of an Argument, for such a one will
quickly perceive, that there is nothing in that which followeth, either in my
own words, or else in those quoted out of Amis, which doth in the least degree
contradict what I say.

Secondly, it is only an increase in the knowledge of the formal object of the
love of God, viz. his infinite goodness in himself, that will argue and inferre an
increase in the inward actual love of God. Now that Christ increased in know-
ledge

ledge of the infinite goodness of God in himself; *Sr. Luke* never averred, neither will any man aver it, but an *Arrian* or *Socinian*.

The Defendant objects often against me, that I confesse, that the fulness of Christs knowledge of the state of humsation, was consistent with the necessity of divine things. But, pray *Sir*, what were those diverse things he knew not as man? I say, the day of judgment, the barrenness of the fig-tree, &c. p. 249. But do I, or any Scholman, or any Orthodox Protestant say, that Necessity of the formal object of divine love; Gods infinite goodness in himself, was consistent with the fulness of his knowledge. If not, all that you say is a meer extravagance.

Thirdly, the increase in wisdom that *Luke* speaks of, is by none of all the Authors that you alledge; applied unto the beatifical vision; and if Christ did not increase in his beatifical vision, then neither in his beatifick love, and consequently not in his love at all: for there was in him at the same time only one inward actual love of God, for accidentis numero tantum diversa non p'sunt esse simul in eodem subiecto: as for the acts of the infused habit of divine love, distinct from the beatifick love, they (as I have already shew'd) are proved by *Vissuez* to be but a figure, and as much may be said of that love of complacency, that acquisite and experimental love, which you ascribe unto Christ, p. 257. for you make it to arise from Christs acquisite or experimental knowledge. And that *Vissuez* proves to be impossible, because the act of the love of God, seeing 'tis of a supernatural order, ought to arise from a supernatural knowledge of God, and such is not that which is acquisite and experimental. *Ex scientia acquisita nullum actum amoris circa Deum esse posse, manifestum est, quia actus charitatis cum sit supernaturalis ordinis, oriri debet ex notitia Dei supernaturali, in rebus primæ Philosophiæ tom. 1. d. 10. 7. c. 3. p. 790.*

As for the Reason whereby your consequence is confirmed, our love must of necessity be proportioned unto our knowledge; It is, I suppose, to be understood of a gradual proportion, in point of degree, and yet even so it needs limitation.

For 'tis evident that it failes, if it be understood universally of all men. For, First, the knowledge of many surmounts the love of virtuous objects; but this is a defect of proportion, and therefore I shall waive it.

But secondly, mens love many times doth, and lawfully may, exceed their knowledge in point of degree. A mans love of Philosophy, may be more intense then his skill in it. *Aquinas* 112. q. 27. a. 2. the Question there debated is, *Utrum cognitio sit causa amoris*; the second Objection against the Affirmative is as followeth, *Eiusdem rationis videtur esse, quod aliquid incognitum ametur, et quod aliquid amatur plusquam cognoscatur*; sed aliqua amantur plusquam cognoscuntur, sicut Deus, qui in hoc vita preit per seipsum amari, non autem per seipsum cognosci: ergo cognitio non est causa amoris. Unto this Objection *Aquinas* returns the following answer, *Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris*. *Cognitio enim ad rationem pertinet, cuius est diffingere e inter ea que secundum rem sunt conjuncta, et componere quoddammodo ea que sunt diversa, unum alteri comparandi, et id ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur, quod homo cognoscit singillatim quicquid est in re, sicut patet, et virtutes et proprietates. Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quæ inspicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit, quod res præ se sit apprehensa, sicut patet. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus ametur, quam cognoscatur; quia preit perfectè amari etiam non perfectè cognoscatur: sicut maxime patet in scientiâ, quæ aliqui amant proprie, et quam singularem cognitionem quem de eis habent, puta quod sciant Rhetoricam esse scientiam, nec quam homo preit persuadere, et hoc in Rhetorica amant. Et similiter est dicendum circa amorem Dei.* From the last words *Irenæus* the Cause is de

Animæ. 2. f. 6. p. 151. hath this inference, *hæc fit, ut Deus non videt cogitationes, vehementer tamen cum aliquando eveniunt.* Against this doctrine of *Aquinas* *Præmissæ* propound, an Objection, and returns unto it an Answer, both which I shall insert, *Dices, Tunc igitur voluntas fertur in incognita, cum earum finis supra cognitionem.* *Ris. Diss. antecedit, fertur in incognita, non quia finis, sed quia in incognita cognitione distincta & perfecta, emendo. Et cum ratione distincta, et simpliciter non cognoscit singula, quæ sunt objecti, tamen impliciter ea cognoscit, solummodo illud esse appetibile. Res clara est exemplis. Plures enim ardorem appetunt ferriatæ, &c. Rationem, Philosophiam, &c. Est, ut sciamus quiescere in pace, sed solum quod ducit ad modum distringendi, &c. Hinc etiam fit ut aliquando levis cognitio animi, aut propensio aliquot objecti intensum exerceat appetitum, eo quod magna si convenientia talis objecti cum appetitu, licet illius notitia sit confusa in intellectu.*

And thus you see this proposition, our love of necessity must beare proportion unto our knowledge, is not true, if it be understood universally of all men, and so 'tis understood by the *Defendant*, for he speaks not only of Christ, but of us: Our love of necessity, must beare proportion to our knowledge, &c. But now concerning Christ we shall readily grant, that his love of God was always for degree proportioned unto his knowledge of God, his knowledge of God's infinite goodness in himself. But now what he increased in this knowledge, *Luke* doth not ascribe, neither have you proved that he is to be understood hereof, by any of the *School*, as in *Paul's Church-yard*, or in the *Library*. Or by any other of the Authorities, of which you make in the paper furnished, such a vain-glorious, but impertinent matter.

The second branch of the argument is taken from Christ's increase in grace, be increased in grace, therefore in the love of God, at least actual: for love is a grace of God.

But is it that grace of God, which *Luke* speaks of, let the Reader but look upon the words following, *Wage* *Θυγατρις* *δεδωκεν*, with God and men, and the addition of them, (which addition our *Defendant* for the most part leaves out, in his quotation of the words) will soon inform him, that *Luke* speaketh not of the grace of the Spirit in Christ, either actual or habitual, but of the grace of God's favour towards him: and in our Translation, it is rendered in favour. Now in God's favour he did not increase, either actual or habitual effects, fruits and signes thereof, and from that our *Defendant* never concludes a gradual increase in the inward acts of Christ's love of God.

The *Defendant* quotes me *p. 189369.* as saying, that Christ did actually and really grow in the inward acts of wisdom and grace, as he did in stature. Indeed I said that he did as really increase in wisdom as he did in stature. But that he did as really increase in grace as in stature, I never said, I never thought, for I well knew that his increase in stature was proper, whereas he increased in favour or grace with God, only improperly and metaphorically, in regard of the effects and tokens thereof. That Christ then increased in the inward acts of grace, as really as he did in stature, are none of my words, but foisted in by the *Defendant*, with what truth and ingenuity, I leave unto the Reader to judge.

And now I shall dismiss the Reader, and take my leave of the *Defendant* too. The Gentleman is pleased (*p. 43.*) to promise, that if I manage my Reply in a *Scholastical* way, then he will keep close unto our *Text*. And say this indeed would be very acceptable, as unto my self, so also unto all judicious Readers. But when I consider how in this pretended Defence, he hath all a long vapored, bragged, railed, and raved, like a *Drum*, I have little reason to expect from him any such thing as a fair, candid, regular, and orderly disputation. However he shall have my hearty prayers unto God, to cure him of this his raging distemper, that he may be as *Paul* (*1 Cor. 13. 25.*) *Doth* (so the words of truth and strength)

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